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SUMMARY
The importance of engineering craft skills is often believed to be 
under threat because of the advent of flexible manufacturing 
systems (FMS), on important component of the so-called ’’automatic 
factory”. FMS is thought by many analyses, such as the ’’labour 
process” and ”regulationist” schools, to possess the capability to 
incorporate, and thus render obsolete, machinists' skills. Other 
writers, notably those proposing manufacturing strategies of 
"flexible specialisation”, argue that craft skills must be combined 
with technological changes to respond to more fragmented product 
markets. A study of fifteen British FMSs confirms the continued 
role of traditional engineering craft skills in commissioning and 
operation of such systems. As the "flexible specialisation" thesis 
finds, responses to demands for overall manufacturing control, 
productivity and production adaptability tend to be better where 
FMS operators have greater autonomy and discretion in system 
intervention. Yet managerial FMS job design preferences still tend 
to restrict operator intervention in programming and determination 
of working methods, while permitting flexibility between FMS 
servicing and ancillary functions. How far managers acknowledge 
requirements for relaxation of labour controls, however, depends 
upon wider institutional cultures and labour relations policies, 
and the types of flexibility and benefit sought from FMS.
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction
i) The context: the "automatic factory”
The metalworking engineering industry world-wide is now in a state 
of flux after several decades of relative stability. Markets are 
becoming more fragmented; to serve this changing pattern of demand 
a growing variety of increasingly differentiated products are 
manufactured, each produced in smaller batches; numbers employed 
are falling rapidly both relatively and absolutely in most 
industrialised countries, while simultaneously manufacturing 
industry appears to be an increasingly unattractive working 
environment for workers with remaining needed skills.
In recent years there has been a growing belief in many managerial, 
engineering and sociological circles that technological changes 
based upon microprocessors and information technology in production 
processes, and generically known as advanced manufacturing 
technology (AMT), contain the promise of solving these problems.
The key to this lies in the levels of reprogrammability, 
integration, and technical flexibility available from computerised 
manufacturing technologies at a decreasing cost. The advantage of 
lower purchase prices is further enhanced by such equipment's 
potential for savings in directly productive labour. Some writers 
now talk confidently about the realisation of this dream in phrases 
such as the "automatic" or "unmanned" factory, or the "factory of 
the future" [1], This is visualised as being akin to the high
1
levels of automation characteristic of continuous flow process 
industries such as oil refining, where production is largely 
independent of direct human intervention. In the "automatic
■tr
factory” production can be quickly switched between batches of 
different components which are made only in the quantities the 
market demands. After the design of any component little human 
intervention is required to aid its rapid progress through the 
shopfloor to final assembly. Parts are transported through the 
factory by mechanised transfer devices, such as automatically 
guided vehicles (AGVs), to various locations, at which fabrication, 
assembly and other operations are carried out under computer 
instruction. The sequence of operations and performance of the 
entire process is predetermined by overall computer control.
Studies of plants into which AMT has been introduced [2] find a 
number of differences between AMT and previous technologies. These 
include a higher capital investment per employee, fewer workers 
responsible for each part of the production process, a greater 
sensitivity of output quality and quantity to human knowledge, and 
more interdependence of work activities. Malfunctions - where and 
when they occur - tend to be more costly and to spread more rapidly 
throughout the production process because of this interdependence 
and capital intensity.
Yet how will the nature of the remaining production workers' jobs 
change as a result of the introduction of these new advanced 
technologies, and what factors will determine the shape of those
2
jobs? In recent years considerable speculation has taken place 
about the likely content and future evolution of such jobs under 
changing economic and technological conditions. At issue firstly 
are the skills that will be exercised. Specifically: how far these 
consist of new areas of expertise; and to what extent traditional 
craft skills are still required (if at all)? And, leading on from 
these points: are divisions of labour allowing the possibility for 
skill retention on the shopfloor likely to materialise in 
actuality; and what are the main factors enabling, or restricting, 
the formation of work roles with such features? These are the 
questions to be answered in this thesis.
ii) The crisis in engineering: Fordism and beyond
To understand the tentative nature of existing discussions of the 
current changes in the employment and skill structures of the 
engineering industry it is necessary to appreciate the wider 
background to the present period of industrial transition. Until 
recently the dominant ethos was that of mass production or 
"Fordism”, which found its apex in Henry Ford’s manufacturing 
methods for the Model T Ford. These innovatory techniques were 
characterised by particular forms of market structure, product 
profile, production processes, and labour inputs. Markets were 
large and undifferentiated, products standardised, production 
processes used highly mechanised but inflexible dedicated machinery 
to exploit the possibilities of huge economies of scale, and the 
labour necessary to tend this machinery was largely semi-skilled.
3
requiring minimal training to perform a very limited repertoire of 
tasks.
In their pure form the diffusion of these techniques was not as 
extensive as has sometimes subsequently been claimed, even in so- 
called mass markets. For instance, Tolliday and Zeitlin (1986, p6) 
note the extent to which British volume car producers, not least 
because of the smaller size of the domestic market, pursued 
variations on these techniques involving a greater variety of 
models and more adaptable capital machinery. Writers associated 
with "dualist” theories, such as Berger, Piore and Sabel, argue 
that mass production only triumphed to a limited extent over 
sometimes very specialised forms of batch production in most 
industrial nations, and even in the USA [3]. This was partly 
because the giant mass production industries presupposed the 
parallel existence of many small firms making a wide range of 
specialised capital machinery by means of general purpose machine 
tools (Piore and Sabel 198*1, p26). More importantly, in view of our 
subject matter in this thesis, the diverse and relatively limited 
markets for most capital goods (such as equipment for mining, 
construction and power generation) rarely permitted the diffusion 
of Fordist techniques in detailed form.
The continued dependency of engineering on small-batch production 
can be illustrated by various estimates which reveal that the 
majority of discrete products manufactured in the engineering 
industry are produced in such a form. The Production Engineering
4
Research Association (1969) reports that 86% of metal parts by 
number are machined in batches of less than one thousand; while 
another estimate (Anon 1980) suggests that as many as three 
quarters of all components are produced in a batch size lower than 
fifty. And a recent National Economic Development Office (NEDO) 
report believes that 70% of UK engineering output consists of 
medium-volume, medium-variety batch production (NEDO Advanced 
Manufacturing Systems Group 1985* p2) [4]. This form of manufacture 
brings about a need for frequent and lengthy changeovers of 
machines to produce new batches of components, resulting in a large 
proportion of available time being spent in skilled setting-up of 
machine tools rather than actually machining parts.
Fordist techniques did however appear in outline form. It was to 
the Fordist "model" that managements even in small-batch 
engineering aspired, pursuing standardisation, mechanisation, 
rationalisation and sub-division of tasks as far as was possible. 
Other Fordist conventions that have percolated widely into 
engineering include: justifications for the purchase of new 
machines in terms of labour cost savings; and an emphasis on 
intensification of production through reducing the time taken to 
perform individual operations. So the use of the term Fordism as a 
characterisation of the era of mass production and consumption, and 
of the ruling orthodoxy among production techniques, is accurate 
enough.
As we said at the beginning of this chapter, since the mid-'sixties
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the Fordist system has been pitched into deepening crisis by 
adjustments in each of the factors that previously gave it its 
stability. Firstly, increasing fragmentation has affected both 
consumer and capital good markets. One report summarises this 
trend, and the implications for manufacturers’ responses, thus:
Although conventional batch production is 
relatively inefficient, difficult to control and 
expensive, it is likely to grow as a percentage of 
total engineering manufacture. This is because both 
industrial and consumer markets increasingly demand 
a wider choice of products and a higher rate of 
product development and innovation. Thus the 
traditional response by companies to increasing 
competition, that is to maximise volume and 
minimise variety in order to reduce conventional 
production costs, may no longer be an adequate 
option. (NEDO. Advanced Manufacturing Systems Group
1984. P2).
Secondly, the products to be manufactured are themselves becoming 
more differentiated, variegated and complex as a result of these 
market changes, resource scarcities and a tendency toward the 
elimination of fitting and assembly labour. The Machine Tool Task 
Force (1980b, pp 28-29) study identifies trends towards the use of 
a wider range of materials, the design of more complex single parts 
to replace multi-part assemblies (which must therefore be machined
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to tighter tolerances), and a higher proportion of thin and light 
components which will be more difficult to machine because of their 
lack of structural strength. These developments require that 
production processes should be able to cope with improved 
accuracies and a wider universe of machining demands [5]*
To these problems must be added an increasing resistance by labour 
to accept the highly prescribed and sub-divided labour processes 
resulting from the application of Ford’s principles. To minimise 
high labour turnover and training costs managements have also had 
to consider ways in which to improve worker motivation in order to 
retain expertise. So we see that conditions of economic recession, 
resource scarcity, and changes in social expectations have caused 
the development of more competitive, constricted and rapidly 
changing markets more subject to customer influence. The features 
of these are said to include shorter production runs, lead and 
resetting times, and perhaps more flexible labour also. All of 
these factors call into question the continued appropriateness of 
dedicated production equipment. Thus in the automobile industry 
traditional high volume transfer lines are becoming increasingly 
inappropriate as volumes decline while markets dictate more regular 
modifications to designs (Abernathy 1978).
If Fordism is in crisis, and increasing flexibility of labour and 
of production are now the watchwords, how are these goals to be 
achieved? Moreover, can they be achieved within a framework still 
basically compatible with Fordism? Two influential schools of
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thought which believe they can, advanced by writers at opposing 
ends of the political spectrum, agree in according a central role 
to recent changes in available production technologies in this.
Influential policy-making managerial and engineering authorities, 
such as the National Economic Development Council’s Advanced 
Manufacturing Systems Group, have argued that the inherent 
flexibility in microprocessor technologies enables:
a series of technological solutions to what have so 
far been considered to be organisational, 
managerial and business problems. (NEDO. Advanced 
Manufacturing Systems Group 1984, p2).
These novel technical characteristics are believed to extend the 
benefits of Fordist economies of scale (such as high machine 
utilisation, rapid throughput times and low levels of work in 
progress) to mid-volume, mid-variety batch machining, while finally 
overcoming the disadvantage of lengthy and expensive changeover 
times between the manufacture of different products.
Further, the incorporation into software databases of the human 
skills hitherto necessary to cope with the variety of small-batch 
work will lead to the "automatic factory" (Slautterback and Werther 
1984). On the political Left some (but by no means all) of the 
"regulationist" theorists proposing the transformation of Fordism 
into a form of industrial structure they term "neo-Fordism" also
see these technologies as critical in allowing the extension to 
small-batch engineering of Fordist forms of labour input and 
structures of control.
One of the problems with the concept of neo-Fordism is the 
definitional uncertainty with which the term has been employed by 
different writers to denote changes in (variously) labour 
utilisation, production methods, markets and industrial structure. 
As far as we can ascertain, the term "neo-Fordism" was originally 
used in the first of these senses by the French Marxist Palloix 
(1976). For Palloix, neo-Fordism seems to consist of no more than 
the attempt to reorganise workers’ task structures on assembly 
lines by means of job enrichment. Thus he sees neo-Fordism as an 
essentially conspiratorial and "purely formal attempt to abolish 
the collective worker" while still maintaining the Fordist system 
of control; merely a more refined method of exploitation and 
control over a basically unchanged labour process (cf. also 
Brighton Labour Process Group 1977)*
In Palloixfs account automation, by which he means most 
specifically the development of continuously-fed multi-machine 
systems, causes a polarisation of skills and results in the 
operator becoming the unskilled "minder" of several machines. Kelly 
(1978, 1982b) expands upon this latter development, interpreting it 
in terms of a capitalist need for the intensification of labour. 
Kelly stresses the need for work roles to be enlarged if the 
remaining "operators" of semi-automatic machinery are to be fully
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employed. In this context the adoption of greater labour 
flexibility than was the case under Taylorism and classical Fordism 
is necessary as technological developments reduce the need for 
direct human attention to machinery.
Another French Marxist, Aglietta (1979). develops Palloixfs 
approach, albeit rather inconsistently. Aglietta (1979. PP 122-130) 
follows Palloix in defining neo-Fordism as a combination of the 
"automation” of control over production and the recomposition of 
work roles. Later, however, Aglietta claims that the real 
significance of neo-Fordism lies in the extension of these 
techniques into new industries and services previously impervious 
for technological reasons to the diffusion of Fordist forms of 
organisation in order to resolve what he sees as a crisis of the 
accumulation of capital (Aglietta 1979. PP 162-169).
Blackburn et al (1985. PP 104-106) have attempted to synthesize the 
above themes to produce a definition of neo-Fordism having three 
main features. Firstly, there are the above-mentioned technological 
developments enabling a weakening of "the link between 
mechanisation and scale". Secondly, organisational (or labour 
utilisation) changes favour the adoption of multi-task occupational 
roles. Both of these factors are said to be dependent upon 
informational changes, which enable many of the supervisory and 
decision-making roles within the production process to be assumed 
by new computer-based infrastructures rather than a extensive 
hierarchy of indirect personnel; as was the case in Fordist
10
production processes. Thus control of labour is built into semi­
automatic equipment, and is now enabled by technical rather than 
hierarchical means.
Like Aglietta, Blackburn et al wish to emphasise the relevance of 
this emergent neo-Fordism for new sectors of the economy such as 
small-batch engineering, which they consider to be in transition 
from a craft to a neo-Fordist labour process. Unlike the French 
Marxists, however, they argue that the need to utilise the 
increasingly capital-intensive production technology efficiently 
makes the employment of skilled workers desirable (Blackburn et al
1985. pl^5)* Also, they see neo-Fordism as constituting a 
qualitative break with Fordism.
Another, rather different, interpretation of neo-Fordism to those 
above is offered by Sabel (1982), who refers to it in the context 
of forms of adjustment to changing market conditions on the part of 
industries hitherto organised on a Fordist basis. An advantage of 
Sabel's approach is its stress on the role of specific management 
policies and strategies for accomodation to changed markets in 
which particular firms and sub-sectors of industry may use means 
other than the exploitation of more flexible technology. Hayes and 
Wheelwright (1979. pl38) illustrate this choice with the following 
example:
For a given product structure, a company whose
competitive emphasis is on quality or new product
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development would choose a much more flexible 
production operation than would a competitor who 
has the same product structure but who follows a 
cost-minimizing strategy.
In some senses these different sets of objectives are mutually 
incompatible and demonstrate what Abernathy’s (1978) study of the 
automobile industry referred to as the "productivity dilemma". This 
argues that incremental increases in manufacturing process 
efficiency, and thus of productivity, presuppose a reduced 
competitive emphasis on major innovation of new products to respond 
to changes in market demand. Developing this approach, Piore and 
Sabel (1984) propose two possible responses to the dilemma in which 
firms find themselves. They suggest that such firms will be forced 
to choose between two strategies. Firstly, they could preserve 
volume production techniques by attempting to extend penetration 
into new global areas in order to recreate a mass market on a new 
basis. Alternatively they could adopt more flexible production 
strategies in terms of their use of labour and technology to 
accommodate to and exploit these market changes [6]. Piore and 
Sabel call this latter policy "flexible specialisation".
Flexible specialisation is based upon the use of adaptable, general 
purpose machinery combined with the expertise of skilled craft- 
trained workers, who are granted considerable autonomy and 
discretion. It also demands a close harmony between manufacturing 
capabilities and marketing strategy, to permit rapid switching of
12
production in line with market demands [7]. "Flexibility” is 
measured according to this ability to allow more rapid changeovers 
between products. Historical evidence (Sabel and Zeitlin 1985) 
suggests that recently developed versatile production technologies 
are not an essential ingredient of flexible specialisation.
However, the ability to pursue a strategy of flexible 
specialisation is considerably enhanced by the development of 
production technologies which allow the advantages of mechanisation 
at lower scales of production and employing a greater degree of 
flexibility than previously possible.
The consequences for labour of flexible specialisation, as 
interpreted by Piore and Sabel, has recently come under attack from 
radical critics. Shaiken et al (1986) find little evidence of the 
development of flexible specialisation in case-studied companies 
that might have been regarded as propitious for such a strategy. 
Instead they argue that the application of flexible production 
technologies has enabled the compatibility of managerial goals of 
incorporating product design changes and increasing management 
control over labour. Increased worker flexibility reflects the 
intensification of labour through the agglomeration of semi­
skilled, mostly machine-paced, tasks rather than a return to craft 
autonomy. Thus, they conclude, market structure has very limited 
implications for the organisation of work; and the current 
restructuring of production is making batch manufacture "more like 
mass- than craft-production.” (Shaiken et al 1986, pl8l).
13
Some commentators on the left have recently gone even further to 
equate flexible specialisation with neo-Fordism (Murray 1985* 
followed by Gough 1986). Murray does this by adopting a remarkably 
loose definition of flexible specialisation, which owes little to 
Piore and Sabel. Indeed, for Murray, flexible specialisation 
appears to be interchangeable with Aglietta and Palloix's 
conceptions of neo-Fordism. Murray and Gough thus argue that 
flexible specialisation is little more than a modification of 
Fordist methods of labour control enabled mainly by technological 
changes, which are seen as increasing exploitation and deskilling. 
On this view, what is called flexible specialisation by Piore and 
Sabel is compatible with the manufacture of non-standardised 
products using low skilled labour. It is argued in this thesis that 
this might be possible within a neo-Fordist strategy, but it is 
certainly not flexible specialisation.
Most of these interpretations of neo-Fordism contain conceptual 
difficulties which reduce their usefulness as theoretical 
frameworks. There is a tendency to undervalue the importance of 
particular management manufacturing and marketing strategies at the 
micro- level, which will affect the manner in which labour and 
technologies are deployed. Secondly, the idea of neo-Fordism tends 
to conflate the use of the concept of "control" in two senses. New 
computerised technologies are believed to enable tighter control 
over the production process while allowing greater production 
flexibility. From this it is thought to follow that tighter control 
of labour in detail ensues, which is assumed to be entirely
14
compatible in turn with greater labour flexibility in such systems.
Against the first difficulty it can be argued that these varieties 
of "regulationist" approach overlook the manner in which eventual 
operating arrangements and organisation of labour in a given 
advanced manufacturing system are decided. Arrangements are 
conditioned both by particular and varying production objectives 
(which affect the dimensions of technical flexibility that may be 
sought) and by pre-existing labour control policies (which affect 
the dimensions of labour flexibility sought and achieved).
We wish to argue instead that the relationship between control of 
the production process and control of labour, and between measures 
of technical flexibility and labour flexibility, is by no means as 
straightforward or technically-determined as the neo-Fordist 
approach would suggest. It is agreed that the technical flexibility 
of computerised manufacturing systems can be interpreted ultimately 
as affording greater management control over production. However, 
it is unclear whether the achievement of greater control can be 
extended equally to labour. It seems possible, as some commentators 
have already suggested, that the exploitation of the potential for 
production flexibility of automated manufacturing systems is likely 
to require compromises between the needs for management control of 
labour as against the delegation of workgroup autonomy to optimise 
operations (Senker and Beesley 1986; Susman and Chase 1986). In 
other words, is it the case that the manufacturing flexibility 
implied by advanced production systems requires a loosening of
15
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control over labour?
ili) Background to the study
A considerable body of literature has been produced in recent years 
(discussed in Chapter Six) on the labour implications of the 
relatively numerous examples of two generations of stand-alone 
computerised machine tools, known respectively as numerically 
controlled (NC) and computer numerically controlled (CNC). This 
interest derives in large part from Braverman's (197*0 seminal 
Marxist work on the labour process Labour and Monopoly Capital, in 
which NC is cited as a prime illustration of his theories of 
deskilling of craft workers, and the removal by managers of their 
control over the labour process. The debate engendered by this work 
(discussed further in Chapter Four) is indeed important as a 
precursor to themes that will be raised again in discussion of the 
"automatic factory". Also, Aglietta (1979# pl25) and Palloix (1976, 
PP 5*J“56), use their interpretation of the labour process 
surrounding NC as principal items of evidence in their theory of a 
transition to neo-Fordism.
For writers such as these French Marxists, however, the increase in 
machine, pacing and deskilling of machinists they attribute to NC is 
merely the prelude to what will happen under more advanced forms of 
mechanisation involving linked machine systems. A further empirical 
study of stand-alone computer-controlled machine tools was 
considered of little use, therefore, on the grounds that this
16
technology does not necessarily involve the more sophisticated 
automatic transfer of parts and control of several operations 
implicit in the much-heralded "automatic factory" concept, and that 
the labour effects of NC and CNC were by now fairly well known (see 
Chapter Six).
Much of this earlier research demonstrates the continuing 
importance of many traditional craft skills with numerically 
controlled machining (Jones 1982; Sorge et al 1983 inter alia). 
Significantly, though, this research (largely of necessity) remains 
agnostic in its conclusions regarding whether this craft role would 
diminish with the development of more advanced forms of 
computerised automation. This study therefore investigates the 
research questions raised in the above sections by reference to 
applications of a major component of the technologies subsumed 
under the rubric of the "automatic factory".
A reading of the above research suggested three preliminary working 
hypotheses. Firstly, it was thought that the possibilities for 
workers, their organisations, and designers to influence the skill 
requirements for, and work organisation surrounding, such systems 
can be identified. Secondly, it was believed that the reasons why 
such possibilities have remained untried in Britain are 
institutional and political, as opposed to technical. Finally, it 
was hypothesised that the most advanced forms of automation, at 
present in formative phases, will be more susceptible to attempts 
to adopt skill-maximising forms of work organisation [8].
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The most advanced machining technology operational to date in the 
small-batch engineering sector is the so-called flexible 
manufacturing system (FMS). This incorporates both the additional 
transfer and control functions of the kind proposed in the 
"automatic factory" (see Chapter Two for a full definition of FMS) 
[9]. There is now a considerable literature on FMS, as Senker 
(1985, p37) also notes, but this has overwhelmingly been of a 
technical or normative nature. Because of a lack of such 
installations until the very recent past, in-depth empirical case 
studies of labour roles in such systems were almost non-existent at 
the time this research project commenced. A notable exception was 
the work of Blumberg and Gerwin (1981), which referred mainly to 
relatively early (and unreliable) FMSs in the USA. There was no 
parallel coverage of the sprinkling of British systems existent in 
1983 other than sporadic, rather superficial, and often exaggerated 
or inaccurate, articles in managerial and technical journals [10]. 
FMS was therefore felt to be the most appropriate test case to 
establish the veracity of existing theories of changes in labour 
roles resulting from current upheavals in technology and industrial 
structure.
iv) Overview of the thesis
The thesis is presented in the following manner. Chapter Two gives 
our definition of a flexible manufacturing system and provides the 
historical background to the development and diffusion of the 
technology in Britain. It also shows how the fifteen FMSs studied
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for this project relate to the total population of such systems, 
and explains how the fieldwork for the research was conducted.
In Chapter Three it is argued that there are three main dimensions 
to "automation" in production techniques: mechanisation of the 
transformation, transfer and control processes. Of these, control 
mechanisation now possesses the greatest potential for future 
development. Its importance in this thesis lies in the fact that 
control mechanisation is now believed to enable the encapsulation 
of much of the expertise and ingenuity formerly the monopoly of 
human skills.
Chapter Four therefore investigates the question of the 
relationship between mechanisation and skills. It proposes that 
some previous influential approaches to this question, notably the 
"labour process" and what I call the "technicist" views, have been 
flawed because they have ignored or underestimated the fact that 
outcomes for skill changes depend on the division of labour. A 
distinction is thus drawn between technically-determined tasks and 
work roles, which depend on additional factors. The 
"sociotechnical" approach acknowledges this distinction, but 
simplifies the process whereby expanded work roles can be adopted 
to mere managerial choice. I argue that, although managerial 
preferences for labour control are probably the most important 
determinant of work roles, product and labour market factors, and 
inherent task variability are also independent influences. The 
other main theme in Chapter Four is the importance of workers'
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tacit skills, which are difficult to automate out of the production 
process. Their often unacknowledged but vital role allows 
production workers to continue to exercise a measure of control 
over the production process, even despite mechanisation.
Applying the above grounding to the machining labour process in the 
small-batch engineering industry, Chapter Five discusses the nature 
of craft skills and control. The reasons for its persistence, 
despite management attempts to rationalise production, are 
discussed with reference to the factors affecting work roles 
introduced above. It is argued in conclusion that, using 
conventional technology and functional organisational methods, 
managers have been unable to achieve the high degree of production 
flexibility required without sacrificing goals of productivity and 
control over the manufacturing process (which has been surrendered 
in part to craft workers).
Chapter Six looks firstly at the recent organisational changes 
(group technology) and technical innovations (numerical control), 
which jointly form the basis for flexible manufacturing systems, 
that have been proposed to harmonise these three manufacturing 
aims. It finds that, applied singly, these innovations have not 
been able to achieve the three objectives simultaneously. In 
particular, fragmenting product markets have resulted in more 
complex production demands and increasing variety. These factors, 
coupled with the complexity of the new innovations, have often 
resulted in more local desion-making by machinists, and hence
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higher levels of skill and control. Secondly, FMS is located within 
a continued concern to enhance productivity, manufacturing 
flexibility and control simultaneously in batch engineering. The 
preliminary evidence indicates that a choice must still be 
exercised between which of these benefits are sought. Also, the 
meaning of "flexibility” in FMS is found to be extremely varied and 
ambiguous, and seven definitions uncovered of the term are given.
Chapter Seven applies the earlier discussion on tasks, skills and 
work roles to the FMSs studied. The types and levels of skill are 
discussed from an analysis of those remaining human task functions. 
Much of the confusion in the literature about the effect of FMS on 
required skills is ascribed to the fact that expertise appropriate 
to process, mass- and craft production can all be found in some 
measure. The continued role of traditional engineering craft skills 
is confirmed. Finally, an overview is given of the changes in work 
roles that occurred at the systems studied. Horizontal labour 
flexibility and vertical mobility between FMS servicing and 
ancillary functions (such as inspection, loading and toolsetting) 
are found to be common, but there is less evidence of flexibility 
between crafts (most notably between production and maintenance) or 
of operator intervention in managerial functions, above all in 
programming and determination of working methods.
Chapter Eight investigates the reasons for what seems to be the 
relatively restricted incidence of extensive flexibility, and the 
virtual absence of autonomous workgroups (as proposed by
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sociotechnical authors). It shows that job design in FMS is 
normally treated as a belated adjunct to technical criteria, and 
informed by wider institutional cultures and labour relations 
policies. Given the nature and size of most of the plants visited 
adopting FMS, work organisation policies tend on the one hand to 
have the effect of undermining craft control by favouring a 
restriction of operator intervention in methods decisions and 
promoting a higher degree of task flexibility than elsewhere on the 
shopfloor. On the other hand, a tendency to permit FMS operators 
some genuine autonomy in system intervention and performance of 
their tasks is noted. These latter features are more pronounced at 
greenfield sites and smaller plants less hidebound by previous 
demarcations. A case study of one plant, where explicit plans for 
an autonomous workgroup were reversed as a result of the adoption 
of more tradional labour management policies, underlines the 
influence exerted by plant-level institutional constraints.
Chapter Nine tackles the question raised by the debate between 
"regulationist" and "flexible specialisation" approaches of 
whether, and how far, different frameworks for job design and 
managerial labour control preferences can affect the achievement of 
overall manufacturing control, productivity and production 
adaptability. It also questions the extent to which a role for 
labour autonomy is recognised by management. It finds firstly that 
the paucity of managerial expertise in FMS process technology, 
coupled with a reliance on informal, on-the-job learning, in 
Britain has resulted in the tacit knowledge of FMS operators
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becoming crucial in making FMS operational. This is confirmed by an 
almost ubiquitous management preference for the recruitment of 
craft-trained machinists as FMS operators, whose tacit skills and 
ability to intervene autonomously to solve production problems 
allows them a measure of control in the manufacturing process. I 
produce evidence to show that managers are sometimes still 
unwilling to cede such control, especially in system programming. 
The price of such reluctance, however, is often reduced 
productivity and restrictions on the ability to switch between 
products and expand the part spectrum machined.
The main conclusion is that in many respects there is still a vital 
role for traditional machining craft skills in flexible 
manufacturing systems, as FMS is still basically a technology for 
machining (albeit a sophisticated one). The expertise conferred, 
particularly by the tacit element of these skills, has allowed 
craft workers to exert a pivotal role in the commissioning and 
operation of FMS. Craft skills allow the absorption of unfamiliar 
technology with minimal organisational dislocation and enhance the 
ability of FMS to respond to new market requirements, and greater 
production flexibility above all. This disproves the "deskilling” 
claims of many "regulationist" analyses.
Despite the importance of craft skill, managerial labour control 
preferences, informed by pre-existing institutional and relations 
contexts, tend in many plants to discourage the exercise of craft 
autonomy. Work roles adopted are indeed more flexible, but normally
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limit operators1 intervention in determining production methods. 
Advocates of sociotechnical job redesign and "flexible 
specialisation” have failed to take these contextual constraints 
sufficiently into account. Experience suggests that de facto 
relaxation of labour controls occurs to the extent that craft 
skills are proved necessary to solve machining problems and enhance 
the production capabilities of the technology.
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CHAPTER TWO: Flexible manufacturing systems: the research project
i) Defining FMS
This study follows the definition of FMS adopted by the British 
Government’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in its guidance 
notes for companies applying for financial support for the 
introduction of such technology [1]. This definition is appropriate 
as it has been very influential in Britain, mainly because most of 
the FMSs installed to date have benefited from grant aid awarded 
subject to conformity with the DTI’s definition of FMS. The FMSs 
studied in the research were among these beneficiaries. The 
Department of Trade and Industry (1984) states that:
Flexible manufacturing is a system which combines 
microelectronics and mechanical engineering to 
bring economies of scale to batch work. A central 
on-line computer controls the machine tools and 
other work stations and the transfer of components 
and tooling. The computer also provides monitoring 
and information control. This combination of 
flexibility and overall control makes possible the 
production of a wide range of products in small 
numbers.
Although we talk of flexible manufacturing systems in practice we 
shall be referring exclusively to flexible machining systems.
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Because of the current paucity of non-machining applications (and 
the fact that only machining systems were studied in the project 
fieldwork) we shall continue to use the term "flexible 
manufacturing system" to refer to machining systems in the present 
context [2].
As a technical concept FMS is based upon the combination of the 
organisation of parts into families of like components (as proposed 
by group technology (GT)), the numerical control of machining, and 
the overall computer control of activities introduced by direct 
numerical control (DNC) (see Chapter Six). Some restriction on the 
range of parts which can be machined on an FMS is necessary in 
order to try to balance the levels of utilisation of the work 
stations in the system, and to put a practical limit on the number, 
variety and complexity of hardware and software features required. 
An FMS is therefore used to machine families of parts of similar 
size and shape requiring the same sorts of machining operations 
(Ross 1981, pp 32-33)« An example of this would be a set of valves, 
each of slightly different sizes but all requiring the same kinds 
of consecutive milling, drilling and boring operations.
In at least two ways FMS comprises a technical advance on the 
separate application of group technology and stand-alone 
numerically controlled machine tools. Firstly, unlike most GT 
applications, materials transfer to different machines within the 
system boundaries is mechanised, usually being performed by means 
of robot, automatic guided vehicle or rail-guided truck. Setting-up
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for an entire sequence of operations only needs to be performed 
once initially, and can now be carried out remotely from the 
machine tools. This relieves the need for repeated manual setting 
of parts on each individual machine in FMS, thus eliminating a 
major cause of machine downtime. Secondly, all the major elements 
within an FMS (that is, the transport system, machine tools and 
overall system management) are now subject to direct numerical 
control from a supervisory (or "host") computer. This enhanced 
control facilitates the improved central coordination of workflow, 
enabling more accurate information on, and better control of, 
components in the system, improved utilisation of technical 
resources, and faster throughput. A typical FMS is illustrated in 
Figure 1 overleaf.
ii) The development of FMS in Britain
Machining systems described and commercially operated as FMS first 
appeared in the United States in the late 'sixties to early 
'seventies, although none of these were really flexible in terms of 
numbers of different parts processable (Harrington 1973; Ingersoll 
Engineers 1982). Yet it was a British maker of tobacco-processing 
machinery which in fact pioneered the flexible manufacturing 
concept in the late 'sixties. The firm, Molins Ltd., dubbed this 
first FMS System 2b [3]. This system, as explained by one of its 
principal designers, Theo Williamson (1968b), was intended to 
automate and integrate the machining and control aspects of a group 


















































components with a minimum of human intervention. The overall 
manufacturing concept and technical design of the system were 
indeed revolutionary for batch manufacture at this time, the 
system's ability to break with the past helped by the fact that the 
firm was aided by government finance and able to install System 24 
in a new building.
Unfortunately for Molins, System 24 as a whole was too premature to 
meet with commercial success, although a number of the machine 
tools were marketed (Anon 1969). Conceived of prior to the advent 
of the microelectronic era, the relatively unwieldy and primitive 
generation of computer power available in the 'sixties meant that 
software and controls were unequal to the extent of the tasks 
expected of them. Molins' ideas were too advanced for the 
technology available at the time, and the firm subsequently 
abandoned machine tool manufacture. Combined with the problem of a 
lack of sufficient finance to further the system's development it 
only ever ran on a demonstration basis (Jablonowski 1985b, pl31)
m .
The manufacturing concept embodied by System 24 did provide the 
foundations on which further development of FMS could take place. 
The immediate initiative for innovation moved abroad however. In 
some advanced countries, notably Japan, this was encouraged by 
coordinated programmes of targetted state aid aimed at developing 
the ability to automate batch production (Hutchinson 1979)- 
Domestic FMS impetus after the demise of System 24 only resumed in
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the mid-'seventies when the Labour Government's Department of 
Industry, concerned at lagging British performance in the field, 
set up a body known as the Automated Small Batch Production (ASP) 
Committee. As had also been the case with System 24, this 
originally comprised a series of research projects to develop 
redesigned machine tools capable of running with considerably 
reduced need for human attention (National Engineering Laboratory 
1978).
This programme was viewed initially as a large scale mechanical 
engineering concept (although with relatively limited state 
funding). However, it became rapidly clear during these initial 
projects that these aims were too grandiose in scope for the 
smaller-scale potential applications more likely to be useful in 
British batch engineering. Also it was discovered that a 
considerable number of the features deemed necessary to facilitate 
the level of machine tool automation proposed already existed in a 
workable form (Anon 1981a) The ASP Committee's emphasis therefore 
changed to reduced scale projects with individual firms applying 
for help. For the later projects it was intended that to qualify 
for government grant aid in developing FMS each scheme financed 
must represent an increasing level of automation in some way on its 
predecessors (Hollingum 1980).
Little hard evidence can be found to suggest that the ASP 
initiative encapsulated a coherent national manufacturing strategy. 
At one point the Committee's chairperson was reported as
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recommending the use of "very high technology to manufacture low 
technology products cheaper than the rest of the world" (Anon 
1982a, p3*0 - in other words, offsetting the disadvantage of high 
British labour costs (in comparison with newly-industrialising 
countries) against low unit capital costs enabled by overall 
economies of scale. This, of course, is classic FordismI Yet the 
above statement is not matched by the reality of subsequent 
developments. As we shall see, few British FMSs fit this criterion 
(although penetration of FMSs into manufacture of low-value goods 
such as gears and valves has recently begun to accelerate). This is 
in large part due to the untargetted nature of government finance 
towards any specific industrial sectors. Instead, FMS developments 
by firms in Britain have by and large assumed the form of ad hoc 
responses to immediate commercial pressures (Hatvany (ed.) 1983; 
Jones and Scott 1985. PP 150-151)*
The most recent direct form of government aid has centred upon a 
FMS support grant scheme enabling firms to recover up to half of 
the costs of a feasibility study for, and a third of the costs of, 
installation of an FMS (Department of Trade and Industry 1984; Sims 
1983)t although this was only initiated as late as mid-1982. An 
overall allocation of £35 million was fixed and was rapidly 
exhausted, being replaced with an Advanced Manufacturing Technology 
Scheme of somewhat wider scope (Kochan 1984b; Sim 1984). Other 
forms of financial support common to other purchases of capital 
equipment may of course also be available.
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Sim (1984, pl36) states that thirty three FMS installations 
received government aid under the FMS Support Scheme, sixteen of 
which were in companies employing less than five hundred workers. 
Since the exhaustion of government aid a slower but still steady 
trickle of new schemes not receiving grants have been announced and 
installed. In total, evidence from this research suggests that some 
fifty-two projects conforming to the DTI’s definition of FMS have 
been completed or are still being installed at the time of writing. 
This means that Britain is now becoming a comparatively large user 
of FMS in European terms, being on a par roughly with West Germany 
(Kochan 1984b, 1985). The above figures probably slightly 
understate the full position owing to the likelihood of some 
planned projects remaining unreported in the technical and trade 
press. The FMSs can be classified according to industrial sector as 
shown in Table 1 overleaf.
Table 1 shows that FMSs are in fact being applied in extremely 
heterogeneous manufacturing applications, encompassing relatively 
high volume consumer products (like automotive parts), very low 
volume production such as die-making, and much in between. Capes 
(1985). in a thumbnail sketch of the pattern of FMS adoption in 
Britain, also finds such a diversity [6]. He interprets this in 
terms of existing flexible manufacturing systems having been 
installed for two conflicting reasons. Either firms have wished to 
maximise productivity by using FMS to produce a very narrow variety 
of parts; or it has been intended to produce a large number of 
dissimilar parts in sets.
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TABLE 1
BRITISH FMS PROJECTS PLANNED OR OPERATIONAL AS OF JUNE 1987 [5]
SECTOR NO. OF COS, PROJECTS
1) Aerospace 5 10
2) Machine tools 6 8
3) Diesel engines 4 6
4) Earthmoving equipment and vehicles 4 6
5) Compressors, pumps, valves
unaccounted for elsewhere 4 4
6) Misc. automotive 3 4
7) Automotive components 3 4
8) Misc. capital goods equipment
and industrial machinery 3 3
9) Mining machinery 2 2
10) Tool and die manufacture 2 2
11) Marine engineering 1 1
12) Domestic heating appliances 1 1
13) Turbines and electrical
power generation equipment _1 _1
TOTALS 39 52
Thus we must distinguish between two broad concepts of FMS 
application in Britain. On one hand, FMS can be conceived of as one 
method whereby manufacturers in industries still producing at 
relatively high - albeit reduced - volumes (such as motor vehicles) 
may respond to more differentiated and competitive product markets. 
Some commentators, such as Goldhar and Jelinek (1985), have argued
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(perhaps rather overoptimistically) that, for such applications, 
FMSs are now capable of superceding the "productivity dilemma” 
identified by Abernathy (1978) in the car industry whereby 
increasing efficiency is directly related to less innovation. As 
Senker (1984, pl35) notes, for relatively large volume producers 
(such as automotive manufacturers) FMSs may be more expensive than 
the traditional transfer lines but the superior productivity and 
flexibility of FMS may well result in their becoming more economic 
for such applications, especially as FMS can be turned to 
alternative uses if necessary rather than simply scrapped. Edgehill 
and Davies (1985) demonstrate further that many "flexible" 
manufacturing systems world-wide do not possess the ability to 
process wide part varieties at low volumes (as the DTI definition 
of FMS would suggest). Rather, these FMSs merely modify the main 
features of the Fordist type of automation (through producing in 
reduced, but still high, batch sizes, for example).
Alternatively it is possible to view FMS in the sense suggested by 
the DTI definition. This sense suggests the use of FMS in capital 
goods manufacture to more economically produce wide varieties of 
components (subject to their formation into part families) in low 
batch sizes, or even in sets, as and when required.
FMS - in common with other forms of AMT (Anon 1986; Harrison and 
Dunn 1986; Ingersoll Engineers 1985) ’ is not yet particularly 
widespread in Britain when set against its total potential for 
applications in batch engineering, despite the now discontinued
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state financial help (see also Kochan 1984a; Pullin 1986a). Indeed, 
investment in such systems is now claimed to be falling (Anon 
1986). It also seems likely that the relatively high diffusion of 
FMS in sectors such as automobiles, machine tools and aerospace has 
been speeded by factors inapplicable to other parts of batch 
engineering. In the automotive sector and its component suppliers 
(classified under headings 3). 4), 6), and 7) In Table 1) take-up 
of FMS and other automated equipment has been encouraged by some of 
the most competitive product markets. For machine tool producers, 
as Kochan (1984a) says, the conditions for investing in FMS are 
"somewhat false", being also concerned with demonstrating ability 
as an FMS supplier to potential customers. And availability of the 
necessary finance appears to be a lesser problem in the highly 
capital-intensive aerospace industry than in other sectors.
A recent survey (Pullin 1986b) of advanced manufacturing technology 
in batch engineering companies provided a number of reasons for 
this lack of diffusion, which are reinforced by the evidence of 
other studies. All of these reasons have been applied specifically 
to the lack of FMS take-up [7]« The principal reason given for a 
lack of adoption of such technologies is the belief that products 
manufactured are too varied to permit the feasibility of 
automation. A second reason is a lack of finance, sometimes coupled 
with an inability to financially justify the necessary investment 
according to a payback period of typically two to three years [8]. 
Thirdly, it is suggested that firms’ awareness of advanced 
manufacturing technology is not matched in many companies by
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possession of the necessary in-house expertise and skills to 
install and operate such equipment. This is further exacerbated by 
insufficient planning, development and training time for new 
innovations being made available by senior management (see later 
chapters for an applied discussion of these points). Particularly 
in the case of FMS, its complexity is a significant barrier to more 
widespread adoption, especially if firms have little or no prior 
experience of CNC, or unhappy histories with previous computerised 
technologies [9]. One recent claim also suggests that machine tool 
suppliers are now becoming disenchanted with offering FMS projects 
due to their complexity (Holland 1986b).
It is of course quite possible that companies may well be 
addressing their production problems with different and less 
complex solutions than FMS. Indeed several management commentators 
claim that many FMS benefits are in fact obtainable by changes in 
the preparatory organisation of the manufacturing methods rather 
than the technology itself (Dempsey 1983; Small 1983)* Bessant and 
Hayward (1986b) even conclude that in some cases the same benefits 
that firms hoped to obtain by adopting FMS technology would have 
been realisable by the alternative (but less popular) route of 
reorganising production methods.
iii) The case studies
Fifteen plants (Plants A-R) were studied in the research. It is 
therefore believed that this survey is the most comprehensive to
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date on social aspects of British flexible manufacturing systems. 
These fifteen plants were owned by the same number of companies, 
which represent a sub-set of the thirty-nine companies believed to 
have introduced FMS in Britain (see Table 1). The plants concerned 
were located throughout the country between the south coast and 
Tayside and variously employed from twenty to one thousand direct 
workers, although medium to large companies were more common in the 
study. Importantly a considerable variety of capital equipment 
(such as mining machinery) and consumer goods (such as passenger 
car gears) were manufactured in the companies studied, thus giving 
access to several different industries, product markets, and 
manufacturing requirements, and hence to examples of both the 
concepts of FMS application identified above. These plants include 
the locations of eighteen out of the estimated current total of 
fifty-two FMSs. Thirteen of the FMSs studied were running on a 
production basis by the time of final interview. This study 
includes a wide cross-section of British FMSs in terms of size, 
cost, machining application and complexity.
The sample possesses the added advantage that nearly half of the 
companies known to be introducing FMS during the period of 
fieldwork were studied. Thus the results obtained can be 
justifiably considered as representative of the limited total 
population of FMSs in Britain. Further details of the FMSs studied 
can be found in Appendix One. At least one firm each in sectors 1)-
9), and the firm in sector 11), in Table 1 is included in the 
study. We are therefore in an authoritative position to discern the
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development of any national trends in patterns of labour 
utilisation and skill requirements in British FMSs.
A number of other plants first approached (Plants T-Z) proved 
unsuitable for the study. This was because - despite first reports 
(and often press claims too) - the machining systems being 
introduced did not fit the DTI definition of FMS; or because plans 
to introduce FMS were abandoned (Plant T) during the fieldwork 
period, or subject to reconsideration at the time of interview 
(Plant X). These plants did however provide some very useful 
information on aspects of the usage of stand-alone CNC machine 
tools, which both complements and contrasts with research published 
elsewhere. Details of these plants are included in Appendix Two. 
Separate reference to some of the information from these plants has 
been also included in the body of the thesis where appropriate for 
comparative purposes with the more integrated FMS systems 
described.
Although the decision to introduce FMS makes these plants atypical 
of small-batch engineering as a whole the wider context in which 
these investment decisions occurred is probably quite typical. In 
nearly all cases the companies concerned had suffered falls in 
output and sales of varying degrees of severity as a result of the 
recession in British manufacturing industry of the early 'eighties. 
Several of the worst-hit plants were those of the mature industries 
in the survey, most of which were also located in regions badly 
affected by recession, such as the Midlands, North-West and
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Scotland. In response to the recession the plants concerned had cut 
capacity and costs, notably through attacking staffing levels. In 
those firms outside the aerospace sector (which had suffered 
proportionately least) it was far from uncommon for the workforce 
to have been roughly halved in the approximate period 1981-85 with 
direct labour bearing the brunt of these losses. In these firms 
adoption of FMS was part of a continuing process of readjustment to 
changing manufacturing conditions and modernisation of technique 
and working methods.
Only two of the FMS companies studied had expanded their business 
during the recession and taken on workers (although it may be 
significant that both these companies were planning to use FMS to 
reduce their need to hire additional labour to accommodate 
increased demand). These were Plants G and K, which - perhaps also 
significantly - were two of the three small companies visited 
installing FMS.
FMS development on greenfield sites only occurred in the cases of 
Plants P and R. These two plants were the earliest and most 
experimental systems in the study, and greenfield sites had been 
chosen mainly because of these factors. The possibility of 
installing FMS on separate sites was discussed at a number of other 
plants (such as Plants A, B, and C), but ultimately rejected on the 
grounds that it was thought important to acclimatise the workforce 
as a whole to major technological innovation.
39
iv) Methodology
In common with much previous research In this subject area a 
qualitative methodology was adopted (Buchanan and Boddy 1983; 
Buchanan 1985* Cockbum 1983* Jones 1982, 1985b; Pendleton 1986; 
Wilkinson 1983; Wilson 1985 inter alia) [10]. Data was gathered by 
means of semi-structured interviews with relevant personnel in the 
case study plants [11].
Fieldwork was carried out between March 1984 and August 1985* 
Access was gained via production engineers or middle managers 
responsible for the introduction of the plants’ FMSs, who were 
interviewed in the first instance [12], In most cases, two visits 
were paid to each of the plants, during which time interviewees 
were broadened to encompass FMS technical, supervisory and 
operating personnel as available. A small number of the FMSs 
exhibiting particularly interesting features for the purposes of 
the research were selected for more detailed study. These were 
visited at least three times. Interviews with further personnel 
were conducted in these cases. The longitudinal element in many of 
the case studies was valuable as labour policies were frequently 
found to be subject to amendment between visits.
The approach developed in this research project assumes that the 
skills required, and forms of work organisation adopted, in 
flexible manufacturing systems can only be understood in terms of 
the wider context of employment, market, and production
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developments within the plants concerned. Firstly, therefore, 
information was sought from production engineers and managers on 
the history, markets, and particular production problems of the 
company; and such background details as the numbers employed, 
relationship with the parent company (if appropriate), and details 
of the sites on which the company operates. These sources were 
supplemented by literature published by the companies concerned, 
and relevant press articles.
Specifically as regards FMS, production engineers and managers were 
asked about reasons for adoption; benefits intended; problems 
encountered in development and use; anticipated and actual effects 
on skills and working practices; procedures for programming, 
tooling, fixturing, inspection, supervision and maintenance; 
criteria for the recruitment and selection of FMS personnel; and 
FMS training programmes. Technical information about the 
configuration, operation and capabilities of the FMS was also 
obtained.
Operating personnel were asked questions about their former working 
background, their recruitment to and training for the FMS, their 
job responsibilities and particular problems encoutered in their 
work. They were also asked to expand on their subjective feelings 
on the advantages and disadvantages of work on such systems 
compared to their previous work experience, with particular 
reference to the changes in skills and autonomy they experienced. 
Union representatives were asked about labour relations policies
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generally within the company; and about policy issues in relation 
to the FMSs, such as what negotiation took place over introduction 
and their attitudes to demands for greater working flexibility.
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CHAPTER THREE: Understanding "automation" in manufacturing
i) Introduction
According to the Oxford English Dictionary something that is 
"automatic" works "of itself, without direct human actuation".
Hence "automation" consists of "automatic control of manufacture of 
product through successive stages; use of automated equipment to 
save mental and manual labour." On this view "automation" consists 
of changes in technology, whose distinguishing features are that 
(unspecified) functions formerly undertaken by human worker are now 
performed by machine.
The superficial plausibility of this definition conceals a number 
of problems, which we intend to clarify in this chapter. In the 
first place the breadth of our definition of automation must depend 
in turn on how we define technology. Secondly, when humans work 
they may be undertaking several different kinds of mental and 
manual activity, some of which are more complex than others and 
therefore require competences (or skills) that are different in 
extent and kind. Simply being told that a function is being removed 
from the worker leaves unanswered the important question of what 
kind, what order, of human function in terms of mental or manual 
activity we are talking about. Here we shall first establish what 
we mean by technology before going on to consider how changes in 
technology relate to automation.
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Some definitions of technology are very broad, encompassing far 
more than simply machinery. Winner (1977* PP 8-12) defends a wide- 
ranging definition of technology, which he takes to include what he 
calls "technique” (skills, methods, procedures, etc), varieties of 
social organisation such as factories, and communications networks 
as well as technical apparatus. Similarly Hill (1981, p86) suggests 
that a definition of technology should encompass "all forms of 
productive technique" (including the unaided human hand and brain), 
the physical organisation of production, and the notion of these 
aspects being the product of conscious human design and direction.
The danger of definitions this wide is that they become too 
unwieldy to use as precise analytical tools. One of the purposes of 
this thesis is to suggest that technical apparatus may be used in 
manufacturing activities to produce several different outcomes for 
skills and methods of working dependent upon factors extraneous to 
the apparatus itself. For example, it might be reasonable to 
suppose that developments in apparatus are interrelated with 
changes in production methods (such as work study techniques). It 
seems wrong, however, to obscure these relationships between 
essentially different phenomena by subsuming them all under the 
heading of "technology". By way of brief illustration of this point 
let us examine Hill's definition of technology. In referring to the 
necessity of considering the organisation of production as part of 
technology Hill describes the former as implying "the division of 
labour and work organisation... built into, or required for 
efficient operation by the productive technique." (Hill 1981, p86 -
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emphases mine (PJS)). This claim gives unwarranted credence to the 
idea (argued to be erroneous below) that work organisation is 
determined by the choice of productive technique. To sidestep such 
problems this study follows Rose et al (1986, pl9) in adopting the 
restricted definition of technology as comprising machine hardware 
and software.
ii) Main trends in manufacturing production processes
Woodward (1965) identifies three main types of method which have 
evolved over the last two hundred years for the manufacture of 
goods, each of which has successively demonstrated the use of a 
greater degree of technology in the production process. In their 
order of development she calls these unit or small-batch 
production, large-batch or mass production and continuous flow 
process manufacture. Small-batch production of discrete components 
in factories, developed after the eclipse of the artisan during the 
industrial revolution, has proved the most persistent of these 
forms. By the twentieth century the expanding market for certain 
types of consumer goods caused this to be complemented (but 
crucially, not supplanted) by the extremely inflexible form of 
batch production known as mass production for manufacture and 
assembly of large numbers of a small variety of discrete 
components. Finally the manufacture of non-discrete goods (such as 
chemicals and metals) was transformed from a batch to a continuous 
flow process. Today all three of these forms of production co-exist 
but the relationship between them is becoming increasingly blurred.
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To understand this claim it will be necessary to briefly 
investigate the evolution of these different production processes.
In the period preceding the industrial revolution items were 
normally made individually by craft workers. An individual would 
take responsibility for the complete manufacture, assembly and even 
the sale of the chosen article. Hand tools were used to fashion the 
product. Because of the expertise demanded by this method of 
manufacture, the rudimentary nature of most of the technology 
involved and the low division of labour it is the accepted wisdom 
that this system eventually broke down because of an inability to 
manufacture quickly enough by these techniques to satisfy the 
expansion of market demand for the products. Certain radical 
critics of this view, notably Marglin (1978), have however 
maintained that inability to maintain control over labour was the 
main reason for the breakdown of this system.
Initially coexisting with and finally almost completely replacing 
the above system was the factory based system of "machino-facture". 
Workers were gathered together in factories to use general purpose 
machines to produce items in batches. Batch production based on 
similar principles continues to the present day, as there are 
countless examples of products with levels of demand insufficient 
to allow other methods of production to become economically viable. 
However, by the nineteenth century there were also many products 
for which an emerging mass market would facilitate an increasingly 
high sub-division of labour based around the development of new
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types of specialised machinery allowing repetitive manufacture. 
Unlike the artisanal system "machino-facture” gradually enabled the 
production of large numbers of parts at much lower unit costs.
•cm
Nevertheless such machinery was normally too inaccurate to achieve 
the production of parts without the need for considerable 
subsequent hand fitting work in assembly. Until about i860 it was 
only in the American government armouries that such a standard of 
precision was regularly achieved. In the USA this form of 
manufacture became known as the "American system", which evolved 
initially because of the need to produce large numbers of 
interchangeable parts for armaments. The requirement for 
interchangeable parts to counter the assembly bottlenecks otherwise 
remedied by hand fitting only became really pressing in the 
minority of industries manufacturing at very large scales of 
production and so did not diffuse widely (Hounshell 1984) [1].
The next major development came during the early years of the 
twentieth century when Frederick Taylor introduced his work study 
doctrines. These were intended to improve productivity in a number 
of factories undertaking large-batch and process production (such 
as the iron and steel industries) by eliminating inefficient labour 
and management practices. To do this it proposed the accumulation 
and systematisation of working knowledge in the hands of 
management, thus substituting defined procedures and "science" for 
the variability of the "rule of thumb" (what Taylor referred to as 
finding the "one best way" to perform a given task) (Taylor 1929)•
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It also proposed an increase in the efficiency of labour by 
substituting less skilled (and therefore cheaper) for skilled 
workers wherever possible. Taylor's scientific management doctrine 
was not therefore a technological development in the sense we have 
defined the term so much as a methods and work study exercise (Hill 
1981, p27). Nevertheless, as part of the process of optimising 
procedures, Taylorism did for example lead to the introduction of 
new coolants and high-speed steels to facilitate faster metal- 
cutting, (Taylor 1929) [2].
The intermeshing of organisational methods with technology was not 
long in coming, however. Around the time of the First World War the 
emerging Ford Motor Company introduced an advance on Taylorist 
production principles in its American factories. This heralded an 
era of "mass'* production on a hitherto unimaginable scale of vast 
numbers of identical consumer goods. At the level of production 
techniques Fordism combined interchangeability of parts, line 
balancing and scheduling methods, and work study techniques with 
certain technological concepts. This combination could be achieved 
because Taylor's "scientific management" simplified the production 
process into a series of fragmented and specified routines, thereby 
laying the basis for the subseqent possibility of automation.
Ford's innovations went beyond Taylor's ideas by building control 
over the speed and intensity of work into the machinery itself. As 
Sabel (1982, p236, note 5) says, because the "Fordist system of 
special-purpose equipment" accomplished "partly by mechanical means 
what Taylor wanted to do through administrative control....
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Taylorism presupposes Fordism and Fordism implies Taylorism.”
Ford developed single purpose machine tools, which were only 
capable of each producing one fixed type of component, but the 
potential disadvantage of this inflexibility was outweighed by the 
fact that they were intended to be in constant use. The "technical 
control", as Edwards (1979) has described it, was achieved by 
adding the concept of mechanised transfer lines, which carried 
components to the workers at specialised work stations at a speed 
predetermined by management. The remaining crucial innovation of 
Fordism was the extension of these principles to the assembly 
process. Drucker (1967a, pp 19-20) notes that little if any of the 
technology used by Ford was novel. The originality behind Ford's 
production process lay in the systematisation and integration of 
existing technologies (such as the special-purpose machine and the 
assembly line) and the organisational concepts described above.
This automation (known as hard or Detroit automation) was dedicated 
to manufacture of a product of fixed design, and difficult if not 
impossible to adapt to other purposes. However, it did enable the 
manufacturer to benefit from great economies of scale and hence 
sell products at low costs to large markets [3]* The approach still 
remains influential to this day.
By the mid-twenties the heyday of this rigid form of automation had 
passed at Ford, although the basic features of the system were 
still to become far more widely diffused in the motor and other 
consumer goods industries in the next thirty to forty years. The
main disadvantage of the early Detroit approach was the rigidity of 
its product lines and of the machinery to specific production, 
which were the principal factors contributing to a lack of product 
differentiation. The resulting saturation of the market caused by 
the very success of these mass production methods made it difficult 
to continue to generate sufficient sales to allow the necessary 
high levels of equipment utilisation (Hounshell 1984).
The development of a limited degree of production flexibility 
permitting minor product differentiation was employed by rival car 
manufacturers (initially under Alfred Sloan's influence at General 
Motors) with some success. The main disadvantage of this latter 
approach, irresoluble in mass production until recent years, was 
the expense of providing the technical flexibility to diversify 
production at scales of output still so high. The costs included 
those of the redundant machine capacity, work in progress, high 
stock levels and - most importantly - the long lead times necessary 
to change over dedicated lines to manufacture of even a slightly 
different product.
The advent, of the early generations of computers in the years after 
World War Two provided a new and powerful boost to the ability to 
automate other, new, areas of manufacturing. In particular it now 
became feasible for certain non-discrete products hitherto made in 
batches to be manufactured as a continuous process. Initially this 
affected those industries where the product was in liquid or 
gaseous form (such as oil refining), for in such cases the
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automation of the handling and transformation of the raw materials, 
which could often be completely enclosed, was technically simpler 
by such methods (Noble 1984, pp 58-59)* More novel, however, was 
the fact that computers were now also applied to the regulation and 
control of these continuous manufacturing processes. Importantly, 
such applications demanded little flexibility in terms of the end 
product manufactured so, at least in this respect, the nature of 
the production process did not differ significantly from the 
inflexibility and high volumes of the mass production industries. 
The application of this degree of capital intensity to the 
production of discrete items (whatever the batch size) has however 
remained a technologist's dream until recent years with the advent 
of the microprocessor.
iii) Categorising "automation"
The above section described the development of the main types of 
manufacturing production process from the middle of the last 
century to the present with particular reference to the changes in 
technology involved. The common thread in each of these different 
production processes is a tendency for increased capital intensity 
substituting for human labour. It is this that is often 
characterised as "automation”. It is believed that the term 
"automation" was first used in connection with the transfer 
mechanisms used by the Ford Motor Company (Winch 1983a, p2). But, 
as Bell (1972) and Cohen (1975) point out, the word has also been 
employed to refer to mechanisms equipped with control feedback
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facilities, and also more diffusely as a metaphor for any activity 
occurring without a need for human intervention. If we hope to 
assess the effects on labour of particular forms of automation 
further preservation of such ambiguities will be a source of 
confusion (Bell 1972; Coombs 1984). It is clear that the types of 
development described have in common the fact that they replace a 
human input to the production process. Therefore the problem is 
that, as Coombs (1984, pl48) observes:
Any technical change which replaces a human 
activity, particularly with some skill or mental 
component, becomes a candidate for description as 
automation.
This "definition" may well encapsulate the popular view of what 
constitutes automation but is inadequate as a theoretical basis on 
which to proceed, because the kinds of human input being superceded 
are actually widely different. We must therefore arrive at a usable 
definition.
The first influential attempt to categorise "automation" can be 
attributed to J R Bright. Bright defines automation simply but 
tautologically as "something significantly more automatic than 
previously existed in that plant, industry or location" (Bright 
1958, p67). It follows that he sees automation as being an 
evolutionary process. Despite the deceptive simplicity of his 
definition, however, he develops a scale of automation comprising
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seventeen levels of mechanisation in which the major dependent 
variable is the degree of control over the performance of the 
production process built into the machinery as opposed to the human 
operator. Thus, beyond a fairly elementary level of interaction of 
the worker with a single power-assisted machine, it is proposed 
that the ascending levels of automation represent an increasing 
atrophy of the function of control over the production process 
performed by the human being. For a long time this linear scale of 
classification represented the only serious attempt to categorise 
"automation", and its influence should not be underestimated. This 
is particularly noteworthy in view of the fact that Bright's 
taxonomy is adopted uncritically by Braverman (1974, PP 213-223) as 
a basis for his thesis that the prime purpose of machine design 
under capitalism is to wrest skill - meaning essentially control 
over the labour process - from the worker and incorporate it into 
the machine (see Chapter Four).
Although Bright's scheme has a certain plausibility this type of 
definition is problematic. It views automation primarily as the 
degree to which machine control processes are mechanised. This 
approach is best suited to the level of "automation'' of a discrete 
machine. Because of this classification's lack of attention to the 
manner in which materials are moved between different parts of the 
total production process it is unable to cope with the "automation" 
of production systems (Coombs 1984, pl48). Its uni-directional 
nature prevents it being used as an analytical tool to explain 
differing types of labour required as a result of "automation".
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Faunce (1965, PP 150”151). on the other hand, provides the germ of 
a method to rectify this shortcoming. He refers to four basic and 
distinct technologies as together constituting "automation”. These 
are power technology, processing technology, materials handling 
technology, and finally control technology [4]. He claims that 
technological developments may occur independently in any of these 
but that ”a certain level of development of each is a necessary 
condition for further development of the others.” Thus automation 
can proceed in a number of different and semi-autonomous 
directions, yet still be subsumed under the same generic term.
Faunce did not pursue the development of this more complex 
definition, however. This task was left to Bell, who develops the 
work of Bright referred to above (whilst seemingly being unaware of 
Faunce's contribution). Like Faunce, Bell criticises previous 
writers on automation for conflating changes occurring in three 
separate types of technology. These he terms (presented here with 
Faunce*s terminology given in brackets afterwards where different) 
the technologies of transformation (processing), transfer 
(materials handling), and control. Respectively these refer to the 
way in which the raw material is fashioned into finished product, 
the way the material is carried between stages in the production 
process, and the manner in which the overall process is controlled. 
Bell describes automation as a "three-dimensional space" in which 
the extent of "automation" is determined by the different and 
almost certainly varying degrees to which the three component parts 
are mechanised. Bell’s purpose was to demonstrate that differing
54
extents of automation in these three areas will have dissimilar 
effects on the numbers and type of labour employed in systems of 
production. We shall discuss this in the next chapter.
Kaplinsky (1984, pp 24-27) acknowledges the importance of Bell's 
contribution, but argues that the work of such writers as Bright 
and Bell is incomplete because it only refers to the activity of 
one particular sphere of the productive process, that of 
manufacture. Kaplinsky argues that industrial enterprises consist 
of three spheres of activity (design, manufacture, and overall 
coordination and control) which have become increasingly 
compartmentalised since the industrial revolution. A central 
feature of "automation" in these three spheres to date has been the 
development in each of numerous (and usually incompatible) 
databases, thus hindering the breadth of automation possible. For 
Kaplinsky the unique feature of new microprocessor-based 
technologies lies in their ability to (re)integrate these distinct 
spheres (see also ACARD 1983; Ingersoll Engineers 1985).
Therefore automation can be viewed as consisting of three distinct 
levels, dependent on the degree of integration of production 
activities enabled. These types of "automation" are: a) individual 
activities within a sphere, such as CNC machine tools (intra­
activity automation); b) the integration of a number of hitherto 
separate activities within a sphere, such as FMS (intra-sphere 
automation); and, c) the integration of hitherto separate 
activities in different spheres, as in the development of a common
55
database for all manufacturing activities (inter-sphere 
automation). This definition is useful in some respects because it 
extends the discussion of automation to encompass all aspects of 
the production process within the enterprise, and points the way to 
future technical developments. However, as Kaplinsky*s account 
makes only too clear, "automation” has but recently begun to 
progess as far as the intra-sphere category. To date developments 
are most advanced in the area of manufacture (which helps to 
explain why previous theories of automation have concentrated on 
this field), beginning with the transfer line but only recently 
finding broader application in linked systems such as FMS.
Kaplinsky's approach to classifying automation is undoubtedly 
helpful in disentangling the various component activities in the 
"factory of the future". However, his definition is too broad for 
our use because our study is basically only concerned with 
automation within the manufacturing sphere according to Kaplinsky's 
definition.
More promising is an even more rigorous application of Bell * s 
typology devised by Blackburn et al (1985. PP 28-29). The following 
analysis draws principally on their classification. They suggest 
that the dominant pattern of development of these three 
technologies since World War Two has tended to lead those seeking 
to define automation into a cul-de-sac. This is because each 
historical phase of "automation" (as described above) has actually 
emphasised the development of different types of mechanisation. For 
this reason Blackburn et al argue that it is misleading to speak of
56
"automation" as such, preferring to drop the term altogether. 
Against this one might raise the objection that "mechanisation" can 
be viewed as the replacement of human physical effort while 
automation represents the substitution of human mental effort, and 
thus the latter presumes the existence of some form of internal 
control feedback. This cannot be sustained, as examples do exist of 
innovations (such as the self-acting mule) which replaced both 
human physical and mental energies, but contained no means of 
feedback (Council for Science and Society 1981, pp 17-18) [5].
To bypass such confusions Blackburn et al prefer to speak of three 
overlapping types of mechanisation, which consist of what have been 
in turn the dominant forms of what has been referred to as 
"automation". These they call primary mechanisation (the automation 
of material transformation in the production process), secondary 
mechanisation (the automation of material transfer in the 
production process), and tertiary mechanisation (the automation of 
control and coordination of the above activities) in order of the 
approach of each of these dimensions toward maturity.
These different trajectories can be inferred from the discussion in 
section ii), in which it became clear that the three main forms of 
production described have tended to exhibit varying extents of 
these three kinds of mechanisation. Thus small batch manufacture 
has displayed considerable mechanisation of the means of material 
transformation for many years, but little in the way of the other 
types until recently (see later chapters). On the other hand, the
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distinguishing feature of early mass production systems was that 
they complemented this first type of mechanisation by seeking to 
mechanise the means of material transfer between work stations. 
Whereas control of labour in this system is partially built into 
the machinery, control over the process itself was heavily labour- 
intensive and remained largely unmechanised during the heyday of 
the transfer line. By the time of the rapid development of 
continuous flow process technology the emphasis of technical 
development had shifted to the mechanisation of the control process 
(whereas transfer and transformation were almost completely 
automated). Transformation and transfer technologies are now 
relatively mature and tend now to be characterised by merely 
incremental innovation. By contrast the era of tertiary 
mechanisation is yet young and now contains the greatest potential 
for future development by means of capturing the information 
databases upon which control functions are based (Coombs 1984).
Within the concept of control mechanisation it is increasingly 
important to draw a distinction between "hardware" and "software" 
forms of control as a result of the increasing power and 
flexibility of microprocessor-based forms of technology. Any 
control system contains a tangible hardware aspect which simply 
consists of the equipment enabling the store of information to be 
processed and transmitted (such as the human brain or a computer). 
It is also important to realise that the necessary information 
itself can also be hardware-based, for example in the form of a 
cam, template, or punched tape (Bell 1972). The disadvantages of
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encapsulating information in this form are its inflexibility - it 
is not particularly easy to adapt or edit - and it tends to become 
more inaccurate with use as it wears out. Also the fashioning of 
templates, and so on, to act as a ’’pattern” is usually a complex 
and skilled task and therefore very labour intensive in its own 
right. Information which is likely to be subject to rapid change or 
obsolescence is therefore rarely suitable for expression solely in 
such a form.
By contrast software-based control information such as digitally- 
encoded data within a computer is extremely flexible, being readily 
amended. The transformation from ’’hard-” to ”soft-wired” control 
systems as a result of the development of microprocessors and 
digital information processing has led to a qualitative increase in 
the importance of control technologies in terms of the range of 
production activities which can now be expressed in digitized form. 
Some, such as Morris-Suzuki (1984, pp 112-113) have gone so far as 
to suggest that ’’knowledge", particularly in the form of software, 
has now been separated from labour and machinery to such an extent 
that it now represents "an independent commodity and element in 
production." On this argument the disembodiment of knowledge and 
its consequent objectification as a commodity results in a loss of 
control for workers occasioned by their possession of this 
previously irreproducible know-how. However, the intention of 
separating the conceptual knowledge in the production process from 
those who are to execute it is not the same as achieving this 
separation. We shall discuss this further in Chapter Four.
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iv) Conclusion
This chapter has used historical evidence of the pattern of 
development in industrial societies to assess the relative merits 
of a number of theories of automation. On the basis of this 
analysis it becomes apparent that the confusion surrounding 
discussion of "automation" can be resolved by accepting that three 
different trajectories of mechanisation are in fact involved.
These, following Bell (1973) and Blackburn et al (I985), we term 
transformation, transfer and control mechanisation. These 
trajectories are characterised by varying levels of maturity.
Of these, it was demonstrated that control mechanisation now 
possesses the greatest potential for future expansion because it 
objectifies human mental rather than physical capabilities. An 
essential difference was drawn between control mechanisation and 
the other, more mature, types of "automation". Unlike these latter, 
control mechanisation is now basically concerned with the 
automation of the "soft" information databases and decisions on 
which all production databases are dependent. It is believed that 
microprocessor-based and information technologies now contain the 
power to store such data in hitherto impossible quantities, and the 
flexibility and reprogrammability to switch rapidly between 
different functions. Hitherto these capabilities have been believed 
only feasible in many productive activities by the uncertain 
application of human skill. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, 
these questions relating to the displacement of human conceptual
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knowledge are at the core of many of the discussions about the 
automation of human skills.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Mechanisation, skills and the division of labour
i) Introduction
The exact nature of the effects of technical changes on skill 
requirements has been intermittently debated in recent decades. 
Despite the amount of discussion, the various debates’ most 
striking feature has been the absence of any unanimity on what the 
relationship between skills and mechanisation might be. Bright 
(1959) answered in the negative to the title of his article "Does 
automation raise skill requirements?" Taking the opposite view, the 
early 'seventies saw other authors, such as Bell (1973)t predict 
the emergence of a "post-industrial" society, which would be partly 
facilitated by the computerisation emerging at this time. Bell 
correlates the greater number of years being spent in formal 
education with a generalised demand for higher skill levels as a 
result of changing technology. By the mid-’seventies the pessimists 
were once again in the ascendant under the influence of renewed 
economic recession, the theoretical guidance of Marxist-inspired 
critics, and (latterly) wide-ranging changes in the numbers and 
nature of jobs as a result of the application of microprocessor- 
based technologies.
These disparities suggest that the classical debates on this 
question mistakenly assumed (as do some more recent approaches) a 
more or less direct linkage between changes in skill requirements 
and whatever they chose to define as mechanisation. In this chapter
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we wish to question the adequacy of existing influential approaches 
to skill and technological change. The differing conclusions of the 
above approaches suggests that additional variables intercede 
between mechanisation and changes in skills and work roles. In 
discussing the debates on the classical theories we shall introduce 
additional factors which some authors have proposed as potential 
variables. Particularly we stress managerial intentions, but we 
argue further that inherent task variability, and product and 
labour market factors also exercise influence over the relationship 
between mechanisation, skills and the division of labour.
ii) Skill
Having discussed mechanisation in Chapter Three our first task here 
must be to define our concept of skill. A considerable debate has 
opened up in recent years as to how skill should be defined [1]. 
Littler (1982, pp 7“H). in a useful exposition of skill 
definitions, identifies three broad basic meanings which stress 
respectively measureable competencies, control over one’s labour 
process, and the ’’social construction" of skills for particular 
bargaining ends [2].
The first approach suggests that skill has a real, objective basis, 
which consists of particular physical and mental competencies, and 
techniques normally acquired through a period of training. This 
definition is the most restricted interpretation of what 
constitutes skill. It sees skill as a personal property comprised
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of categories such as motor or manipulative skills, perceptual 
skills, and conceptual or intellectual skills. These are necessary 
for the performance of given tasks but, in this definition, they 
are internal to the worker and can exist largely independently of 
external factors dependent upon the division of labour. This 
definition is most frequently associated with occupational 
psychologists and others concerned with the training of employees 
(Engineering Industry Training Board 1971; Hazlehurst et al 1969; 
Seymour 1966), who have attempted to devise methods for the 
measurement of these skills [3].
This limited definition, adopted by More (1980) in his study of the 
engineering industry, is superficially attractive. However, as 
Rolfe (1986, p40) points out, the definition of skill according to 
measureable psychological criteria, while always inadequate for 
work with a high conceptual (and therefore "invisible") content, is 
also of limited application to manual work. This incompleteness 
results from Polanyi's (1958, 1962) recognition that the skill 
involved in humans’ use of tools is essentially an experiential 
process which cannot be formally articulated or codified, although 
it nevertheless exists as a subsidiary form of mental awareness. 
Polanyi calls this "tacit knowledge". Studies of training 
techniques such as the Engineering Industry Training Board (1971) 
and Seymour (1966) have acknowledged the difficulty that tacit 
skills pose to the formal transfer of knowledge. They found that 
the more intellectual, planning and adaptive skills employed in 
jobs with a wide variety of tasks and high conceptual content are
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too elusive and suject to variability to be formalised as highly 
specified and proceduralised rules applicable to every 
circumstance. The importance to our study of the concept of tacit 
skill is such that we shall refer to it separately below.
A second school of thought, most prominently but not exclusively 
associated with labour process studies of (mainly) Marxist origin, 
agrees that skill has an objective basis in the possession of 
particular abilities, but argues that the indispensible element is 
control and autonomy over one's own labour process, which is best 
illustrated in the notion of "craft"-type work. This definition 
emphasises additional notions such as "autonomy", "discretion" and 
control over the labour process. In an extreme version of this 
argument, which begins to overlap with the third definition below, 
Blackburn and Mann (1979) and Oliver and Turton (1982) see "skill" 
as comprising not competence but mainly behavioural, attitudinal 
and motivational factors influencing the recruitment of personnel 
for particular jobs. For Blackburn and Mann (1979. p292), in their 
study of the labour market in Peterborough (where, it might be 
noted in view of later discussion, a very high proportion of jobs 
are for semi-skilled rather than craft workers), skill constitutes 
a position of discretionary "trust... within which decisions, 
whether routine or complex, could be taken by the worker 
himself..."
This approach also has its drawbacks. Concepts like autonomy and 
discretion are both relative and subjective, and therefore
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difficult to measure, although undeniably present in jobs.
Moreover, to apply such concepts to the jobs of individual workers 
presupposes a parallel consideration of the manner in which overall 
responsibilities are subdivided between workers. Notions of 
autonomy, discretion and control are therefore dependent upon 
analysis of the extrinsic variable of the division of labour.
Studies of skills at the levels of work tasks holding to the above 
definitions have been criticised by some sociologists. These 
writers argue for a more "ideological" definition of skill based on 
power relations in the workplace on the grounds that skill has 
little objective basis [4], but rather labels of "skill" are 
socially constructed by workers and employers in order to try to 
further their own interests. For these writers the study of skill 
should consist of investigation of this process.
This approach amplifies the sociological aspects of skill implied 
by the idea of control over the labour process. It sees "skill" as 
a bargaining process; a category based on power, on which basis 
particular groups may be selected for, or excluded from, certain 
categories of work. For Penn (1984, pl29) the central feature of 
skilled manual work is "some form of social exclusion." This view 
originates in Turner's (1962) research in the cotton industry. He 
disputes that the jobs are skilled in any objective sense but notes 
instead the use of the term in cases where workers have been able 
to artificially restrict the supply of labour into the industry by 
means of trade union action or period of apprenticeship [53 - Other
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forms of social construction than by union action have since been 
identified. Feminist writers studying the undervaluing of women’s 
work (Phillips and Taylor 1980, p79). and changes in the printing 
industry (Cockbum 1983). contend that the labelling of jobs as 
"skilled” is used as a weapon by male workers to deny female 
workers either access to particular kinds of employment or adequate 
recognition of its value and skill content.
At various points this study refers to the idea of skill in each of 
these three senses, but the primary emphasis is on the first two. 
Our main focus will be on changes in the nature of the specific 
skills required and the redivision of work tasks as a consequence 
of technological changes. However, we shall refer to the ideas of 
"skill" and "control" as separate categories to avoid contributing 
further to the confusion caused by their frequent conflation in 
much of the literature reviewed below. It is necessary to draw this 
distinction for, as Rolfe (1986, p4l) says, it does not necessarily 
follow that the possession of skill will lead to control over the 
labour process or vice versa [6]. In this thesis we are 
particularly interested in craft skills and, by extension, it may 
become relevant to consider the social construction of skill Turner 
believes to exist through the mechanism of craft control. We shall 
make it clear when skill is being discussed in this sense.
iii) "Labour process" analyses and the "degradation of work"
)ne of the most influential approaches in recent years to the
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question of skill has considered its most important aspect to be 
the idea of control over one's labour process. Kelley (1984) 
defines any labour process as consisting of three elements: a set 
of related tasks that need to be performed to achieve a particular 
purpose; technical means (tools); and a body of knowledge necessary 
to effect the transformation (skills), which in turn implies a 
given degree of complexity in planning and implementation tasks, 
and a knowledge base of a certain breadth on which it is necessary 
to draw. One occupation may encompass an entire labour process, in 
which case it may be described as a craft.
This idea of craft or artisanal production as the very embodiment 
of skill underpins in particular the influential Marxist approach 
popularised by Harry Braverman. In his view: "For the worker, the 
concept of skill is traditionally bound up with craft mastery...” 
(Braverman 1974, p443, see also Hinton 1973)* central to which is 
the ability to visualise how the product will appear in its final 
form (Braverman 1974, p444). Implicit in Braverman's concept of a 
craft is the idea that the worker has autonomy and discretion in 
decision-making regarding the organisation and performance of his 
or her work resulting from the possession of these particular 
competencies [7]. The notions of discretion in deciding the pace, 
content and planning of work derive mainly (but not exclusively) 
from Marxist approaches to the question of skill. The emphasis on 
autonomy stems from the Marxian concern with the division of labour 
and, in particular, the notion that its developed capitalist form 
requires the separation of conceptual from execution tasks as
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proposed by Taylor. Braverman claims that the necessary physical 
prerequisites of skill are a less significant component than the 
ability to unify in one’s work the conception and execution of 
tasks he believes to constitute the essence of craft.
For Braverman, the (largely pre-capitalist) era of artisanal 
production was characterised by workers who had served a lengthy 
apprenticeship in their particular craft, during which they 
developed the all-round knowledge of the techniques necessary for 
production of a complete item from start to finish. In such a case 
the labour process encompassed an entire occupation, and so the 
division of labour was minimal at this time. The beginning of the 
era of machino-facture, however, constituted a qualitative break 
with this period, and ushered in a more intensive division of 
labour. This division of labour developed at different speeds 
within different industries: indeed it is only recently that the 
craft basis of the printing industry has been seriously challenged. 
As a general trend, though, manufacturing and then assembly jobs 
became subject to sub-division and mechanisation. This process 
reached its apex with Taylor's scientific management techniques and 
Ford's assembly line, although it did not proceed very far in 
small-batch engineering (see Chapter Five).
Braverman therefore uses the concept of skill in a dynamic sense to 
theorise a process of overall deskilling during the twentieth 
century on the basis of the claimed fragmentation of conceptual and 
executive activities into separate jobs, each comprising an
69
increasingly circumscribed variety of tasks. This trend is said to 
facilitate management's pursuit of accumulation of surplus value in 
two ways. Firstly, as most jobs now comprise a smaller number of 
simpler tasks, they can be filled by less skilled workers (in terms 
of the competencies required), who will therefore be cheaper to 
employ and to train. Secondly, the separation of conception from 
execution allows increased management control over workers' job 
performance, thereby permitting the intensification of labour and 
an enhanced ability to extract surplus value.
Braverman sees this process of deskilling as being initiated by the 
application of Taylor's methods rather than by mechanisation. The 
rationalisation of the organisation of the production process is 
viewed as first enabling the deskilling of work through its 
routinisation, and the subsequent ability to separate conception 
and execution. Only when individual jobs had become so routinised 
and deskilled that their automation was a technically unchallenging 
task, was machinery recruited to further the possible dimensions of 
what Braverman sees as a conscious management strategy. Thus he 
regards automation as essentially a more sophisticated (and, to 
workers, less ouvert) method by which managers may achieve a twin 
political goal of increasing their control over the production 
process by appropriating the skill formerly residing in the 
employee (see also Edwards 1979).
Braverman arrives at his concept of the relationship between 
automation and skill by marrying Bright's typology to Marx's theory
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of capitalist development. Braverman takes up Marx’s claim that the 
essential purposes of the development of machinery under capitalism 
are the usurpation of human manual and mental control functions. In 
language later echoed by Taylor (see Chapter Three), Marx (1976, 
p508) refers to:
the replacement of human force by natural forces, 
and the replacement of the rule of thumb by the 
conscious application of natural science.
Bright (1958). although certainly no Marxist, provides the second 
pillar for Braverman's argument. Bright, as we saw in Chapter 
Three, compiles a seventeen-fold classification of levels of 
"automation", which for him is characterised by an increasing order 
of mechanised control over production operations and decisions. As 
"automation" becomes more sophisticated so the conceptual skills 
required and discretion exercisable decline in proportion. Bright's 
purpose here was to argue that the skill requirements of automated 
machinery were being generally overestimated and that wage and 
training levels for those employed such equipment could be reduced 
accordingly. Braverman seizes uncritically on Bright's 
classification and assumptions to provide evidence for a claimed 
continuation through "automation" of the rationalisation process 
set in motion by Taylor and Ford.
In this approach, furthermore, it is believed that technology, 
taken as more or less embodying unambiguous management control
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objectives, will determine the structuring of work into 
hierarchical patterns. Forms of job redesign under such 
technologies as the assembly line and NC are viewed as no more than 
a confidence trick to obtain workers' continued consent, and 
enabled by the fact that the pace of work is now technically 
predetermined (Braverman 197^ * Palloix 1976) [8].
The most significant criticisms of Braverman are that he 
underestimates actual and possible worker resistance to deskilling; 
that he assumes the universal adoption of one overriding management 
strategy based on Taylorism, which emphasises labour control above 
all other possible objectives; and that this strategy is being 
pursued to the exclusion of any possible others and is largely 
succeeding. Braverman's evidence of deskilling is derived primarily 
from secondary sources like the claims of equipment sellers and 
management consultants in a limited number of technological 
applications. Little energy is expended on study of the practical 
outcomes of the adoption of such systems [9]*
Many subsequent contributions to the labour process debate have 
been concerned to redress these various shortcomings [10]. For us, 
the most relevant have been those contributions which propose the 
existence of alternative labour control strategies, some of which 
may allow groups of workers greater autonomy (Edwards 1979;
Friedman 1977); those transcending this level to stress other, more 
primary, focii of management control objectives than merely labour 
(Buchanan and Boddy 1983; Cutler 1978); and those questioning the
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directness of the link between conception of a "strategy” and the 
ability to implement it (Rose and Jones 1985) (see also Child 1985* 
pp 108-110). We shall take up these criticisms again below when we 
attempt to draw together some conclusions on the relationship 
between mechanisation and skill. However, one particular body of 
thought on the inviolability of certain worker skills - the theory 
of tacit knowledge - is sufficiently important to the subsequent 
argument to merit separate discussion below.
iv) Tacit knowledge and mechanisation
Tacit knowledge consists primarily of the unformalised awareness it 
is necessary to possess in order to perform a task. Such knowledge 
is acquired through trial, error, observation, imitation and the 
accumulation of experience rather than formal instruction. But 
tacit knowledge implies slightly more than just the abstract 
possession of this ability. It also presupposes the ability to 
perform a task at the level of speed and efficiency of a practiced 
worker (this is called Experienced Worker Standard) (Engineering 
Industry Training Board n.d., pp 4-5). Although recent studies have 
concentrated on the presence of tacit skills in semi-skilled jobs 
(Kusterer 1978; Manwaring and Wood 1985) other research suggests 
that such skills are also important in craft jobs in order to 
successfully apply theory practically (Engineering Industry 
Training Board 1971* Seymour 1966) [11]. Here the concept of tacit 
knowledge has a two-fold importance. Firstly, it reintroduces a 
role for workers’ subjective action in the production process that
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is discarded in Braverman's approach. Secondly, and bound up with 
the first point, the nature of tacit knowledge itself renders it 
difficult to translate into a formal body of expertise, which it is 
then possible to computerise (Bourne and Fox 1984, p80). The idea 
of workers' possession and use of tacit knowledge therefore throws 
doubt upon the extent to which their job knowledge and skills can 
be appropriated by management (Manwaring and Wood 1985). Let us 
look at these points.
As we saw above, Braverman claims that management’s pursuit of 
Taylorite strategy is facilitating its monopolisation of job 
knowledge by separating conception from execution and extending the 
division of labour. This wrongly assumes that control (through the 
possession of job knowledge) can be seen as zero-sum: either 
possessed by management or workers, but not both. Management 
acquisition of the theoretical knowledge necessary for the 
performance of production tasks does not denote that they therefore 
monopolise such expertise, as the workers involved must also still 
possess the elements of this knowledge themselves (Burawoy 1984, 
p4l; Kelly 1982b, pp 22-23; Wood and Kelly 1982, pp 78-79).
Kusterer (1978), in a study of the tacit knowledge acquired on the 
job by semi-skilled workers to expedite or improve the precision of 
their work, argues (against Braverman) that the possession of tacit 
skill confers on workers a continued degree of control over the 
labour process. As Manwaring and Wood (1985. pl84) argue, Kusterer 
may well overstate the degree of control workers are thereby able 
to retain. However, he rightly emphasises the continued dependence
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of management on workers' use of their subjective knowledge to 
facilitate the successful continuity of the production process.
This dependence manifests itself in workers' often unacknowledged 
(and unofficial) interventions in the production process to 
compensate for variance [12]. Variances may consist of product- or 
process-specific factors (such as poor quality raw material or 
unreliable machinery). Through the use of tacit skill certain, 
possibly significant, decisions on work methods remain at the point 
of production rather than being transferred to production 
engineers, or mechanised so on. This latter option both creates 
delay in resolving production problems and relocates control over 
manufacturing decisions.
The difficulty of articulating necessary tacit skills as opposed to 
formal knowledge is the major problem in readily enabling the 
transfer of tacit expertise to management, should they wish to 
achieve this. In the case of machining, professional engineers' 
knowledge of the process is expressed in abstract terms of set 
methods, tables of feeds and speeds, computations of cutting 
forces, etc. For the machinist, however, metal cutting is 
experienced as the practical accumulation of physical working 
knowledge based on sensory intuition, and as the observed and 
"felt" behaviour of workpieces, tools and machines in combination 
with the human operator. Therefore the different cognitive 
structures of professional engineering and production jobs results 
in activities in the production process being "conceptualised in 
radically different ways" and articulated in different terms by
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practitioners of different departmental specialisms (Jones 1984b, 
pl9). Workers possess necessary job knowledge in a much more direct 
and very different form. In everyday operation and in cases of 
minor innovation machine operators tend to pass on learning to one 
another on the job in an unstructured manner. Thereby their 
understanding of the detailed practicalities of job performance 
becomes considerably removed from, and improved upon, the 
structured means employed by the professional engineers.
These points can be demonstrated in an example of the employment of 
tacit skill in the control of variance in machining. When the 
machinist feeds the tool into an item being turned too fast on a 
powered lathe the resulting ”drag" on the tool can be felt through 
the hands of the experienced machinist, who will then sense the 
need to modify the machine’s operating values in order to avoid 
turning out a defective part [13]* The signals transmitted through 
the tool in this manner enable the immediate continuous 
compensation necessary to achieve satisfactory performance of the 
machining operation.
The only way of formally imitating these manual actions is through 
the recently developed, but imperfect, technique of adaptive 
control. This monitors the power consumption levels drawn by tools 
during cutting, and shuts the operation down if these levels exceed 
broadly-set pre-programmed limits. However, Larsen (1981) indicates 
that adaptive control does not appear in practice to have lived up 
to its theoretical promise to surpass the effectiveness of manual
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control, and fieldwork evidence demonstrates that adaptive control 
is at its least effective with those small tools which tend to 
break most readily in any case (see also Scott 1985). Adaptive 
control does not appear to compensate for machining variables as 
thoroughly or readily as the tacit knowledge of the human operator.
One objection to the above argument might be to acknowledge that 
tacit skill exists, but to propose that the central purpose of 
mechanisation (particularly of control functions) is to free the 
employer from dependence on operator control of compensation for 
variance in the production process. Zuboff (1982, pp 143-1^), for 
example, makes explicit the argument that the purpose of 
computerisation is to formalise into software the tacit decision 
rules on which workers' control over the labour process is based:
The purpose of the intelligent technology at the 
core of a computer system is to substitute 
algorithms or decision rules for individual 
judgements. This substitution makes it possible to 
formalize the skills and know-how intrinsic to a 
job and integrate them into a computer program....
For some jobs the word "decision" no longer implies 
an act of human judgement, but an information 
processing activity...
A parallel argument suggests that a change in technology will cause 
mary or indeed all of the skills applicable to the operation of the
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tcechnology replaced to become redundant. Braverman (1974, PP 224- 
2127) argues that operatives in chemical process plants need now 
kmow nothing about the underlying process of chemical 
tiransformation occurring behind the lines of gauges in the control 
rcoom. Likewise Palloix (1976, p55) (prefiguring some of the 
argument in Chapter Six) maintains that:
(A numerically-controlled machine tool), though it 
involves less use of man-power, at the same time
reduces even more the technical skills of the
worker to the extent that the skills themselves 
increasingly disappear.
The view taken here is that these claims, which are again 
predicated on a zero-sum model of skill and control, are unfounded 
in most circumstances. To explain this, and to understand the
reasons for the qualification, we shall draw a distinction between
the form in which a process of transformation is being controlled; 
and the content of that transformation process. Modification of the 
form of control does not necessarily alter the underlying content 
of the production process concerned. The skills attached to the 
latter are therefore not necessarily displaced. This is best 
illustrated by way of two examples. Let us consider respectively a 
transition from conventional metal-cutting to electro-chemical 
machining and numerical control.
The skills appropriate to conventional metal-cutting of a component
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would be completely Inappropriate to "machining” of the same part 
by electro-chemical methods, which are based on the principles of 
electrolysis. But (despite Palloix’s claim) the same cannot be 
said of the replacement of conventional machining by NC. Why the 
difference? Our first example represents a complete change in the 
process whereby a piece of metal (a blank) is transformed into a 
finished shape. Electro-chemical machining is based on entirely 
different principles and methods of transformation and control to 
conventional machining. The means of control appropriate to the 
latter process are simply eliminated.
Numerical control is not akin to this. Under NC the content of the 
process whereby the metal's shape is transformed is identical to 
conventional machining. Here surplus metal is still removed by the 
motions of a tool relative to a workpiece by physical cutting 
(rather than electro-chemical) forces. The form of the system of 
control under NC is indeed different, being "hidden" in digitised 
form. But to understand the computerised cutting process one can 
only proceed by mental analogy of the conventional machining 
process (see also Canter 1985)t for in content it merely tries to 
imitate the movements that would otherwise be made by a human. 
Success may not however be assured, because of the fact that 
numerical control dispenses with the direct body/brain/tool 
interaction that comprises tacit skill, and the compensation of 
variance it enables. Similar cutting errors are possible as a 
result of this identical means of material transformation, and thus 
the same skills for error avoidance are still required.
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Thus, in such a case, skills are not lost per se. However, the 
question now becomes: who possesses the authority to control any 
variances that still arise in the production process? For there 
exists with the changed form of control a choice as to whether this 
function should remain at operator level (albeit exercised in a 
more conceptually-based manner) or become a management prerogative. 
The issue is not so much the loss of skills as the manner in which 
they are distributed throughout the labour force. This will be 
discussed further in Chapter Six.
Additionally, even advanced forms of mechanisation may not be 
immune from the influences of retained control through tacit skill. 
Piore (1968b) and Jones (1984c) offer evidence that the incremental 
tacit transference of job knowledge can still occur even when 
radically new technologies creating new types of job are 
introduced. In such cases, Piore (1968b, pp 441-443) notes, 
transmission of knowledge through on-the-job learning still takes 
place as production workers are familiarised with the new 
technology during its innovation and installation periods. During 
this crucial debugging phase the first generation of job incumbents 
develop their own body of knowledge and method of understanding the 
system requirements which they then teach to new workers.
Alternatively (but more rarely) the engineer responsible for the 
design of the system may become one of its first generation 
workers. Jones (1984c) stresses the importance of the continued 
everyday modifications to the operation of the technology by its
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workers once the phase of debugging or "productionisation" is past 
[1*0. regular working patterns become established, and the "new” 
technology becomes "old" technology. As time goes on the system 
operatives are increasingly less likely to be the same personnel as 
were trained for the system during the second stage, and will 
introduce their own new sets of subtle variations on the details of 
system operation. Tacit job knowledge and learning becomes a means 
whereby production workers can overcome a partial vacuum in 
management's process knowledge caused by unfamiliarity with the 
detailed workings of the technology.
In sum, then, tacit skill constitutes an often unacknowledged 
medium whereby production workers may be able to retain some 
control over the performance of their work through their monopoly 
of essential but unformalised practical "know-how". Managers cannot 
monopolise the knowledge of workers' productive technique through 
work study techniques (especially when work has a conceptual 
content), or through mechanisation when the same underlying 
principles of material transformation are retained. Paradoxically, 
the more innovative the technology compared to what currently 
exists in the plant (and can therefore be used as a comparator) the 
more likely it seems to be that, to get and keep the equipment 
running, spaces will be created for the ad hoc interventions of 
production workers, and the greater the possibility that production 
workers will be able to retain a pivotal role for their tacit 
skills in enabling the new equipment to function efficiently.
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v) Technological reskilling and the "socio-technical” schools
Two schools of thought have developed which take a contrary view to 
labour process analysts of the relationship between mechanisation 
and skill. The first of these, which we shall label "technicist", 
retains the idea that a fairly direct linkage exists between 
technical change and skill requirements. The second approach is 
that of sociotechnical analysis. As Blackler and Brown (1978, pp 
128-130) observe, sociotechnical theory shares the values and 
underlying assumptions of a transition to post-industrial society 
propagated by the technicist writers. However, it offers greater 
sophistication than the technicist approach because of its stress 
on conscious management policies as the factor determining the 
effect of mechanisation on job design and thus on skill levels.
In the "technicist” approach skill is defined similarly to 
Braverman. Blauner (196*0, in his classic study of parts of the 
labour process in four industries, is a prime example of this. The 
work of the printer is considered as a craft "ideal", in which 
skill is exemplified by such factors as freedom from supervision, 
freedom to decide the pace of work and the quantity and quality of 
work, and:
direct control over the technological environment 
by means of the manipulation of tools and 
materials. (Blauner 196*1, p*12).
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This is contrasted to the worker on the assembly line, for whom 
"the technological environment” removes all such autonomy and 
discretion. The "technicist” analysis differs from Braverman and 
his disciples, however, by proposing that tertiary mechanisation 
(best exemplified by the continuous flow process industries 
developing after World War Two) will facilitate the re-emergence of 
craft-type control over production processes. Writers such as Kerr 
et al (1973) and Bell (1973) specifically relate rising skill 
levels to the emergence of a "post-industrial" society, which is 
less dependent for the creation of its wealth upon the elementary 
and highly sub-divided forms of manufacturing employment hitherto 
predominant. Such writers concur with the view that highly sub­
divided work - symbolised above all by the assembly line - has led 
to de-skilling and "alienation" of the worker from industry 
(Blauner 1964; Williamson 1972 inter alia), but see this as the 
product of technologies prevalent in an era of industrialism now 
being superceded. For these writers the capital-intensive 
continuous flow process industries emerging in the post-war period 
symbolise the means whereby the reversal of the Taylorist division 
of labour will be attained. Continuous process manufacture seemed 
to writers such as Blauner (1964) and Bell (1973) to exhibit a low 
division of labour with a requirement principally for technically 
highly skilled workers exercising considerable autonomy (although 
arguably little discretion) in overall process control.
Because of the fact that the operator is now freed from the need to 
actuate and monitor individual machines it becomes possible (and
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indeed desirable) to decrease the subdivision of tasks. It is 
argued that the main feature of the jobs in process industries is 
the overall management, supervision and control of processes by 
means of sophisticated computer systems. These jobs are said to 
require the use of high level conceptual and perceptual, rather 
than manual or manipulative skills, because of the enclosure of the 
material transformation and transfer processes. This strain of 
analysis concentrates almost exclusively on the potency attributed 
to the technology of continuous process industries. In most of 
these commentaries the continuing existence of largely unautomated 
batch production remains invisible [15]-
The technicist approach is perhaps less influential since the onset 
of mass unemployment in Western economies, which has overshadowed 
the presumed professionalisation of the workforce. A more 
sophisticated variant which has been much talked about in recent 
years - although practised considerably less) is so-called 
sociotechnical analysis. This is both applied at a more concrete 
level and (usually) less technologically deterministic than the 
technicist approach. Rather than broadly generalise about changes 
in societal skill structures sociotechnics concentrates its 
analysis at the level of the workgroup. In most versions 
sociotechnical analysis sees skills as relatively autonomous from 
technology, and affected more by managerial choices in the division 
of labour at this latter level. Thus it prescriptively applies a 
concept of "organisational choice" in job design in order to argue 
for a restructuring of labour roles. Sociotechnical writers propose
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that any organisation is an Hopen system” consisting of a mutually 
interacting "technical system" (the technology employed) and 
"social system" (the employees and organisation of their work). 
These are not in automatic harmony - indeed, they will conflict to 
a certain extent. Therefore it is not possible to optimise both 
dimensions simultaneously. However, it is proposed that each 
dimension should be consciously remodelled and harmonised as far as 
possible ("jointly optimised") with the goal of affording improved 
job content to the workers concerned.
For sociotechnical writers desirable criteria for job design 
include relatively higher decision-making ability, longer work 
cycles and a wider range of tasks than would be found under the 
Taylorite principles still assumed to be generally characteristic 
of industrialised society [16]. Central to the achievement of these 
sociotechnical goals is a requirement that workers become 
increasingly flexible between the different tasks to be performed. 
It is important to distinguish between a number of types of such 
flexibility between tasks that may be sought, as different forms 
vary considerably in the degree to which they extend the worker's 
role. The main stratifications can be divided into either 
horizontal or vertical categories (Connock 1985, p36; Incomes Data 
Services 1986, p9)« Horizontal flexibility includes firstly job or 
task rotation. As Kelly (1982b) and other radical critics argue, 
these are not necessarily incompatible with continued Taylorism. By 
contrast job enlargement consists of the grouping in one job of 
additional (and hitherto separate) tasks at the same grade. This
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can include flexibility within the same trade, such as when a 
machinist becomes responsible for operating a number of different 
types of machine tool (see also Chapter Five). In the case of craft 
jobs horizontal flexibility may take the form of flexibility 
between different trades (such as between production and 
maintenance personnel), which is often known as multi-skilling. In 
this latter case craft workers may be trained in additional skill 
’’modules". This form of inter-craft flexibility is still relatively 
rare in Britain, as craft unions have been largely successful in 
preserving the sanctity of the boundaries between different trades.
Vertical flexibility involves the worker taking additional 
responsibility for tasks of a lower or - more significantly - 
higher grade level (job enrichment). Here we are particularly 
interested in the addition to directly productive jobs of pre- and 
post-production tasks with a decision-making content. Prominent 
among these functions in engineering firms, for example, would be 
quality control, part programming, supervision, production 
scheduling and the overall management of production. The emphasis 
of sociotechnical writers tends to be a combination of the above 
categories of horizontal and vertical flexibility to produce what 
are known as flexible (or autonomous) workgroups. Here the focus of 
interest shifts from the individual to a distinct team of workers, 
who become jointly responsible for a set of activities, including 
managerial, work allocation, and decision-making functions related 
to the tasks concerned (Kelly 1982b, p6l; Wall 1982, pp 11-12).
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Many versions of sociotechnical theory claim to be agnostic 
regarding the appropriateness of different types of technology, 
including computerised technology, for the achievement of its job 
design aims. Cooper's (1972, pl55) view is typical:
Advanced automation... will not of itself provide a 
more congenial form of work for the human operator.
It will, however, provide the opportunity for job 
enlargement based on combining attenuated operating 
functions with more complex maintenance 
requirements. Planned intervention will be 
necessary to make this a reality.
It is apparent however that certain sociotechnical authors lean 
heavily towards the position that only the sophisticated technology 
characteristic of the computerised control of processes is able in 
practice to facilitate an enhancement of jobs and skills (see for 
example Davis 1971; Davis and Taylor 1979; Hirschhorn 1984). 
Hirschhom argues that the high level of sophistication of the most 
advanced current "automated" control systems denies professional 
engineers the ability to foresee all possible modes of failure. For 
Hirschhom, therefore, authority should be devolved to autonomous 
workgroups organised on sociotechnical principles in these 
environments and circumstances. This will enable the flexibility to 
learn about, and respond to, unpredictable contingencies that occur 
outside of the parameters for which computerised control systems 
have been programmed, and to react to changing market conditions.
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Both of the approaches described in this section are flawed. The 
technicist approach, based on inferred transformations in skills 
and employment structures within continuous process industries, has 
been subject to considerable methodological criticism. For example, 
Blauner's methodology and conclusions are questioned by Gallie
(1978), who notes that similar French studies have arrived at 
opposite conclusions; and Nichols and Beynon (1977). who draw 
attention to the continued existence of low-skilled heavy manual 
jobs in such plants [17]•
The limitations of sociotechnical theories for job redesign have 
been comprehensively criticised by many authors [18]. The problem 
with this approach that we wish to emphasise here is that its 
underlying humanistic prescriptiveness abstracts the achievement of 
job design at the level of the individual work unit from the wider 
economic, political, technical and social pressures that lead 
managements to introduce new forms of work organisation (Knights et 
al 1985. PP 1-3). There is a danger in much sociotechnical writing 
of reducing the adoption of its job design principles - however 
desirable these might be - to the level of a rational management 
choice. In some forms, such as Hirschhom (1985), this becomes 
distorted by overemphasis of the potency of computerised technology 
into an assumption that job redesign exercises are almost compelled 
thereby (Jones and Scott 1986, p356; see also Silverman 1970)*
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vi) Beyond technological determinants
The above discussion demonstrates that theories of a more or less 
unmediated relationship between changes in technology and skill 
levels are untenable. Such deterministic perspectives are flawed 
because of the unwarranted extrapolation to the level of societal 
trends of the limited evidence presented of changes in skill and 
control in selected occupations. Additionally, as Blackburn et al 
(1985) argue, they are beset by an inability to distinguish between 
different types of mechanisation which suggest contradictory skill 
outcomes. Because these theories see just one category of 
"automation” they are only able to postulate one direction of 
effects upon skill.
Ironically, these theories were formulated within an era of 
inflexible production technology and stable markets now being 
rapidly superceded and consequently rendering such views outmoded 
even on their own terms. Because of microprocessor-based and 
information technologies, mechanisation is now associated with 
increased (rather than decreased) production flexibility.
Technology may constrain work tasks required, for these are largely 
technically determined, but does not in itself determine work roles 
(Clegg 1984, P135>.
In common with the findings of previous research (Buchanan 1985; 
Child 1985. PP 134-136; Jones 1982, pl98), a number of factors 
additional to technology which act as independent influences on
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skill structures and the division of labour have been identified in 
the course of the discussion above. These additional variables are 
managerial intentions, inherent task variability, product market 
characteristics and labour market characteristics. The last two of 
these factors can operate at both the general level and 
specifically at the unit of production. The first two refer 
exclusively to the unit of production [19]. They can be expected to 
intervene to a greater or lesser degree between the choice of a 
given technology and the resultant effect on skills. In this 
section we intend to demonstrate the relevance of these factors, 
and to show how interrelationships between technology and these 
other factors may also impact on skill requirements.
First, however, let us add a note of caution. The introduction of 
these additional factors does not signal a belief in total 
contingency. The position adopted here is similar to both "labour 
process" and sociotechnical analysis in according primacy to 
managerial intentions as a determinant of labour roles within a 
given technology. However, this is done for different reasons, and 
in a more qualified fashion. There is definitely no agreement here 
with the view that managerial objectives cannot be thwarted! My 
doubts concern similar areas to those raised above in the criticism 
of labour process approaches. These objections concern the 
assumptions about the centrality accorded to labour control; 
different levels of management having identical objectives; the 
possibility of effectively insulating the achievement of labour 
objectives from the wider manufacturing and marketing goals of the
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organisation; and - as far as the introduction of particular new 
technologies is concerned - the role of existing institutional 
frameworks.
Having inserted this caveat, we can now examine the role of the 
four factors identified above, beginning with the part played by 
managerial intentions and objectives. The argument concerning the 
use of technologies by management to achieve objectives of control 
over labour can be treated at both an abstract and a specific 
level. At an abstract level any management has influence over the 
technologies that are developed. At a specific level the choice of 
technology is constrained by the requirement to perform a 
particular set of production tasks. Within this limit management 
then has a degree of choice about the policies it wishes to adopt 
towards labour roles, and the extent to which these determine the 
final configuration of the technology employed [20].
The choice for patterns of working policies and labour control 
within a given technology, which Littler and Salaman (198*0 have 
called "design space", will also be affected by the interplay 
between different managerial objectives. A useful distinction has 
been drawn between three types of management objective, which tend 
to be characteristic of successively lower levels of management. 
These are respectively strategic objectives, which are external and 
market-orientated, such as a more rapid rate of product innovation; 
internal and performance-orientated operational objectives, such as 
high machine utilisation; and control objectives, which include
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labour control and improved management information (Buchanan and 
Boddy 1983, PP 243-244).
All of these objectives (insofar as they are present) will impinge 
upon work organisation and the degree of latitude in decision­
making accorded to operatives. As Buchanan and Boddy rightly argue, 
the pursuit of control objectives may conflict with and impair the 
achievement of strategic and operating objectives. A policy of 
devolution of labour control will tend to favour the retention of 
skill on the shopfloor, the kind of autonomous workgroups advocated 
by sociotechnical writers* and the compensation for production 
variables at source. Tight labour control will reproduce the 
Taylorite pattern of highly prescribed work roles and the transfer 
of major production decisions from the shopfloor to professional 
engineers and managerial personnel. Plant size appears to be an 
important variable in determining the institutionalisation of the 
division between categories of labour and the autonomy permitted to 
production workers in methods decisions (Sorge et al 1983).
The subdivision of tasks and lack of autonomy implied by the 
pursuit of labour control objectives appears counterproductive in 
view of the increased interdependence between manufacturing 
functions engendered by microelectronic technology (Buchanan 1985)• 
As Buchanan argues, the pursuit of control objectives is likely to 
be disfunctional to overall efficiency to the extent that 
unexpected variances enter into the production process. It becomes 
less likely in circumstances where the possession of production
92
expertise is diffused among many separate occupational specialisms 
that anyone with the ability or authority to correct errors will be 
available to catch them as they arise at source.
A distinction needs also to be drawn between policies for labour 
management at plant level and changes proposed to those policies 
because of the introduction of particular new items of equipment 
(Jones and Scott 1986). Proposed changes in work patterns as a 
result of the introduction of new technology are crucially mediated 
by already existing frameworks for working practices operating 
within influential institutional contexts. Technological 
innovations - especially those having implications for several 
manufacturing activities simultaneously - can provide challenges to 
these established norms. However, in all bar exceptional 
circumstances (such as relocation on a "greenfield” site) they must 
be somehow "fitted in" to existing company organisational systems, 
cultures and industrial relations frameworks. These latter are 
unlikely to have been built up in readiness for the new 
technological systems, but will ultimately have the potentially 
greater influence over labour deployment. This tends to be ignored 
in practice, as innovation is normally seen as essentially a 
technical process to which human and personnel factors are 
secondary and consequent (Clegg and Kemp 1986; Jones 1984c; Jones 
and Scott 1986).
Let us now turn to the second factor: task variability. As Perrow 
(1970) argues, the variability inherent in tasks is determined by
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their degree of complexity and uncertainty. Perrow refers to 
variations mainly in the context of the raw material of the 
product, but we wish to emphasise additionally variability in the 
process of production itself. Mechanisation may have contradictory 
effects upon task variability depending upon the interplay of the 
changing demands of the product and process. As Buchanan (1985* PP 
24-25) says, one of the purposes of mechanisation (and particularly 
flexible microprocessor-based technologies) is to eliminate the 
need for human discretion in dealing with exceptional circumstances 
in the manufacture of products.
With relatively standardised products whose requirements are well- 
known and static this is likely to present little difficulty. 
However, Buchanan argues that (even with the aid of advanced 
manufacturing technology) it will not be possible where products 
are frequently changing, or where the procedures for dealing with 
exceptions are difficult to analyse directly or poorly understood 
(as with craft knowledge). In such cases one may still need to 
compensate for variability at source, although whether this happens 
or not will depend on managerial intentions (see above). But, as 
Hirschhom points out, the price of building control over product- 
centred variability into systems may be an increased dependence on 
operators to manage greater instability in process-centred 
variability. In other words, even if product complexity and 
uncertainty can be diminished by mechanisation, this may only mean 
that the sophistication of the new process creates novel types of 
fault and sources of uncertainty.
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Thridly, product markets are generally becoming more differentiated 
and rapidly changing (as was noted in Chapter One). At the level of 
the unit of production, firms* response strategies to these 
developments will impact upon skill requirements in terms of such 
factors as the breadth of product range, quality required, batch 
sizes, response times demanded, rate of product innovation, 
complexity and novelty of components, and so on. The product 
spectrum will in turn determine the complexity and variability of 
the tasks required, and reflect back on the possibility and/or 
desirability of pursuing particular managerial objectives towards 
labour roles.
Our final factor concerns the role of the labour market. At a 
general level the labour market affects individual firms in terms 
of the balance of supply and demand for particular kinds of labour. 
This in turn affects the general climate of labour relations in 
encouraging management or labour to act as independent agents in 
pursuit of their opposing bargaining objectives. These factors, 
which operate at both national and local levels, are further faced 
at the stratum of the labour market confronting the individual 
firm. Of course, different categories of labour will be in more or 
less demand even at the same time in the same plant. A relative 
scarcity of workers with particular skills not easily reproduced, 
for example, is likely to result in such groups accumulating 
considerable bargaining power, which will be reflected in such 
factors as high pay, considerable control over the labour process, 
and autonomy. In such circumstances those workers with scarce
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skills and/or who are able to maintain a high degree of control 
over the production process - such as craft workers - are also 
likely to be in an advantageous position to inflate their status 
through the social construction of skill that overlays ’’real" skill 
levels. Cockburn (1983) suggests that this has been the case with 
compositors in the printing industry, for instance.
A number of studies argue, against more traditional views, that 
technologies are often developed and adopted for labour and skill 
substitution objectives to break this dependence. Wilkinson (1983, 
pp 9-12) argues that political considerations and goals of 
production engineers and managers themselves colour the 
technologies developed and innovated [21]. For Wilkinson, and for 
Piore (1968a), these goals frequently include labour substitution 
and a reduction in skill and control on the shopfloor. Senker
(1979) also provides some evidence that the adoption of certain 
automated equipment by firms is a substitute for the lack of 
availability of skilled craft-trained labour [22],
Cockburn (1983) and Sadler (1970), in their studies of the printing 
industry, see the introduction into the production process of new 
technologies having labour- and skill-displacing effects as a prime 
factor in creating discontinuities in the process of social 
construction. Such changes will have the effect of both 
reformulating "real" skill requirements and, where skill or control 
is removed, placing pressure on the ability of the workers 
concerned to (at least) maintain their claimed skill level and
96
privileged position.
Some commentators, such as Hill (1981, pp 116-118), argue that 
technology is used to deskill in turn those occupational groups 
holding a pivotal position in production. This process has only 
been obscured and mitigated by the continuing social construction 
of skills, thus enabling "labelled” skill levels to be artifically 
inflated above the actual technical content. The opposite to this 
view of an immanent logic of technical development is that an 
overall redistribution of skills between different sections of the 
total workforce is occurring, resulting in a complementary process 
of deskilling and reskilling of different jobs (Edwards 1978; Jones 
1982).
In conclusion, the second view seems more accurate on the basis of 
the evidence above. The development of control mechanisation makes 
likely the formalisation of increasingly complex human abilities. 
The intervening variables are managerial intentions, product and 
labour market characteristics, and task variability; combined with 
the development of technology that is increasingly flexible in 
terms of its end use. These variables allow a considerable range of 
outcomes for work roles, control of the labour process and the 
locations of required skills. Straightforward "deskilling" or 
"upgrading" could be among these outcomes but, should this be so, 
would be filtered through the above factors. Outcomes for skills 
and work roles of the introduction of new technology must therefore 
always be assessed with these institutional factors in mind.
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CHAPTER FJVE: The labour process of small-batch machining
i) Introduction
It is clear from the discussion in Chapter Four that the "impacts" 
of particular technologies on work roles and the distribution of 
skills are partly contingent upon intervening variables acting at 
both a general and plant level. To understand the implementation of 
FMS technology it is first necessary to comprehend the particular 
characteristics of those industries producing in small batches in 
terms of the variables identified above, and the "machining labour 
process". For these have been the traditional bases whereby 
engineering workers have been able to retain a degree of skill and 
control over the labour process.
ii) The small-batch engineering industry
As a whole the engineering industry in Britain (which includes 
vehicles, aerospace, marine and electrical, as well as mechanical, 
engineering [1]) was responsible for some 10# of gross domestic 
product and the employment of some 2,100,000 workers in 1985* Total 
engineering employment has fallen by one-third (from 3.200,000) 
since 1979 (Financial Times 1986, pl5). The domestic economic 
recession of recent years has affected the less electronically 
based, maturer, sections of the engineering industry 
disproportionately hard. These conditions have been exacerbated by 
the simultaneous increase in penetration of foreign imports in many
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of the industry’s sectors. Thus reductions in employment and output 
have been most pronounced in sectors such as motor vehicles, and 
the majority of mechanical engineering industries rather than in 
sectors like aerospace (Fidgett 1984; Freeman (ed.) 1985; Sciberras 
and Payne 1985)* The total number of employees in mechanical 
engineering alone has dropped from 919t000 in June 1976 to 659»000 
in September 1983 (Freeman (ed.) 1985* P5) and to 630,000 in 1985 
(Financial Times 1986, pl5)»
Britain's Engineering Industry Training Board (EITB) divides 
engineering industry employees into nine separate categories. These 
are: managerial staff, scientists and technologists, technicians 
(including draughtsmen), administrative and professional staff, 
clerical and office staff, supervisors, craft workers, operators in 
occupations requiring at legist one week's training, and all other 
employees. One of the most pronounced trends within the overall 
engineering employment statistics has been the relative decline in 
the manual categories of operators and (less so) craft workers at 
the expense of technical and managerial occupations (Burgess 1985; 
Financial Times 1986, pl5)* The two manual classes have fallen in 
number from two million to 1,200,000 in the period 1979-85, 
although they still remain the largest single groups employed.
A declining proportion, now some 18# (approximately 500,000), of 
the total number of employees in engineering are craft workers 
(Aspinall 1981; Machine Tool Trades Association 1985. p21). The 
proportion of craft workers in each sub-sector of engineering
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fluctuates considerably, increasing in proportion to the variety 
and complexity of work, and lower batch sizes. Thus proportionately 
fewer craft workers are employed in the motor vehicle industry than 
in aerospace (Fidgett 1984) or the machine tool industry (Sciberras 
and Payne 1985; Machine Tool Trades Association 1985 # p21). Small 
companies, whose production requirements tend to be more varied, 
tend to rely more heavily on such workers (EITB 1980c).
It is important to define the categories of operator and craft 
worker here in anticipation of later discussion on changes in 
manual work roles. The Engineering Industry Training Board provides 
an official definition, which distinguishes between these two 
grades according to the breadth of skills employed, degree of 
autonomy and discretion exercised, and transferability between 
firms of expertise:
The operator:
(a) Generally works on short cycle repetitive 
tasks or task clusters.
(b) Usually works to explicit instructions and close 
supervision.
(c) His tasks are usually product or process orientated 
and therefore his skills tend to be particular to the 
company/employer. (Oxley 1981, p579t my emphases -
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PJS).
Whereas the craft worker Is:
(a) Characterised by lengthy training - usually 
an apprenticeship lasting four years.
(b) The engineering craftsman is distinguished by a broad 
range of skills which he deploys with minimal 
instruction and/or supervision.
(c) He adapts and applies his skills flexibly and with 
discernment. He therefore plans and makes decisions.
(d) His skills are highly transferable. (Oxley 1981,
P579. my emphases - PJS).
And, as the Manpower Services Commission (1984, p3) adds, craft 
workers:
are trusted to work on their own with minimal 
supervision because they are capable of achieving 
the necessary results to the standard, and in the 
time, required.
The usefulness of craft-trained machinists lies in their ability to 
independently apply abstract engineering principles of machining
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operations, tooling, materials, and cutting theory gained in their 
initial year of apprenticeship training. This provides the basis 
for the subsequent extension by practical application of this 
theory in a range of situations. Craft workers thus understand work 
problems in terms of the abstract principles underlying tasks they 
have learned to perform, and which may therefore be applied to new 
situations encountered, and to the diagnosis and solution of 
problems (Berger and Piore 1980, p21).
iii) The labour process of machining
It will be recalled from Chapter Four that a labour process 
consists of a body of purposeful activities, together with 
particular technical means and a knowledge base to achieve these.
In its widest sense a craft engineering labour process would 
involve all those activities, from design through machining to 
assembly, required for the production of an item (Kelley 1984). Yet 
this craft basis to engineering has been gradually fragmented 
through the successive separation of the various activities 
involved so that, for example, design, assembly, manufacturing 
engineering, and machining now each form distinct labour processes 
of their own [2].
At this point we shall treat machining as an occupation in its own 
right, although later sections will discuss the division of labour 
within the various tasks that make up machining. As a distinct 
labour process the "craft" of machining presupposes that certain
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task functions must be carried out [3]* These consist of planning, 
setting up the job and machine tool, performance and monitoring of 
the cutting operation, and inspection and finishing. In this 
section we will examine the nature of the tasks involved throughout 
the machining labour process and assess the skills and requirements 
necessary for the performance of these tasks. This will form a 
basis for later discussion of the division of labour within the 
machining labour process itself and the effects of mechanisation in 
small-batch machining operations.
Harrington (1973. PP 281-282) provides an appropriate introduction 
to this topic in an excellent summary of the skills exercised by 
the engineering craft worker on conventional machine tools. This 
bears quotation at length, for it provides a superb "feel" for the 
context in which craft skill is exercised:
The old-time machinist knew how to read a blueprint 
and look at a pallet of castings or forgings. He 
could plan how he would convert the raw material 
into the part shown on the drawing....
The machinist knew how to set the part up on the 
machine table or chuck. If he received a part 
unlike any he had seen before and the manufacturing 
engineer had not designed a fixture for it, he 
would confer with his foreman....
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The machinist knew how fast a 3/^ in* carbide 
tipped drill could safely be fed into an annealed 
nickel steel forging. He either found the 
information in a well-thumbed (and probably 
obsolete) handbook, or he remembered what he did 
the last time the occasion arose, or he ran his 
machine at a speed his "intuition" told him was 
safe....
When the cuts were made, the machinist could 
measure the finished part with his micrometers and 
gauges to decide whether the surfaces were within 
the tolerance limits....
Cutting tool selection and, in some shops, tool 
sharpening were normal functions of the machinist.
There is nothing more important in metal cutting 
than the complex relationships of cutting edge, 
rake, and clearance angles; tool tip shape; depth 
of cut, feed per cut, and metallurgy of the part, 
on the one hand, and the surface finish, metallurgy 
of the tool, tool wear, time required, and power, 
on the other.
The first task in performing any job is to plan a method from the 
"job card" and component drawing (see also Table 2 below). It is 
necessary to decide upon the order, sequence and nature of cutting
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operations; the tools to be used; how the job will be held in place 
on the machine; type of coolant; the most suitable speed at which 
to run the machine, and the relative rate at which tool and 
workpiece should feed into each other.
Planning is basically a conceptual process involving a series of 
decisions based on fixed information and variables. This decision 
process takes place within an implicit framework, both as regards 
the types of decisions that need making, and the existence of 
general engineering principles (the "do's" and "don't's" of 
engineering practice) in order to aid that decision-making [4]. The 
translation of this generality into specific decisions in the 
concrete situation of a particular job is based on the accumulated 
experiential wisdom of the engineering craft worker. Essential 
features of these principles are their flexibility and ability for 
modification in the light of new developments. The EITB study of 
craft skill goes so far as to characterise these principles and 
their application as "the central feature of skilled behaviour” 
(EITB 1971, p25).
For any operation on a particular machine the limitations of the 
machine itself are the first constraining factor. Its capacity, 
rigidity and range of speeds will determine what work can be put 
onto it in the first place. The component drawing and/or the job 
card will give the rest of the basic information from which it is 
necessary to work: that is, the size and shape of the workpiece; 
the material form and type; together with the surface finish,
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TABLE 2
PROCEDURE OF PLANNING FOR THE CRAFTSMAN [5]
Check drawing, job instructions and materials and decide following: 
Operation sequence- - - - - Location for further operations
Measurement
Time factor and safety
Workholding - - - - - - - -  Distortion to workpiece
Finish and accuracy 
Safety
Cutters - - - - - - - - - -  Mounting
Size and type 
Finish required 
Speed range of machine 
Safety and swarf clearance




Cutting fluids -Use as coolant 
Use for flushing action 
Use for dampening
Measuring equipment - - - - Select type required
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accuracy, operations, and batch size. Within the constraints of the 
job required and the limitations of the machine, the method of 
arriving at the finished goal is normally very much up to the craft 
worker.
In the case of planning the variable job factors such as methods 
and sequence of operations, and selection of tools, the machinist’s 
decision must take into account multiple influences, some of which 
may have synergetic effects. For example, the important final 
selection of feeds and speeds (which themselves normally possess an 
inverse relationship) is influenced by material type and form; 
tooling material, type, shape and cutting angles; size and shape of 
the workpiece; range of spindle speeds; quantity of workpieces 
required; and surface finish. To further complicate matters the 
cutting process usually proceeds in two stages: a series of 
’’roughing" cuts to remove the bulk of the metal followed by a 
"finishing" cut run at a faster speed to provide the required 
quality of surface finish.
After the planning process is complete conceptual skills are still 
required as the job must be laid out ready for machining by etching 
or dyeing cutting guide lines onto its surface. This requires 
mathematical ability and accuracy, coupled with visualising the 
shape of the workpiece at the various stages of transformation. It 
is also sometimes necessary to remove surplus rough metal from the 
blank workpiece. Following this, the job must be set up on a 
specific machine. This requires the workpiece to be fixed onto the
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machine in correct alignment (normally by means of special 
fixtures) according to the layout markings. Similarly the 
appropriate cutting tools must be set in their holders. In some 
cases it may be necessary for tools and fixtures to be made 
specially. The machine tool's rotating speed is also set at this 
point by means of the appropriate dial.
The process of setting-up demands a degree of positional accuracy 
and care directly related to the tolerances allowable on the 
finished article; and a related ability to use measuring equipment 
of a comparable standard. In the case of a requirement to perform a 
number of operations at one setting the skill needed for setting up 
will be greater, in order to position workholding equipment such as 
clamps in places which will not foul the toolpath of a subsequent 
operation at the same setting. In any case a knowledge of all the 
operations to be carried out will be required in order that the 
tool and workpiece can be positioned aright. Achieving sufficient 
tightness of tools and workholding equipment is very much a matter 
of exercising perceptual skill, for distortion will result if 
overtightening occurs. This is more critical on fragile or flimsy 
workpieces and soft materials such as aluminium.
During the actual machining operation itself the types of skill 
required tend to shift away from conceptual skill towards the 
exercise of motor and perceptual skills. The operator has a certain 
amount of discretion (within time constraints) over the method of 
achievement of a required standard of accuracy because of the fact
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that cutting is taken in two stages. The coarseness of the rough 
cuts requires relatively less attention than the finishing cuts 
which remove material to the final dimensions and surface texture 
called for. The finishing cut will normally require more accurate 
tooling (for example, a drilled hole is normally bored to the 
finish diameter) and more constant and detailed machine control.
For any machining job, therefore, the real operational skill of the 
machinist is concentrated into the finishing cut towards the end of 
the operation. The accuracy achievable here is entirely dependent 
on the manipulative skill of the operator.
The rate of feed of the tool into the workpiece (or vice versa in 
the case of lathes) is controlled by the operator via handwheels, 
and therefore calls for the exercise of a continuous combination of 
subconscious motor / perceptual abilities in the machining 
process. It is important to realise that much of the skill employed 
in the cutting process itself consists of recognising and pre­
empting the development of error conditions (Engineering Industry 
Training Board 1971)* On conventional machine tools the successful 
performance of the operation and the avoidance or correction of 
errors depends upon the exercise of perceptual and motor skills for 
defect recognition and correction.
The operator is in close proximity to the workpiece and the cutting 
process is easily observed, the view of the workpiece only being 
obstructed (if at all) by the flow of coolant or swarf. On 
conventional machine tools the operator's proximity and need for
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continuous control permits small but potentially significant 
dynamic changes in operating variables to be readily perceived and 
modified. The perceptual skill consists in the ability to detect 
very slight warning signals in, say, the colour of the swarf or the 
sound of the tool from the high level of "background noise” present
[6]. Control of the machining process in this manner relies heavily 
on reaction to sensory data, primarily of an aural or visual 
nature. The experienced machinist can detect early warning signals 
for a large number of operational errors (which can be specific to 
either the machine or the part). Many signals are common to a 
variety of different causes, however, so the skill lies in 
dissembling the exact cause at any given time. The vibration and 
ridged surface appearance characteristic of the fault known as 
chatter may be caused by over a dozen faults, which may not even be 
mutually exclusive, including incorrect speeds and feeds, worn or 
loose tooling, insecurely fixed work, etc. The appearance of ragged 
or discoloured swarf may be traced back to a number of coolant or 
tooling problems [7]- Therefore the machinist must recognise faults 
overwhelmingly by means of secondary signals.
Nevertheless a large number of faults of dimensional accuracy 
permit no easy early warning, and these must be rectified after the 
machining process is complete. Once again a single effect (i.e. 
machining out of tolerance) may have a wide variety of causes: in 
the case of tight tolerances (finer than about IT6 according to 
British Standard 1916) thermal factors from the outside environment 
itself come into play as a possible variable - heat can expand both
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workpiece and machine column causing inaccuracy. Many conventional 
machine tools suffer from a lack of rigidity in construction, and 
consequently of accuracy. Thus ability to achieve required 
tolerances is often only enabled by the "tacit" preventative skills 
exercised by the machinist to make up for the deficiencies of the 
machine tool by "tricks of the trade", such as by physically 
putting his or her own weight onto the machine to affect its 
deflection and compensate for the flexibility in its structure. In 
addition the machinist must compensate for the idiosyncracies that 
develop over time in all machine tools. It is a common observation 
in machine shops that no two machines are exactly alike, even if 
they are the same model (and this is equally true of computer- 
controlled machine tools). Machine accuracy is affected by a host 
of electrical and mechanical factors, inertia, friction and so on 
(Donmez et al 1982), while part-specific errors may be caused by 
deficiencies in the raw material or by incorrect clamping pressure 
resulting in the deformation of the part.
During operations it will be necessary to measure the part to 
ensure the machining process is according to plan. The variables to 
be measured are textural and dimensional accuracy. The inspection 
of the standard of surface finish produced basically requires 
perceptual skills. Texture is checked by comparison plates of 
guaranteed standards of surface finish which are held against the 
work. The proximity of texture is then checked against that of the 
workpiece by means of a visual and tactile comparison (EITB. H4, 
n.d., p8l), which clearly allows the machinist the exercise of a
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limited amount of discretion in passing judgement. The checking of 
dimensional accuracy, although basically similar, may have a 
conceptual content depending on the complexity of the measuring 
equipment required. Some mathematical ability may be called for, as 
in using a clinometer or vernier height gauges (see for example 
EITB. H29, n.d., pp 70-71). although this is unlikely to be more 
complicated than simple division.
Thus machining as a distinct labour process comprises a number of 
task areas (planning, job layout and set-up, the machining 
operation itself and final inspection), which demand different 
types of skill at different points. The conceptual and planning 
content of the work is concentrated into the tasks preparatory to 
the machining process itself. During machining predominantly manual 
skills are required, although we have seen that craft work implies 
the concurrent exercise of decisions to prevent the emergence of 
fault conditions.
iv) The sub-division of labour and functional organisation
We have argued above that the machining labour process comprises 
particular purposeful task functions which require certain skills. 
It has been assumed that this labour process can constitute the 
entire occupation of a craft-trained machinist. In reality, matters 
are more complex because of the role played by the organisational, 
task-centred, product and labour market factors discussed in 
Chapter Four. In this section we shall apply these factors to
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small-batch engineering in order to establish how far a process of 
skill fragmentation has occurred.
Studies of industrial relations in the labour-intensive batch 
engineering industry (Goodrich 1975; Hinton 1973; Jefferys 1946 
inter alia) argue convincingly that a primary motivation of 
management has increasingly been to gain control over the labour 
process from craft workers. The attraction to management of a 
strategy of wresting skill and control from these traditionally 
militant workers to reduce unpredictability within the production 
process and lower labour costs can be readily understood [8].
Following Kelley (1984, p65). a useful distinction can be drawn 
between a craft tradition as discussed above and a craft task 
structure. A craft tradition, in the sense of a distinct 
"artisanal" set of social arrangements surrounding the labour 
process (such as limited entry to the ranks of the "skilled" by 
means of a period of apprenticeship), remains a force of some sway 
in engineering, although now declining in influence. A parallel 
craft task structure (of the sort reviewed in section iii)) has 
been gradually whittled away by various forms of interacting 
horizontal and vertical divisions of labour since the nineteenth 
century. In small-batch engineering, firms made sporadic attempts 
(the first of which long predated Taylorism) to achieve the 
fragmentation of labour by these methods [9].
The horizontal division of labour was achieved firstly as a
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consequence of the development of particular classes of general 
purpose metalworking machine tools. By the end of the nineteenth 
century the four basic types of machine tool that exist today (the 
lathe, milling machine, grinding machine and drill) had evolved. 
Between them these tools were able to perform the main processes of 
metal removal (Williamson 1968b). The basic organisational 
principles of the Small-batch engineering production system (which 
have remained virtually unchanged since the nineteenth century, 
despite the vast increase in the scale of production since this 
time) were organised on so-called functional lines. In this form of 
organisation each type of machine tool is normally allocated to a 
particular area of the shopfloor, so that (for example) all drills 
would be clustered in one section while the various types of 
milling machine would be grouped in another area (see for example 
Edwards 1971. PP 20-21). Functional organisation was a response to 
the very diversity of batch engineering production.
The functional organisation of production based around single­
process machine tools has also resulted in a distinct pattern of 
evolution of the division of labour within small-batch engineering 
[10]. Machinists on the shopfloor were subject to a horizontal 
division of labour according to specialisation in particular 
machining processes. Sub-classes of these machine tools, which 
were often designed to simplify or eliminate human intervention as 
far as possible (as in the development of the bar-fed automatic 
lathe, for example) evolved for more specialised purposes. In these 
cases the skills required to operate such tools diminished
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accordingly. Thus, after apprenticeship, the craft increasingly 
implied specialisation on one type of machine: one was a turner, or 
a millwright, and so on. A further evolution of increasing task 
specialisation within the "craft" tradition was the development of 
the principle of "one man (sic) to one machine". This was supported 
by the main engineering craft union, which is now known as the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) [11], as a method of 
maintaining the numbers employed in workshops. Operating functions 
were further sub-divided by means of the introduction of semi­
skilled helpers to deal with ancillary tasks such as workpiece 
transfer and swarf removal.
The more significant development in the division of labour in 
machining work, however, has been its concurrent organisational 
sub-division on a vertical basis, so that management, planning and 
pre-production (indirectly productive) functions become separated 
from execution tasks. During the era of the factory system a 
feature of capitalist production has been the attempt to transfer 
the former functions from the control of the machinists on the 
shopfloor to a new class of predominantly office-based indirectly 
productive workers. In the engineering industry this was expressed 
in the advent of specialist supervisory, production control, work 
methods, quality control and other task functions. In production 
control, for example, decisions on which job should be machined 
next became the responsibility of the foreman and scheduling 
personnel; and progress chasers were employed to track down, and 
expedite the completion of, parts on the shopfloor. Most
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importantly, the Methods Department took over the craft worker’s 
task of deciding how a part would be made and the machines to be 
used in doing so, and would try to set a rate and time for the 
performance of the job.
At least in theory the craft task structure of machining has been 
threatened by the extension of the division of labour both 
laterally and vertically. The question remains to be asked, 
however: how far has this tendency towards increasing sub-division 
been realised in practice in small-batch engineering? The 
principles behind the methods described above have diffused widely 
in small-batch engineering to the point where they represent the 
standard basic structure according to which all engineering firms 
are organised. In many cases batch engineering firms have tried to 
sub-divide labour wherever possible. For example, small turned 
parts required in large numbers (such as discs or shafts) have been 
assigned to bar-fed automatic lathes staffed by semi-skilled 
operators; or complex, non-standard components have been sub­
contracted to outside engineering firms.
However, as we have hinted above, such methods have so far proved 
inappropriate to the majority of the production requirements in the 
industry, and this has resulted in an uneasy tension in small-batch 
engineering between the attempt to sub-divide and rationalise 
wherever possible, and a continued reliance on the tenacious craft 
skill of the machinist. Small-batch production, mostly carried out 
in the small firms that form the greater part of the engineering
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industry, is predomininantly concerned with the manufacture of very 
wide ranges of specialised capital goods, which are normally 
required in limited numbers and may rarely be re-ordered in the 
same design. In many cases the unpredictability and variability of 
the production requirements for such goods, and the need to 
maintain maximum productive flexibility to respond to a wide 
variety of potential orders, have necessitated continued reliance 
on craft skills in small-batch engineering. These factors have 
discouraged the rigorous application of Fordist methods through the 
pursuit of the intensive sub-division and simplification of labour, 
the detailed pre-planning of production, and standardisation of 
techniques.
The components produced are themselves often complex to 
manufacture, possibly requiring the working of difficult materials 
or machining to tight tolerances. In the latter case, the lack of 
rigidity, inaccuracy, and poor repeatability of many of the general 
purpose machine tools necessarily used has also ensured a continued 
need for machinists* skills to enable the production of components 
to the standard the customer required. In this environment a 
combination of the difficulty in analysing craft skill, and the 
unwillingness of the machinists to share their knowledge, ensured 
its retention.
The limited success of these strategies to rationalise the 
machining process can he exempli? led \yy the ?ehe o? one earVj 
attempt to introduce indirectly productive staff to take over the
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task of stipulating the operating values of machine tools. As early 
as the turn of this century, some engineering employers began to 
introduce "feed and speed men” into turning machine shops, whose 
function was to work out for each job the depth of cut and cutting 
speed. These tasks had previously been the prerogative of the 
machinist. This attempt to wrest skill from the shopfloor by means 
of a heightened division of labour was too primitive to succeed, 
though, for the following reasons:
The feed and speed instructions were very crude: a 
combination of worker resistance, and their own 
inaccuracy, effectively put a stop to the 
introduction of the instructions in their original 
form, and much more responsibility had to be given 
back to the workers in order to make the system 
operate satisfactorily. (More 1980, pp 189-190).
Moreover, the varied nature of batch production itself proved a 
stumbling block to the diffusion of the "feed and speed man" 
system. In many machine shops "such methods were not so much 
unknown as inappropriate because of the diversity of work." (More 
1980, pl90).
Other writers also show, for example, how attempts at technological 
deskilling backfired by merely stimulating new customer demands 
for work of more exacting quality. Jefferys (19^6, pl6) for 
example, details the way in which engineering employers foresaw the
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introduction of new tools such as the planer as reducing skill 
requirements. Although, in themselves, the machines did just this, 
the increased accuracies and speeds permitted by the new tools 
created a demand for entirely new classes and standards of work. 
These changed requirements enabled by the new machine tools 
resulted in skilled workers still being necessary to enable the 
novel demands to be met.
It has already been suggested that the relative strength of craft 
labour in small-batch machining constituted an important reason for 
the weight accorded by management to deskilling objectives. In 
Britain craft "skills”, and the period of apprenticeship considered 
necessary to attain them, have historically been defended by craft 
unions such as the AEU. Because of their value in bargaining over 
jobs and pay the real basis of these skills has often been 
questioned by those preferring a social definition of skill (see 
Chapter Four). Evidence confirms that the union has used its 
strength wherever possible to maintain job controls untenable by 
workers with more job-specific skills (More 1980; Penn 1982, 1984). 
For instance, the union tried (with limited success) to oppose the 
"dilution" of skills by means of the employment of less "skilled", 
non-apprenticed women workers on work normally performed by its 
members during the First World War (Hinton 1973)* Pursuing this 
theme, Penn’s (1982) study of engineers in Rochdale notes the 
ability of the craft engineering trade union in times of labour 
shortage to dictate the level of skill of the employee that will 
operate any machine, quite regardless of the "technical" skill
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requirement.
These historical attempts to assert workplace-based skill 
construction have fluctuated in their success rate according to the 
relative strengths of management and craft workers at any given 
juncture. It seems clear that the social construction of skill has 
been rife in small-batch engineering. This certainly does not mean 
that the real basis to craft skill discussed above is insignificant 
or non-existent. One would expect the much-vaunted management 
offensive launched in the wake of the post-1979 recession to have 
succeeded in pruning such social construction of skill as did exist 
prior to the time of this study. However, recent studies still 
report skill shortages at craft level in certain firms and areas, 
even despite heavy redundancies (Confederation of British Industry 
1935; Smith, M 1986; Wilkinson 1983; inter alia). Such shortages 
were also reported by many of the firms in southern Britain studied 
in this project.
Recent moves to reduce the control exercised by craft workers (and 
other directly productive personnel in engineering companies) have 
included attempts to gain greater flexibility in labour deployment 
between tasks. This managerial focus results from the belief that, 
as Kilpatrick and Lawson (1980) pose the issue, poor British 
economic performance relative to other countries can be partly 
attributed to the historical rigidity of occupational demarcations, 
which has been occasioned by the peculiar form of the British 
industrial relations system and the strength of the labour
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movement. Thus, it might be said, the preservation of "overmanning” 
through the artificial maintenance with the aid of union power of 
technologically obsolete craft divisions has hindered innovation, 
reduced the mobility of labour and increased its cost relative to 
other factors of production.
Some writers argue that an attack on the restrictions preserved by 
trade demarcation lines has become one of the most significant 
themes in industrial relations bargaining generally in the 1980s; 
and that economic and technological pressures have led managers to 
attempt to win greater flexibility among employees (Connock 1985). 
For so-called "core" groups of employees, such as craft workers, 
pressures for flexibility mainly take the form of attempts to make 
workers responsible for a more extensive task repertoire, which 
Atkinson (1985) calls functional flexibility [12]. Studies of 
progress towards craft flexibility in British manufacturing 
industry (which include examples from batch engineering) suggest 
that the two main enabling factors for employers have been the 
labour shakeout caused by the economic recession of the post-1979 
period coupled with the introduction of new technology (Atkinson 
and Meager 1986; Dunn 1986; Incomes Data Services 198^a, 1986). It 
is largely coincident that these two factors should come into play 
at the same juncture. However, it is possible that their 
combination in firms badly hit by the recession but nevertheless 
investing in new technology may well have produced synergetic 
effects enabling both labour reductions and more flexibility from 
those workers directly involved with the new systems.
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Empirical studies convincingly question just how widespread or 
effective the drive towards labour flexibility has been. They 
conclude overall that major headway has been minimal, agreements 
have often been subject to formal and informal workforce or union 
pressure for reversion to previous arrangements (Incomes Data 
Services 1984a, 1986), existing demarcation lines have proved 
tenacious, and that little extra training has been provided by 
employers (Atkinson and Meager 1986; Labour Research Department 
1986). Major changes in labour flexibility are usually related to 
production on greenfield sites and/or the introduction of new 
technology [13]* Work role modifications on greenfield sites 
include fewer tiers of management and supervision, minimisation of 
status differences, avoidance of existing trade demarcations and 
the "restrictive" practices of other plants, thus enabling 
attainment of maximum functional labour flexibility. The 
institution of forms of vertical or horizontal labour flexibility 
intended to encourage joint responsibility, individual motivation, 
discretion and autonomy, and to reduce indirect costs is often part 
of this process (Incomes Data Services 1984b).
It can be seen overall that the high degree of production 
flexibility required in small-batch engineering has preserved a 
considerable role for the craft skills of the machinist. By its 
nature this skill is hard to analyse. With this skill, therefore, 
has come control over the labour process, a degree of which has 
remained, despite encroachments by some technological and 
organisational developments, and management intent.
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v) Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the nature of craft skill within the 
small-batch engineering industry. It has shown that, 
notwithstanding atrophy over the long term, features inherent in 
this sector as the producer of specialised capital goods have been 
responsible for a continuing requirement for such skill. Despite 
considerable social construction of craft skill at periods of 
labour strength, such skill must have an underlying real basis, 
otherwise the concept of craft control could not be 
operationalised. The real basis lies in the tacit conceptual and 
executive skills which form the grounding for so much craft job 
knowledge.
Managerial intentions have succeeded to some degree in reducing the 
skill and control exercised by craft workers. These intentions 
spring from a Fordist dream of production rationalisation. This 
vision entails both decreasing labour costs through skill 
substitution (as labour has been believed to form a high proportion 
of total costs in batch engineering); and increasing the 
predictability in operations through the transfer of as much 
control over the production process as reasonably practical.
Considerable emphasis has been placed by managers on reducing 
labour’s control over the production process at the expense of 
tackling the basic organisational problems of batch engineering. 
These include low rates of machine utilisation stemming from the
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frequent need for skilled and lengthy resetting of machines; a lack 
of control over the production process, due both to the autonomy of 
labour, and to the complexity of production and inventory control 
under functional organisation for wide varieties of parts; long 
component lead and throughput times, which were hampered by and 
high material costs tied Up in scrapped components, work in 
progress (WIP), and in finished stocks because of the need to 
machine components in an economic batch quantity (EBQ) [14].
Overall these problems have resulted^ the inability to respond 
rapidly and flexibily to changing production demands (Skinner 1971; 
Williamson 1968b, 1972).
Indeed, the focus on sub-dividing labour, when pursued, has 
actually exacerbated organisational problems. Labour fragmentation 
has created both formal and informal job demarcations, and 
consequently greater difficulty in overall coordination and control 
of operations between different groups in the production process. 
This latter point was demonstrated in the example of the rise and 
fall of ’’feed and speed men”.
Technological developments, which might be another vehicle for the 
removal of skill, have been sparse because of the difficulty (until 
recently) of developing cost-effective special purpose machinery to 
operate at low scales of production. Secondary and tertiary 
mechanisation have thus only affected the periphery of small-batch 
engineering. Sometimes, moreover, their effect has been to create 
new skills which have given birth to new roles for the craft
124
worker.
The managerial problem to be confronted in small-batch engineering 
can therefore be summed up as follows. There is a need for 
production flexibility, which in turn presupposes a need for 
versatile technology. Hitherto the use of such technology in the 
form of general-purpose machine tools has involved the devolution 
of considerable control over the labour process to skilled craft 
workers. The power conferred by this control has prevented managers 
from obtaining labour flexibility; and the development of 
horizontal and vertical demarcations has impaired the ability to 
achieve a rapid response to market changes through a wider 
organisational flexibility. We can now turn to the technical and 
organisational solutions that have been proposed to these problems.
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CHAPTER SIX: Technical and organisational change in small-batch
machining
i) Innovation in small-batch machining
Several technical and organisational innovations have been 
introduced into small-batch machining in recent decades, of which 
FMS is but one of the most recent. The basis for the development of 
FMS rests on two preceding innovations which were separately 
introduced into batch engineering, particularly from the 'sixties 
onwards. These are an organisational arrangement called group 
technology, and a set of technical changes generically known as 
numerical control [1]. Group technology is an alternative form of 
production organisation to the functional type; while numerical 
control transfers the technical control of a machine tool's cutting 
process from human to programmed form. The program can be expressed 
in either "hard-wired" punched paper tape (NC) or, latterly, "soft- 
wired" digital forms (computer numerical control, or CNC). Direct 
numerical control (DNC) - a further refinement, and a prerequisite 
for FMS - enables the transmission of programs to individual 
machine tools from a central computer.
GT and NC should be understood in terms of their usefulness as 
analytical tools to comprehend the basic technological and 
organisational principles on which FMS is grounded rather than as 
production systems in themselves [2], for diffusion of both GT and 
NC in Britain has been minimal to date [3]. The relevance of
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discussing these precursive innovations here stems from 
contemporary debate upon the intended and actual changes in the 
machinist’s labour process as a result of their introduction. Our 
investigation provides the background to the argument in subsequent 
chapters on how labour roles evolve further with FMS.
Firstly, as we saw in Chapter One, the subject of whether such 
innovations have been basically intended to extend to low-volume 
manufacture traditional, quantifiable, ’’Fordist" production 
benefits has been much debated. Such benefits include calculable 
gains like reduction in inventory and work in progress levels, 
faster throughput times, higher levels of utilisation of capital 
equipment, and reduced unit labour content (particularly that of 
direct labour). Moreover, it is alleged that the increased control 
over production available through innovations like GT and NC 
largely equates with a desire for tighter specification of labour 
roles and a reduction in workers’ discretion. Thus technical 
flexibility is viewed in terms of an operational ability to 
increase management control, eliminate human intervention and 
machine downtime, and thus boost productivity.
In contrast to this narrow approach, it has been argued that the 
increasing fragmentation of product markets renders these 
traditional cost and labour control aims increasingly insufficient 
to resolve wider business and marketing problems. Recent evidence 
suggests that these difficulties are particularly relevant to 
British manufacturing industry [4]. Instead, it is suggested, the
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pursuit of intangible, qualitative, "strategic” benefits available 
through increased flexibility and wider manufacturing control are 
more important reasons for innovation [5]. Such benefits include 
improved product quality and consistency, reduced need for fitting 
and assembly work, ability to respond more rapidly to market 
changes in terms of product mix, volume, or type of product 
produced, and rationalisations of product designs. Qualitative 
benefits are difficult to define or measure because of the 
additional (and often poorly understood) dimensions of the 
manufacturing flexibility available, and may consequently be more 
difficult to exploit [6], but may have an indirect, "knock-on", 
effect in improved long-term manufacturing profitability, as non­
price factors become more important in overall competitiveness 
(Goldhar and Jelinek 1983; Jones 1985c).
Controversy has also centred on the extent to which traditional 
"Fordist" productivity and labour control objectives are realisable 
through innovations like GT and numerical control in small-batch 
machining while preserving necessary adaptability. Chapters Four 
and Five showed the difficulty of attaining these goals while 
simultaneously retaining the production flexibility associated with 
functional organisation and conventional machine tools operated by 
skilled labour. And, as Fenwick (1984, p27) says, automation in any 
form introduces an element of dedication into the manufacturing 
process and reduces productive flexibility. It will therefore be 
difficult to harmonise the competing claims of productivity and 
adaptability. For example, high levels of machine utilisation will
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be more difficult to achieve if a firm also desires frequent 
switches between products to capture new markets.
Several questions interest us here. Firstly, to what extent does 
the introduction of GT and the various generations of numerical 
control demonstrate the application of traditional labour control 
and deskilling objectives? Where attempted, it is possible that 
such aims could be thwarted by a number of factors. These might 
include a technical requirement for machinists to acquire 
additional skills or to exercise greater judgement than hitherto, 
or resistance to deskilling through industrial bargaining power. 
Secondly, how far has the pursuit of labour control aims through GT 
and NC proved compatible with the achievement of productivity and - 
even more so - production flexibility benefits under conditions of 
more complex and integrated technology, and of increasing market 
fluidity and fragmentation? To what extent, therefore, have these 
innovations enabled the satisfaction of more or less varied market 
requirements while incorporating the technical control of 
activities that would otherwise be the prerogative of labour? 
Through investigating these questions we hope to better understand 
the manner in which FMS’s proposed solutions to productivity, 
control, and adaptability in small-batch manufacture flow from the 
shortcomings of these less integrated systems.
ii) Group technology
Group technology, which was much discussed in the ’sixties and
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'seventies, was intended to redress shortcomings of functional 
organisation such as low machine utilisation and long resetting 
times, poor production control, and high material and labour costs. 
GT developed in three phases: group technology, cell layout, and 
group working (Bornat 1978). GT’s first stage promised firstly the 
reduction of the time and skill involved in machine set-up. The 
essential feature of GT is that it reverses the emphasis found 
under functional organisation on differences between components, 
and concentrates instead on their similarities. "Families" of 
components are formed according to their alike size and shape [7]* 
Specialist, semi-dedicated, tooling and set-ups could be designed 
for machining of such part families on given machine tools, 
allowing a reduction of necessary changeover times between 
different batches within a given part family (Mitrofanov 1966).
The second stage of GT, cellular manufacture, proposed a group - 
rather than functional - layout [8] to bring simplified, faster 
material flow and, with it, improved production control. Cellular 
manufacture extended the basis of classification to a requirement 
for similar sequences of different machining operations. Such part 
families could then be routed for production on set machine tools, 
which (by logical extension) could be grouped into specific working 
areas, or "cells", -on the shopfloor (Hyer and Wemmerlov 1984, 
pl42). This created a simplified, although largely fixed, path of 
material flow within component groups.
Group working, GT's final stage, applies "human relations"
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approaches to changes in the organisation of work and deployment of 
labour to GT cells. Higher productivity and improved worker 
motivation are claimed to be possible through increased flexibility 
of labour between machines. For the machinist cellular manufacture 
introduced a number of the disadvantages characteristic of flow- 
line production to smaller batch work due to the increased 
standardisation of components and techniques (Wild 1973)* Lower 
utilisation levels of individual machine tools in the typical GT 
cell encouraged managers to counteract this problem by trying to 
achieve greater flexibility of labour between machine tools than 
usually found under functional organisation [9]. It was proposed 
that a flexible workgroup smaller in number than the machine tools 
dedicated to a cell should become responsible jointly for all 
production tasks within the cell [10].
Overall, then, it was believed that GT would lead to such benefits 
as faster resetting of machines between batches of parts (through 
the use of specialised tooling set-ups), simplification of 
materials flow, materials handling and production control (as all 
components within a family are produced in one area), reduction of 
throughput times and work in progress; and thus lower demand for 
indirectly productive workers such as storekeepers and progress 
chasers (Burbidge 1975. PP 236-237; 1979)*
To what extent is achievement of the presumed increase in 
productivity, manufacturing control, and flexibility in GT 
dependent upon the modifications to labour roles proposed by the
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advocates of group working? And do the changes planned for work 
organisation entail increased or decreased levels of skill and 
control exercisable by machinists? Three conflicting explanations 
have been preferred on the basis of analysis of some well 
publicised examples of GT "successes" (Bornat 1978) [11]. These 
accounts originate respectively from "technicist", sociotechnical, 
and neo-Marxist perspectives.
The first approach suggests that the economic and technical aspects 
of group technology are the main reasons for its success, with 
changes in labour flexibility being largely irrelevant. Any social 
benefits that may accrue in terms of increased job satisfaction are 
seen as incidental secondary, if useful, consequences of the 
technical changes (see Gallagher and Knight 1973; Hyer and 
Wemmerlov 1984).
A second school of thought is influenced by the ideas of the 
sociotechnical theorists. Edwards (1971* 1974b), Fazakerley (1974), 
and Burbidge (see especially 1976) argue that the advantages of 
group technology cell layout in terms of higher productivity cannot 
be separated from greater worker motivation attributable to 
benefits from work reorganisation. These writers’ stress falls on 
the importance of predominantly horizontal forms of task 
flexibility such as job enlargement and task rotation within self- 
contained work groups. It is believed that improved worker 
motivation will result from an increased breadth of responsibility 
for the process of manufacture, encompassing several different
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machines, perhaps of dissimilar types, thus creating a new 
involvement with the machining of a component from start to finish; 
possibly more varied work because of the likelihood of lower batch 
sizes; increased autonomy while still being part of a distinct
team; and higher pay as a result (which can be financed through the
higher productivity) (Burbidge 1979* p2^5)« Burbidge (1978, p89) 
claims that skill requirements are often increased in GT cells.
The third school of thought is primarily influenced by Marxist 
writings. It is concerned with relating changes in labour 
organisation within a specifically capitalist labour process to the 
development of a real subordination of labour in the Marxist sense 
(that is, the control of human labour power by machinery) [12]. 
Reversing the sociotechnical school’s interpretation, Bomat (1978) 
and Green (1978) argue that the economic benefits of group
technology occur at the expense of workers' skills and control over
the production process.
It is argued firstly that group technology offers management the 
opportunity to reduce skill levels by limiting the variety of parts 
processed in any one cell (through their classification into 
families of like components); use of more specialised machine 
tools, and rationalisation of the variety of tooling and set-ups. 
Through these techniques the level of overall skills required 
within the cell is reduced accordingly. As Bornat (1978, pp 77-78) 
argues, for example, the reorganisation of product information and 
machining along the lines suggested by group technology then
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provides a basis for further automation by means of the 
simplification of workflow and machining processes.
Secondly, it is argued that management control over production is 
increased. GT is thought to extend to small-batch engineering mass 
production's depersonalised technical control over workers' 
execution of tasks. Quality and production control are built into 
the system. This technical discipline functions through the 
interdependence of workers (each team member has a vested interest 
in ensuring he or she receives work of adequate quality from team 
mates), the fact that overall accountability rests with one person 
(the cell's foreman) rather than many, and the removal from workers 
of discretion in scheduling.
For these reasons the above critics argue that the sociotechnical 
proposals for the creation of autonomous work groups are not 
incompatible with what they see as increased management control and 
deskilling, for such "autonomy'' disguises the reality that most of 
the major methods decisions on work planning and scheduling have 
been removed from the shopfloor into the Planning Office. Thus, it 
is argued, production engineers and managers can afford to grant 
what superficially resembles greater autonomy, although the 
worker's performance is in fact now more closely specified and 
technically supervised than was possible under functional layout.
The neo-Marxist argument that GT has the consequence of enhancing 
and centralising overall management control of the production
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process at the expense of workers’ discretion appears convincing. 
But, while GT may have reduced workers' control, it is less certain 
that they were also "deskilled’. Some evidence (Leonard and 
Rathmill 1977®. 1977b) confirms our view that GT’s outcomes for 
skill levels and working practices are more indeterminate than the 
neo-Marxists suggest. Leonard and Rathmill insist that the 
implications of job flexibility for skill levels have proved highly 
ambiguous. As they ask, does labour flexibility refer to:
a skilled operator producing parts on another 
specialist machine? A semi-skilled operator using a 
skilled operator's machine? Or a skilled operator 
making simple parts? (Leonard and Rathmill 1977b,
P^3)
Leonard and Rathmill (1977a)* who argue for the need to generally 
reduce operator skill requirements in engineering, conclude that GT 
systems could only have viably achieved both this objective and 
improvements in machine utilisation if used on flowline principles 
for machining simple parts with a high similarity of design (such 
as valves) [13]• GT was, therefore, technically ill-suited to more 
than a small proportion of the wide variety of products machined in 
small-batch engineering, and this partly accounts for its minimal 
diffusion. Considerable preparatory classification and coding of 
very wide varieties of components into families would have been 
necessary. Even with the aid of a computer this presupposed a 
significant amount of indirect work, which even many firms that did
135
consider GT thought unjustifiable (Gill 1985# p69) [!**]•
GT also failed in the ’seventies for industrial relations and 
organisational reasons [15]» many of which are still relevant. 
Management were unwilling to tackle existing demarcation lines and 
labour practices for fear of shopfloor resistance, or to invest in 
necessary extra training [16]. Where attempts were made to attack 
demarcations in the process of introducing GT, Leonard and Rathmill 
(1977a) note that there were difficulties in obtaining the desired 
degree of labour mobility. Further, as the above quote indicates, 
the first two of Leonard and Rathmill’s three possibilities imply a 
need for training to be provided for additional skills, thus 
increasing workers' bargaining power at the expense of management 
and confounding deskilling motives. Under GT many firms 
underestimated the amount of retraining of already skilled workers 
that would have been necessary to adequately instill the skills of 
operating different types of machine tool, and were reluctant to 
pay the price for achieving labour flexibility by providing extra 
training (Leonard and Rathmill 1977a; Swords-Isherwood and Senker 
1978). The organisational complications were also prohibitive. 
Because of the wide variety of parts processed in small-batch 
engineering, in many cases GT cells resulted (ironically) in 
increased complexity of overall production control. It was less 
versatile than functional organisation in terms of the ability to 
produce a given part on different machines (which we shall call 
routing flexibility) and to respond to sudden fluctuations in 
production volumes (volume flexibility). Moreover, much expensive
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upheaval would have been Involved in the change from functional 
layout and organisation to GT.
Evidence indicates that GT's promise of increased productivity, 
manufacturing control, and flexibility of resetting was only 
attainable in certain restricted applications. In particular no 
necessary correspondence can be found between GT and ”deskilling”, 
although machinists' discretion appears to have declined. The skill 
in machine operation was still firmly located within the operator. 
It seems highly likely that many firms realised that labour 
flexibility, if it required additional skills, might actually 
compound the problems of labour cost and control they hoped to 
solve and, for this reason among others, did not pursue GT.
iii) Numerical control; separating conception from execution?
Many of the benefits of productivity, control over production and 
labour, and flexibility claimed for GT were also believed to be 
achievable through the technical means of the numerical control of 
machine tools. With numerical control these benefits were intended 
to occur through increasing mechanisation of machine tools 
requiring reduced labour inputs, management-determined production 
methods and cycle times, improved manufacturing information, and 
the ease of reprogrammability. After the effective demise of GT in 
the 'seventies the diffusion of NC in small-batch plants began to 
increase therefore, although the technology had been first 
developed as early as the late 'forties for complex applications in
137
the aerospace industry [17] •
The term ’’numerical control” conceals a number of stages of 
technical development. It is necessary first to appreciate these 
different phases in order to see why - as we shall argue below - 
possibilities for machinists to expand their skills and control 
have been extended by successive technical refinements. Under 
numerical control the control of a machine's cutting motion, and 
the sequence of necessary operations, are directed by programmed 
means rather than the conscious activity of a machinist. In its 
original form, NC, the ’pattern” of coordinates for the tool to 
follow (the toolpath) and other necessary sequential commands (such 
as instructions to turn coolant on and off, to change tools and so 
on) was generated digitally on a mainframe computer, the 
information transferred to punched paper tape, and this program fed 
in sequence through a control unit connected to a machine tool 
(Noble 1985).
Manufacturing control objectives were enhanced by direct numerical 
control, which linked groups of stand-alone NC machine tools to a 
central computer with a larger memory and "downloaded” the required 
programs from this to the relevant machine tool. DNC was even more 
complex and expensive than NC (and was only adopted in a few large 
aerospace plants), but overcame the incompatibility of the control 
systems on different (particularly early generation) NC machine 
tools, and their lack of computing power and program storage 
ability. Improved management information on machine status could
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then be obtained through the transmission of data in the opposite 
direction to a central level.
The level of flexibility and manufacturing control available from 
numerically controlled technology was really revolutionised by the 
development of microprocessor-based CNC in the ’seventies. CNC 
provides a cheaper, more powerful, compact, and reliable means of 
machine control than its predecessors (Ferguson 1978). Computer 
numerical control allows part programs to be amended more quickly 
and simply than could the older punched paper tapes (a form of 
adaptability I shall call modification flexibility). Greater 
computing power means that it is possible to store and run 
increasingly complex part programs and to incorporate additional 
facilities into machine tool control systems, making available more 
management information (such as machine status), diagnostic 
maintenance routines (such as displaying fault codes in the case of 
malfunction) and other information of value to the machinist. This 
permits improved management control over the production process by 
allowing statistical data on performance efficiency (such as 
information on machine utilisation and downtime) to be collated. In 
the more powerful recent versions of CNC programs can even be 
created through manual data input (MDI) of information into the 
machine-level control unit [18]. CNC enables all these facilities 
to be obtained at the level of the individual machine tool. DNC, 
now redeveloped on the basis of microprocessors, replicates these 
advantages of CNC, but centralises the locus of machine control. 
With DNC, machine-level CNC controls are little more than a
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transmission belt for the downloading of part programs from a 
central computer and the uploading of management information 
(Harrington 1973; Kochhar and Bums 1983).
The mechanical capabilities of numerically controlled machine tools 
themselves have increased concurrently with the innovations in 
control systems. The development of the machining centre 
demonstrates this particularly [19]• Such machine tools are multi­
functional, integrating hitherto separate machining processes such 
as milling, drilling, boring and tapping; and increasingly 
universal, being able to perform a number of operations at one 
setting. They can also assume a number of hitherto manual 
monitoring and ancillary functions, such as changing tools and 
compensating for unexpected machining conditions. A further 
embellishment is the partial mechanisation of the material transfer 
process by the provision of a number of pallets on which workpieces 
may be set up away from the machine tool, and then presented to the 
machine according to a predetermined schedule. Remote set-up and 
automatic toolchanging finally permit the considerable increases in 
machine utilisation that were unattainable with early numerically 
controlled tools. Much improved cutting speeds and standards of 
accuracy compared to older machine tools are also possible with the 
more recent models of machining centre.
Radical authors such as Braverman (197*0 and Noble (1979). 
following claims made by some managerial writers (see for example 
Harrington 1973). have been influential in propagating the view
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that the main purpose of numerical control is to destroy craft 
control of machining. These writers argue that cycle times, tool 
life data, the consistency and repeatability of machining 
performance, machining methods and other operating phenomena can be 
precisely specified under NC, thus removing the variability caused 
by the operator*s direct control over the machining labour process.
Enhanced managerial control finds expression largely in the manner 
in which the machining labour process is fragmented under NC. The 
machinist's most skilful tasks concerned with methods decisions on 
job planning, set-up, fixturing, feeds and speeds, and tooling are 
taken over by process planners and manufacturing engineers - 
although, in some cases, certain of these responsibilities had 
already been transferred under conventional methods - and by a new 
office-based occupational specialism responsible for part 
programming. The part programmer's main task is to construct a 
computer program to replace the operator's direct control over the 
planning and performance of the machining operation. The machinist 
is neither required to conceptualise and plan how the part is to be 
made nor to directly control the machine's motion, as these tasks 
are incorporated into the part program. On this view, the machinist 
is reduced to loading and unloading the job and minor monitoring, 
finishing and inspection tasks. For Braverman and Noble NC as a 
system of manufacture completes the deskilling of engineering work 
begun by Taylorist methods of organisation by enabling the 
rationalisation of variables in the production process and 
extending the division of labour in small-batch machining.
1*11
Predictions of an overall deskilling of operators have not been 
borne out, however (Taylor 1978, p95)• Radical authors made three 
mistakes. Firstly, they failed to appreciate the technical reasons 
for the division of labour under NC. They also underestimated the 
continued requirement for machining skills with numerical control 
in small-batch production and the methods whereby machinists were 
able to retain control over the labour process (see also Chapter 
Four). Finally, they neglected to take account of the manner in 
which the technical flexibility of CNC has disproved the assertion 
that numerical control has rigid organisational ramifications.
To take the first point, technical difficulties in the original 
development of NC made it unamenable to decentralised control. 
These were exacerbated by the production requirements and well 
established organisational demarcations in most of the plants that 
could afford NC. NC was originally used within the aerospace 
industry to ease the ability with which the contouring of 
complicated parts could be reproduced without the inaccuracies 
inherent in templates or manual control (Ferguson 1978). Thus NC 
was developed for the production of relatively low batches of 
complex components with high quality standards and cycle times that 
would otherwise have required a very high direct labour content. 
Such components would have been technically very difficult - 
perhaps impossible - to fashion by manual means (Noble 1979). 
Programming control tapes for such NC jobs was therefore a time- 
consuming, repetitive and intricate process on the relatively 
primitive computers then available. As utilisation rates of stand­
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alone NC machine tools tended to be low in practice anyway [20], 
managers would not have wished to diminish them further by 
permitting the operator to construct the program. Technical support 
facilities such as programming were readily supplied in the large 
establishments where NC was first used. Once established, however, 
this division of labour was reproduced when NC then found wider 
application in smaller engineering firms, and for turning and other 
less complex small-batch work requiring lower precision.
Secondly, the technical limitations of NC and CNC machine tools; 
and organisational, product-related, and industrial relations 
factors specific to the small-batch environment, combined to ensure 
that such machines still often benefitted from a skilled labour 
input, and that machinists were able to maintain a measure of 
control. These variables include the design of the machine tool 
itself (for example, whether it could change tools automatically) 
and of its control system; the ability of the part programmers, how 
well support facilities were coordinated, the prevalence of a 
horizontal division of labour between machine operation and setting 
as distinct job categories; complexity and value of components, 
batch sizes machined and the frequency with which new jobs are 
introduced, thus necessitating prove-outs; and workforce bargaining 
power (Hazlehurst et al 1969; Jones 1982; Senker and Huggett 1973 
inter alia).
Compared to current numerically controlled machines early NC and 
CNC models were technically backward, and required considerable
manual attention. Continued attendance at the machine of an 
operator was still needed to perform remaining unmechanised 
functions, deal with any unpredictable contingencies that might 
arise, and (importantly) to use tacit skills to detect the 
development of potentially dangerous situations. As Jaikumar (1984, 
p35) says, a comparable level of skill to manual machines was still 
required from the operator in these circumstances, for the lesser 
skilled person was incapable of recognising systematic errors in 
the machine, and the early control systems could not notice or 
recover from faults.
Existing literature [21], confirmed by fieldwork evidence from this 
project, demonstrates that the usefulness of experienced machinists 
lies in their ability to employ their knowledge to improve machine 
performance, and thus achieving the maximum productive potential 
and versatility from NC and CNC tools. For example, a manager at 
Plant T succinctly described the traditional skills thought to be 
necessary on the company's CNC lathes as follows:
of conventional skills you lose nothing: you still 
need to know the basics of how a lathe works; what 
it can do, what it can’t do, how you set up the 
tool, when a surface finish has deteriorated, and 
that still comes down to something as old-fashioned 
as if you suddenly hear the noise it's making has 
changed. You still have to be able to put the tool 
in properly in the toolholder...
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Ironically, perhaps, evidence from Plants T-Z suggests that the 
very complexity and technical refinement of recent CNC machine 
tools creates skill requirements where additional, more 
generalised, machining knowledge is needed while control skills 
become less transferable and more process-specific. Because 
machining centres can perform several different types of machining 
operation at one setting, they therefore require the recombination 
within the operator of the specific basic skills and knowledge 
relating to these hitherto separate machining processes. The 
improved technical performance of CNC machine tools in terms of the 
increased speed at which it is possible to cut (which increases the 
potential for damage in case of error), and the geometry and 
quality of work achievable compared to conventional machines, also 
brings about a need for an improved understanding of the 
theoretical aspects of cutting and how these relate to the 
capabilities of particular CNC machines. CNC machinists interviewed 
in the project fieldwork emphasised the importance of familiarity 
with a particular machine control system for optimum performance 
[22]. CNC control systems can vary widely, and sometimes use the 
same codes for different purposes. Therefore, as Sorge et al (1983* 
pp 1-2) argue, the main changes in skill requirements for 
machinists operating CNC machine tools consist of ’mastering a more 
demanding cutting process by means of electronic controls which 
become increasingly easy to use.”
Organisational factors allowing the retention of machinists’ skill 
and control include the difficulties of coordinating information
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between different grades of personnel when management chose to sub­
divide machining labour, and the frequently haphazard availability 
of support facilities. The fragmentation of necessary tasks between
4C*
programmers, machine setters, and operators created difficulties in 
coordinating vital machining information. Off-shopfloor 
programming, although often intended to bypass machinists' 
expertise, was normally unable in practice to optimise the metal 
cutting process without their assistance, and access to their tacit 
knowledge. This proved especially true when those employed as part 
programmers had not previously been machinists themselves [23]. In 
an important sense the hiatus in knowledge between programmers, 
setters and operators:
derive(s) from the problems of communicating 
technical information between occupations that have 
been organisationally segregated. (Jones 1983,
P99).
Thus Hearn (1978) even argues that effective and unambiguous 
communication between these different grades of personnel is the 
key to successful exploitation of numerical control. Furthermore, 
as Jones (1982) observes of NC, deskilling and overall control of 
labour were lessened because support activities necessary to 
reaping the benefits of fixed cycle times (such as provision of the 
right tooling and fixtures at the right place and time) often 
appeared to be as uncoordinated as before. Managers frequently 
relied on machinists' initiative in such circumstances to enable
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the continuity of production.
The high value and degree of complexity of many of the jobs 
allocated to numerically controlled machines made it advisable to 
employ skilled operators in order to optimise the running of the 
machines and avoid accidents. Indeed, Hazlehurst et al (1969) find 
that the skill levels for particular NC jobs often have more in 
common with those for the conventional jobs they replace than with 
other NC jobs. This is because of a continued requirement for 
skills relating to knowledge of the product and its machining 
difficulties. When new jobs were introduced machinists' accumulated 
skills were still necessary to "prove out" the first run of a part 
program. This involved ironing out wasteful machining methods as 
well as technical programming mistakes in order to optimise the 
program for production use. High skill requirements were more 
constant when new jobs were continually being introduced, as 
required skill levels often tended to decline after amendments to 
the initial run and establishment of a "production version" of a 
program (Senker and Huggett 1973)* Hearn (1978, p2) notes, however, 
that optimum methods to minimise non-cutting time and improve 
process efficiency are difficult to visualise at the programming 
stage and may indeed vary when the next batch of the same 
components reappear. Regular skilled interventions will be helpful 
in correcting these deficiencies.
Traditional staffing patterns remained little disturbed as a result 
of stand-alone NC/CNC machine tools, despite evidence of a
1^7
managerial desire for greater control over machinists that can be 
related partly to peculiarities of British industrial relations 
traditions (Senker 198*1; Sorge et al 1983) [24] and to plant level 
internal politics (Bumes 1984; Wilkinson 1983). Craft engineering 
union activity often played an influential role both in inhibiting 
horizontal and vertical labour flexibility and, in many cases, 
preserving skilled status for NC operators in cases where 
management had attempted to reduce skill levels (Swords-Isherwood 
and Senker 1980, p22). Machinists’ control over the labour process, 
although diminished by the removal of planning tasks in the first 
instance, was not exorcised entirely, as machinists found various 
tactics to reclaim some of the control that they were deemed to 
have lost. As Wilkinson (1983) demonstrates, machinists developed 
arguments in favour of shopfloor editing and programming to 
maintain or improve their sphere of control [25] which they were 
often able to deploy against the competing claims of part 
programmers [26] (who, to further emphasise divisions, are 
organised by different unions).
Machinists’ roles sometimes formally or informally expanded into 
editing programs or reprogramming jobs themselves. Even when 
operators were officially forbidden to tamper with the programs, it 
appears that pride in the job sometimes led them to learn 
programming and to express their tacit skills in the conceptual 
terms of its abstract codes and symbols rather than techniques of 
physical coordination. The operator was also still able to exercise 
ultimate control of the feed and speed rates employed through
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access to an "override” facility officially intended for use in the 
event of unexpectedly difficult machining conditions being 
encountered. Operators used these facilities to regain some of 
their control over cutting conditions in a way management 
considered unnecessary, such as slowing down the feed rate to make 
what they thought was a better job.
NC was costly and diffused into few firms, in which the conditions 
of production were such that machinists could often retain skill 
despite the sub-division of labour. The fears of the radical 
critics that NC would usher in systematic deskilling of machining 
in the small-batch environment proved largely unfounded, although 
such a tendency cannot be denied when NC was applied to large-batch 
turning work. Skill preservation occurred partly because of the 
continued usefulness of traditional machining skills and "know­
how" , and partly due to the sometimes serruptitious knowledge 
gained by machinists of machine control procedures, which enabled 
the partial clawback of skills.
With CNC, the remaining technical obstacles to the control of 
editing and programming being located with the machinist are 
increasingly being eliminated. So a number of different options for 
the division of labour in the programming and control of CNC are 
now realistically possible [27]. The most radical possibility is to 
reverse the centralisation of support functions and allow operators 
to perform all programming themselves at machine level from 
component drawings using MDI. This technical capability reduces the
1^ 9
significance of part programming as a separate occupational 
specialism, allowing the machinist to absorb this task as an 
additional responsibility [28]. The option of decentralised 
programming returns to the operator many of the planning tasks and 
decisions on work methods removed under NC. Alternatively, one 
could choose to program CNC machine tools centrally, away from the 
shopfloor, employing specialist programmers, as was typical with NC 
(with operators perhaps being permitted a role in editing programs 
to various degrees). Taking centralisation a step further, one 
could diminish the autonomy, and degree of intervention required, 
of machinists through the use of remote office-based direct 
numerical control (which can also be interfaced with other 
information technologies, such as computer aided design and 
manufacture (CAD/CAM) databases).
How these planning and decision-making tasks are in fact allocated 
are the expression of managerial choices. This choice has become 
clearer as CNC has diffused into a wider range of small-batch 
engineering applications, and the technology has become more 
versatile and affordable to a greater number of companies [29].
Many of these firms - especially the smaller companies - have been 
unencumbered by the restrictive division of machining labour 
characteristic of NC, having never previously purchased 
programmable equipment.
Much contemporary debate on future adoption of these alternative 
divisions of labour in batch engineering turns on the degree to
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which machinists' discretionary inputs are still believed necessary 
and/or desirable for productive efficiency and flexibility in 
increasingly competitive markets. Sorge et al (1983) argue that the
•e*
continuing fragmentation of most product markets and the increasing 
complexity of parts manufactured will help to check the drift of 
direct labour skills into occupationally separate planning 
functions (which they associate with the idea of the "automatic 
factory") because of the desirability of managing increasing 
production variances at source. As they see it:
The present phase of technical advance is less 
characterised by stable, specialised mass markets, 
but by more differentiated and shifting market 
patterns which always bring about the need for 
human direct intervention because standard 
solutions are too costly, complex and liable to 
fail in view of unanticipated variety. (Sorge et al 
1983. Pl63).
Devolution of management of the machining process to craft workers 
will permit a greater flexibility of response to production 
variables and ease problems of accountability and labour 
coordination. This view is reinforced by proponents of the adoption 
of "flexible specialisation" (Piore and Sabel 1984), who set great 
store by the improved production flexibility believed to be enabled 
by such devolved labour control. The fear for management is that 
operator programming could also require expensive training, and
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lead to sub-optimal use of expensive capital equipment and 
reproduction of the worst excesses of craft control.
Centralised responses should enhance managerial control over direct 
labour and permit the precise specification of machining methods. 
The cost will be a lack of flexibility in amending programs, slow 
response to faults, reduced accountability for errors, and 
increased power for part programmers. The labour process approach 
suggests that increasingly centralised technologies and lower 
labour discretion will be chosen, even at the expense of optimum 
productive efficiency and high flexibility. DNC, as a technology 
developed for control objectives, is viewed as attractive to 
management because of its value as a vehicle for increasing 
management subjugation of the labour force (Gough and Stiller 1983; 
Winch 1983a, p9).
NC and CNC, despite - perhaps even partly because of - their 
increasing technical sophistication, have been largely unable to 
dispense with at least some role for the skill of the machinist, 
thereby allowing the retention of a degree of craft control. This 
latter has also been effective in restricting the degree of labour 
flexibility between machines realisable as a result of such 
technology. The manufacturing flexibility (in terms of rapid 
response to production problems and changing demand) increasingly 
required has continued to depend upon the autonomy and discretion 
of machinists. This versatility appears to have been most readily 
achieved in CNC systems allowing MDI, although there is no reason
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in principle why even DNC systems should not be managed and 
programmed by machinists. Such was the case at Plant V, for 
example, whose DNC system was under the explicit control of 
retrained machine setters. The question is now, however: does the 
higher level of technical control and integration enabled by FMS 
allow the simultaneous achievement of the productivity and 
flexibility denied under the technologies discussed above?
iv) FMS: flexibility for what purpose?
A wide range of productivity, control and versatility benefits are 
claimed to be attainable from the introduction of flexible 
manufacturing systems. Influential analysts (see for example 
Hartley 198*1; Ingersoll Engineers 1982) suggest that considerable 
quantifiable benefits are achieveable [30]. These include reduced 
product throughput times, lower labour requirements, faster 
changeover times, less inventory and work in progress, and reduced 
economic batch sizes. The possibility of higher levels of machine 
utilisation, particularly by exploiting the opportunity to run FMS 
unstaffed in new shifts, is strongly stressed. Such benefits are 
believed particularly pertinent to the justification of FMS in 
Western countries (Ingersoll Engineers 1982), and Britain in 
particular (National Engineering Laboratory 1978) [31]* A number of 
less quantifiable and predictable benefits such as greater overall 
manufacturing control, rationalisation of product design, improved 
management information, higher quality, shorter product lead times 
[32], better response to customer requirements and enhanced
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manufacturing flexibility are claimed to be both possible and 
largely mutually compatible with the former group of advantages.
Evidence from both this project (see also Jones and Scott 1985) and 
other analysts (Primrose and Leonard 1986; Smith, P 1986, p70) does 
suggest a concentration on the more quantifiable of the above 
benefits, albeit to the exclusion of the more intangible 
advantages. Senior management pressures for immediate production 
and high levels of machine utilisation were observed at most 
plants, and were a particular source of complaint at Plants G, K,
M, N and R. The grievance of plant engineers and operational staff 
was that they were thus denied adequate time to develop the control 
and flexibility capabilities of the FMSs concerned to accept 
broader product spectrums.
This calls into question the exact meaning of the "flexibility” 
attributed to FMS. I believe that the term is ambiguous and 
requires clarification. Several authors [33] have already 
demonstrated that numerous different types of flexibility can be 
identified within FMS which, depending upon the particular 
production benefits desired, will condition the type(s) of 
technical flexibility needed (Ewaldz 1986; Hannam 1985). On the 
evidence of this project, seven senses were identified in which the 
term "flexibility" was used [3*0* These I call machine, mix, 
routing, volume, size, modification and product flexibility. Of 
these, mix, routing and size flexibility are concepts applicable 
only to multi-machine systems. Flexibility in FMS can therefore be
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interpreted in more ways than we have done so far, because of the 
increased integration of flexible manufacturing systems. For the 
purposes of clarity, and to prepare the ground for later discussion 
of how exactly different forms of adaptability may affect skills 
and control policies in FMS, it will be helpful to define 
flexibility.
Machine flexibility consists of the ease of resetting the FMS to 
produce a different part or set of part types that have already 
been programmed to run on the system by means of the provision of a 
new set of tools, fixtures, part programs, and so on. In itself, 
however, the pursuit of machine flexibility does not discount the 
possibility that the batch sizes processed may still be relatively 
high, although the economic batch quantity will be reduced. Machine 
flexibility can also be related to the ability to achieve high 
rates of machine utilisation, primarily through minimising the need 
for human intervention in resetting FMS. Machine flexibility 
entails the incorporation of sufficient features on the work 
stations within the system to enable switching between the 
production of different components with mimimal time delay for 
resetting. For example, machine flexibility may be increased by 
reducing the need for tool changing between different jobs by the 
provision of extensive tool magazines, or by minimising the variety 
of tools the system is required to carry (by means of tooling or 
part design rationalisation).
Our second category, mix flexibility, refers to the ability of the
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FMS as a system to simultaneously process in varied ways different 
part types already programmed. Most specifically, the presence Of 
this type of flexibility would mean that components for possibly 
several different products could be produced in sets rather than 
batches at the same time. As Gerwin (1985) and Jones (1986a) claim, 
this would be a very rigorous concept of flexibility, allowing the 
considerable reduction of batch sizes and the ability to diversify 
products.
Routing flexibility consists of the ability to provide alternative 
routings for given components in the system so that a choice exists 
as to the work stations at which they can be machined [35]* Routing 
flexibility may be employed only in cases of machine tool 
breakdown, thus enabling production to be maintained by means of 
provision within the system of a level of machine redundancy; or 
under normal production conditions too. This form of adaptability 
is predominantly related to traditional operational management 
objectives of maintaining production.
The next two types of flexibility are closely related. The first, 
volume flexibility, refers to the ability to manufacture parts in 
varying volumes according to short-term fluctuations in production 
requirements. This type of flexibility would allow a reduction in 
the lead times necessary for response to changes in product demand. 
The second, size flexibility (to which other writers do not seem to 
have referred), can be employed partly in connection with more 
long-term demand changes. This is concerned with the ease of
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altering the existing FMS configuration. This could mean adding 
equipment to the FMS to respond to a need for increased capacity, 
or a wish for greater technical refinement by the integration of 
additional equipment. Equally it might have to mean removing work 
stations from the system and turning them to other uses. This 
latter type of flexibility also depends for its realisation on 
available floor space and the ability to integrate direct numerical 
control with further facilities.
The last two forms, modification and product flexibility, are also 
related, and refer to the ability to modify and expand the part 
types produced. The former of these types is believed by some 
authors supporting the "neo-Fordist" position, notably Shaiken et 
al (1986) to be the dominant form of product versatility in FMS; 
while those arguing for the existence of flexible specialisation 
tend to stress the latter. Modification flexibility is the ability 
to incorporate design changes to the parts already produced on the 
system, or to introduce within an existing family of components 
additional parts requiring only minimal alterations to data for 
current components (small changes to dimensions of drilled holes, 
for example). This refers only to making changes within part 
programs, therefore, implying incremental innovation and 
representing a relatively low addition to the learning curve.
Product flexibility refers to the ability to introduce entirely new 
families of parts onto the system in response to fluctuating and 
developing market requirements. Product flexibility is taken to
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imply major innovation requiring a considerably greater learning 
curve than modification flexibility. It refers not only to writing 
new programs but also provision of new fixtures, tooling and so on 
compatible with the existing system hardware elements.
In practice flexibility is finite. Certain of these forms of 
technical adaptability are mutually incompatible; or at least they 
are prohibitively expensive to harmonise simultaneously, as 
flexibility is further conditioned by the scale of the costs and 
time incurred to make a given set of changes. The more "flexible" 
system will be the one that can adapt more quickly and cheaply 
(Slack 1984, pl07). Authorities on FMS caution that such systems 
are not naturally adaptable, as most of their features (such as 
tools, fixtures, programs, handling equipment and pallets) 
potentially introduce an element of dedication and militate against 
flexibility (Ingersoll Engineers 1982, p31)* As Small (1983. pl37) 
encapsulates the problem: "Flexibility is selective and exists 
where it is specifically forced into the system by its planners."
To take one instance of selectivity, a system comprising a number 
of identical machining centres will enable the satisfaction of 
operational criteria such as the provision of alternative routings 
for parts within the system and response to sudden surges in demand 
(routing and volume flexibility respectively). If employed, 
however, this will reduce the ability of the system to fulfill more 
strategic objectives by accepting many different types of part 
simultaneously (mix flexibility) because of the need in the former
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cases to keep the same sorts of tooling at each machine.
Firms must therefore tailor the respects in which they require 
flexibility to the benefits desired from an FMS. In the example 
above the pursuit of routing and volume flexibility may well result 
in low levels of machine utilisation because of the need to 
incorporate into the system a possibly substantial degree of 
surplus capacity (or redundancy), which could be exploited in the 
case of breakdown or short-term additional demand.
However, FMSs may also display elements of more than one type of 
flexibility. For instance, a high level of machine flexibility 
would be a precondition for the random assignment of parts to 
machine tools proposed by a rigorous form of mix flexibility. A 
difference also exists between the explicit and implicit possession 
of a given type of flexibility. We mean by this that an FMS may 
only accidentally or belatedly be found to be capable of exhibiting 
a mode of flexibility for which it was not specifically purchased 
[36]. For example, both Plants K and P in this study were employed 
to machine products other than those for which the systems were 
originally specified. Thus they possessed an implicit product 
flexibility which was not originally intended to be exercised (or 
of which maybe even the system engineers and managers were unaware) 
but was nevertheless present. To clarify the relationship between 
these types of flexibility and the purposes of FMS introduction in 
the case study plants Appendix Three details the main aims for 
which the FMSs studied were introduced and the degree to which
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plants exhibited these seven types of flexibility in practice.
v) Conclusion
GT and numerical control could each form only a partial solution to 
the manufacturing problems of small-batch engineering. In 
particular major advances for management in productivity, while 
also reducing machinists’ skills and control, have only been 
possible at the expense of reduced flexibility in terms of the 
variety and material variability of components processable 
(although recent developments in CNC machining centres have 
allieviated this situation somewhat). Where GT and NC were applied 
with labour control and deskilling motives primarily in mind the 
result was often inflexible response to production variations, 
which was reflected in the rigid compartmentalisation of labour 
categories. In the ’sixties and 'seventies this was exacerbated by 
the technical shortcomings of the innovations, poor coordination of 
support services, and by union strength illustrated in the ability 
to maintain demarcation lines.
Current innovation is diffusing in a climate in which standardised 
technological solutions and traditional forms of labour utilisation 
are declining in effectiveness as product markets become more 
competitive and unstable. Increasingly the diversity of production 
appears to require local decision-making as to the best method of 
performance, devolution of detailed labour control and provision of 
additional training to instill the necessary skills required for
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optimum operation. Successful implementation of GT and increasingly 
powerful numerical control technologies beyond the mere periphery 
of small-batch applications might well require organisational and 
labour fixities to be challenged in a manner which would devolve 
direct control over labour in order to optimise production as a 
whole.
FMS publicity claims now hold out the promise of allowing 
simultaneous achievement of greater levels of productivity, 
manufacturing control, and versatility than have proved possible 
when GT and numerical control are applied separately. In practice 
the types of flexibility - and, with it, of benefits - available 
from FMS are indeed more extensive than were available with earlier 
innovation. But they are neither infinite nor wholly mutually 
exclusive. A choice must still be exercised in small-batch 
engineering as to the benefits and adaptability sought.
Several questions worthy of discussion in relation to the fieldwork 
evidence are raised by these findings. Firstly, to what extent have 
firms adopting the even more integrated and complex technology of 
FMS learnt from the experience of GT and numerical control that 
organisational readjustments, a greater devolution of labour 
control, and new skills and training needs are often required for 
optimum operation? Or, alternatively (and as some publicists 
suggest), does FMS enable these human resource needs to be 
effectively bypassed? And how far are these new needs dependent 
upon the kind of benefits and versatility sought from FMS?
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Changes in tasks, skills, and work roles in FMS
i) Introduction
Flexible manufacturing systems combine the technical principles of 
direct numerical control with group technology in order to 
facilitate the production of small batches of components in a 
manner akin to a continuous process. Because of the fact that FMS 
as a production process bears a resemblance to certain facets of 
continuous flow or transfer line production, some discussions of 
skill requirements in FMS use these comparators to reach a 
bewildering variety of conclusions, and to selectively emphasise 
one type of skill profile at the expense of the others. Thus, for 
example, Ingersoll Engineers (1982) foresee the operational skills 
in FMS becoming akin to those of operators in continuous flow 
processes.
On the other hand, analysts such as Shaiken (1985) and Blumberg and 
Gerwin (1984) see a continuation of the trend toward the transfer 
line form of labour process, implying less skill and responsibility 
for FMS operators. These critics argue that tasks in FMS tend to be 
highly prescribed and proceduralised, so that the technical skills 
in FMS consist mainly of mastering a more complex set of 
routinised, computer-based, procedures than those applying on 
conventional or stand-alone CNC machine tools. Procedures can be 
more easily formalised and variables taken into account, it is 
suggested, because the range of products manufactured on FMSs will
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usually be considerably less varied than in the machine shop as a 
whole [1], Blumberg and Gerwin therefore argue that the skills in 
FMS are those of a trained operator rather than a craft worker.
The diversity of opinion in the above literature on the nature of 
FMS skills often results in part from too literal an attempt to 
reduce them to those abilities characteristic of the manufacturing 
method with which the authors concerned wish to demonstrate an 
affinity; and, also, inadequate attention to Clegg's (1984) 
distinction between tasks and work roles. If these accounts are 
true, moreover, it becomes difficult to explain why, as an earlier 
paper (Scott 1985) also points out, the vast majority of the direct 
workers employed in the FMSs studied should be the products of a 
craft-trained background?
We wish to do two things in this scene-setting chapter to the later 
substantive discussion on the reasons for, and efficacy of, the 
forms of labour deployment found within British FMSs. Firstly, by 
looking at the task functions required within FMS we wish to deduce 
the consequent skill requirements and, in particular, the role that 
might still persist for the craft skills discussed above. We can 
then progress beyond these technically generated requirements to 
the latter part of Clegg's distinction by looking at the various 
possibilities of how these tasks, and inherent skills, may be 
combined into work roles, and comparing these possibilities to the 
arrangements found in the FMSs studied. We are particularly 
interested in evidence of the development of more flexible labour
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combinations which undermine traditional occupational demarcations.
ii) Task functions in FMS
To explain the task requirements of FMS it will be helpful to 
describe how a typical system works [2]. As with numerical control, 
it is first necessary to undertake considerable programming and 
preparatory work in order to introduce new components to be 
machined on an FMS (see Figure 2 overleaf). Tools and fixtures must 
be provided, machining programs written and parameters set. The 
programs for the part concerned must then be "proved out" to ensure 
that they will run satisfactorily. Fieldwork evidence indicates 
that introducing and "proving out" new parts is a time-consuming 
activity, which can take up to several weeks (depending on how 
complex the parts are, and how much time is made available for such 
development work).
To process an already "proved" mix of parts an FMS typically 
requires a number of preparatory actions (see Figure 3 below). 
Operators are notified by the host computer of the type of blank 
components next requiring machining operations and the priority 
rating of each job. These components are located, and are normally 
set up manually on prescribed fixtures at a central loading station 
[3]. The host computer is notifed by the operator that parts are 
ready for machining. It is then necessary for the host computer to 
check that the prescribed machining and any other required 
programs, and work stations, are available for use. The host
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FIGURE 2
STAGES OF TASKS IN INTRODUCING NEW PARTS ONTO FMS 
Product design  --  ^  Draughting
I  '
Planning
Methods, tools, fixtures, materials, sequence of operations
I
Programming
Write all necessary programs
Scheduling
Determine work stations to 




Load tools into work station, 
load part into fixture Download program from host computer
Prove out tape
Observe cutting process, note errors, suggest modifications
End sequence, unload part, unload tools if necessary
Inspect part
Pass part for subsequent Modify tape as required
operations, rework or reject
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FIGURE 3
STAGES OF TASKS IN PRODUCING PARTS ON FMS
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End sequence, unload part, unload tools if necessary
Inspect part
V
Modify tape as requiredPass part for subsequent
operations, rework or reject
computer also checks that the required tools have been loaded into 
the correct tool magazines, the details of which will have already 
been the subject of a previous set of instructions from the host
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computer to the system personnel.
Tool condition management becomes one of the most critical problems 
with FMS if the promised minimal staffing levels are to be 
achieved. Several mechanised methods can be employed to pre-empt, 
detect, or sometimes to compensate for, tool wear, and to recover 
from tool breakage. These include pre-programmed probing features 
on the machine tools to measure tool lengths, any deviation from 
the specified length being relayed back to the host computer and 
the dimensions updated in the relevant part program accordingly. A 
more advanced method is adaptive control (introduced in Chapter 
Four) which, on the basis of pre-programmed safety values, records 
any unacceptable torque levels drawn by tools during the cutting 
process. Alternatively, a simpler and more common method known as 
historic life monitoring involves the nomination of a cutting 
"lifetime” for each tool in the system, which is usually decided 
according to past experience. Progress toward expiry of this life 
is monitored by the central computer, which alerts operators to 
change tools when a given percentage of this point is reached. In 
most FMSs studied a number of these methods were used in 
conjunction to minimise the likelihood of part damage through tool 
wear or breakage.
Assuming the required tools have sufficient life left to complete 
machining of the component it can be released into the system for 
operations at the various work stations according to a 
predetermined schedule of routes. (This schedule need not be
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automatically generated, though it normally is.) To aid the 
progress of operations with minimal human intervention the 
individual machine tools in FMS are normally designed to reduce the 
requirement for direct human attention during the machining 
process. This is achieved by the addition of a greater number of 
mechanised measurement, feedback and control facilities than are 
usually found on stand-alone CNC machine tools. Both the literature 
(Felstead 1983; Lord 1984, pl86), and fieldwork evidence from 
Plants F, J, R, U and X, indicate that machine tool designers 
specifically intend these features to replace the sensory control 
functions by which the machinist monitors and guides the machining 
process when present rather than to confer any addition production 
flexibility [4]. Features such as touch trigger probes, pre­
programmed to detect the presence or measurement of parts and tools 
at given locations, oversee the satisfactory progress of the 
machining operations and transfer between machines. After machining 
the part is returned to an unloading station for removal from the 
system or resetting for another batch of operations.
Should the host computer detect an error or malfunction in the 
system (say, if a tool breaks or a guided vehicle misreads an 
instruction) it will normally shut down the part of the system 
concerned and notify the system personnel that attention is needed. 
If the breakdown is at a machine tool an operator will typically be 
summoned by a flashing beacon at the machine concerned. On arrival 
at the machine a diagnostic maintenance code displayed on that 
machine's visual display will often be available to help locate the
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fault. Similar systems of coded multi-coloured light beacons at 
load/unload stations are also often used to indicate to the 
operators the status of each pallet, and which pallets or machine 
tools need attention. If remedial attention is needed the operator 
will be required to confirm to the host computer when the necessary 
tasks have been performed.
Thus a particular set of task functions are required with FMS 
which, compared with stand-alone CNC machine tools, have further 
modified machine operating tasks. Certain hitherto manual tasks are 
now effectively superceded. Most importantly, it is no longer 
necessary for workers to set up workpieces on, or to actuate, 
individual machine tools, or to manually transfer components 
between work stations. Table 3 indicates those task functions which 
are always mechanised (except in very exceptional circumstances) in 
FMS.
TABLE 3
MECHANISED TASK FUNCTIONS IN FMS 
Actuation and performance of machining cycle 
Loading of tools from magazine to spindle 
Transportation of parts
Transmission of programs from host computer 
Collection of management information
The primary unmechanised human interventions now required with FMS, 
which are summarised in Table 4 overleaf, are of two types. These
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TABLE 4
EXCLUSIVELY MANUAL TASK FUNCTIONS IN FMS
A) MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
Programming of machine tools, computer routines, system parameters, 
and transfer mechanisms
Overall management of system and personnel functions
B) SERVICING AND ANCILLARY 
System start-up and shutdown procedure 
Initial loading and final unloading
Loading tools to either central tool library or tool magazines 
Use of manual over-ride facilities on machine tools (in rare cases) 
Recovery from unprogrammed malfunction





concern overall management, coordination and control of the 
technical and human resources in the FMS; and a number of 
unmechanised servicing and ancillary functions. Firstly, 
supervision, management and day-to-day coordination and control of 
personnel and production activities is still required. The extent 
of these functions is also likely to increase because of the 
greater number, integration and complexity of activities subsumed 
within an FMS. One of the most important component parts of this 
group of activities is the pre-production, preparatory decision­
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making on working methods. This includes the writing of machining 
programs, as with stand-alone CNC, but encompasses additionally a 
number of new tasks created because of the additional programming 
requirement to generate parameters for the transport system, extra 
monitoring equipment, production scheduling, and so on. Secondly, a 
number of residual servicing and ancillary productive functions are 
necessary to keep the system running. Some of these functions must 
be performed at particular points in the production cycle (such as 
changing tools, loading parts, and breakdown maintenance), while 
others are not so time-dependent (such as toolsetting, swarf 
clearance and regular maintenance).
The tasks outlined in Table 4 are technically difficult to 
automate, either because they are believed to require greater 
dexterity than mechanised means are able to achieve; or because 
they contain too much variability, a large number of exceptions, 
and/or are based on the exercise of inscrutable human judgements, 
to be formalised in computer software.
These technical limitations to mechanisation have been overcome in 
a third and expanding group of FMS task functions (outlined in 
Table 5 overleaf). These include both the coordinating activity of 
production scheduling and a further number of servicing and 
ancillary functions. The procedural rules necessary to execute such 
tasks can indeed be formalised. Doubt remains in each individual 
case, however, whether the degree of variety and complexity in the 
application concerned makes mechanisation a justifiable
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TABLE 5
FMS TASK FUNCTIONS CAPABLE OF MECHANISATION
A) MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 
Production scheduling
B) SERVICING AND ANCILLARY 
Inspection and quality control
Transmission of tool offset data into machining program 
Tool wear monitoring 
Deburring 
Swarf removal
proposition. In such cases fieldwork evidence indicates that 
economic considerations dictate which of these functions are to be 
performed by human operatives and which mechanised. Here the 
decision on whether or not to automate a particular task is 
determined by managers' subjective preferences for technical as 
against human solutions to production problems. The significance of 
these preferences will be discussed further in subsequent chapters, 
but at this point we should note simply that many different 
allocations of tasks between human and machine are possible.
iii) Skill and discretion in FMS tasks
Table 3 above shows that the skills unquestionably removed from 
human jurisdiction in FMS are, firstly, many of those concerned 
with the manipulation of objects, such as machine operation and 
materials transfer, and, secondly, mathematical calculations. The
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skills found in the remaining human tasks, which were described in
Tables 4 and 5, will be analysed in this section. In summary four
types of skill are required in FMS. The first of these are 
conceptual skills concerned with the control of workflow and pre­
planning of working methods. Some of these skills involve a high 
discretionary and decision-making content. Then there is an 
altogether more diffuse and, as yet, poorly understood set of 
partly tacit conceptual and perceptual, so-called "control", skills
enabling the day-to-day operational control of FMS. Thirdly, and
considered in some depth here, we discuss the continued role of 
theoretically grounded, yet difficult to articulate, "craft"-type 
problem-solving skills with a high discretionary content. Finally, 
there are low-level manipulative and dexterous skills, which tend 
to be highly proceduralised and allow little discretion.
The first group of skills concern the conceptual planning skills 
required to decide on working methods. These planning skills 
concerned with methods and work scheduling are essentially the 
high-level conceptual abilities traditionally employed by craft 
workers and already described in Chapter Five. As we showed above, 
many of the tasks requiring such skills have been excised over the 
years to become managerial prerogatives because of the considerable 
decision-making content such skills possess, although there is no 
reason in principle why craft workers should not continue to 
control planning tasks. To some extent, however, the discretionary 
element of even these skills within FMS has been reduced with the 
development of advanced computerised programming techniques (as
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discussed in Chapter Six), which have in many cases enabled the 
formalisation of programming methods. Scheduling of production, 
being based largely on mathematical skills, has tended to become 
even more formalised. In the FMSs studied, scope for human 
intervention in scheduling varied between the two extremes of being 
entirely computer-determined (such as Plants B and C) and, much 
more rarely, being subject to the decision of an operative to 
choose options based on a computerised display of the consequences 
of various possible options (such as Plants F and R).
Three varying types of operational skills can be identified in FMS, 
which resemble respectively the skills believed to be 
characteristic of continuous flow, small batch and transfer line 
production processes. Here it is argued that tasks variously 
requiring the exercise of operational skills of all these types are 
demanded in FMS. Therefore, although we are particularly concerned 
to identify the persisting role of traditional engineering craft 
expertise, operational skills must be understood as being hybrid in 
nature, bridging aspects of the three skill types to be discussed 
below.
The skills needed by operators of continuous-flow processes in 
order to monitor, manage and control the actual production process 
have been found to comprise a number of aspects [5]. Such skills 
involve the correct perception of the status of the process, 
anticipation of process behaviour, a knowledge of the dynamics of 
system variables, and the ability to choose what action is
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necessary to modify system behaviour in order to achieve a desired 
output of a given quality. Such skills are also characterised by 
considerable discretion to perform chosen actions, and to manually 
override the process if necessary. As Crossman (I960, pl5) states, 
decision-making on required action to modify continuous processes 
can take place within prescribed (or "rule of thumb"), logical / 
rational, or tacit / intuitive modes. Significantly, in view of the 
argument in this thesis, Crossman (i960, pl6) and Bainbridge (1978) 
find that the last of these appears to be the most effective, and 
seems to allow the greatest flexibility in learning.
This learning aspect of process control skill is amplified by 
Hirschhorn (198*0. Hirschhorn wishes to question how process skills 
are modified by the greater technical sophistication, enabling the 
improved production flexibility demanded by more volatile markets, 
of current generations of process technology (in which he includes 
FMS). He argues that the acquisition of effective control skills 
under conditions of high technical and production flexibility 
requires an open-ended and dynamic process of tacit learning. This 
will enable operators to comprehend the evolving abilities of the 
system as it develops, and is progressively upgraded and modified 
over time in order that they may satisfactorily deal with novel and 
increasingly elaborate possible failure modes. In such complex 
integrated systems, it is also argued, operational skills become 
more closely intertwined with maintenance skills, which themselves 
require both mechanical and electrical expertise.
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Evidence from FMS operators interviewed confirms to some extent the 
use of skills of this type. Most specifically, now that operators 
no longer perform machining tasks (and indeed may work at some 
distance from the machine tools) they must visualise what is 
occurring by construction of a mental model of the system's action. 
This allows operators to "read ahead" the times at which further 
direct intervention will be called for, and to plan their tasks 
accordingly. This model also enables them to intuit when 
malfunctions are developing at an early stage. Interaction with FMS 
controls normally occurs remotely from the machine tools and is 
based on the understanding of how various controls will affect the 
machine tools' cutting action.
My evidence suggests, however, that there is considerably more 
skill input to the successful control of FMS than the story so far 
indicates. In important respects the skills appropriate to the 
remote control and adjustment of continuous processes sit uneasily 
with the expertise necessary for FMS. For, as with preceding 
machining technologies (but unlike process production), FMS 
involves the manufacture of discrete items in batches by an 
unchanged method of material transformation. The skills necessary 
to understand system variables and their interaction, to detect 
error, and to attain output volume and quality, still consist to a 
large extent of "craft" knowledge therefore. This comprises those 
residual fault-finding and problem-solving competencies based on 
the autonomous application of engineering principles and machining 
know-how with which we are particularly concerned in this thesis.
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An earlier paper, based on this research project, by the author 
(Scott 1985) argues that a continuing requirement exists for craft 
expertise in setting-up and monitoring functions, and intervention 
in programmed sequences. Certain functions, notably tool- and 
machine-setting and any residual machining tasks for example, do 
indeed benefit from the application of craft skills. Yet in 
retrospect this paper erroneously suggests that (possibly 
temporary) economic or technical limitations in mechanisation are 
the primary reasons for the employment of skilled craft-trained 
labour in FMS, and does not necessarily overcome objections that 
further mechanisation might eventually obviate such a skill 
requirement [6].
In fact craft skill really comes to the fore in the avoidance, 
detection, diagnosis and correction of metal-cutting errors. This 
resource is often capable of being subsequently incorporated into 
part programs (although this does not invariably happen). The 
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory (1984, p367) distinguishes between 
two types of error source occurring in FMS: static (such as a sag 
in one axis of a machine tool’s bed), which occurs constantly at 
equal magnitude each time the manufacturing task concerned is 
performed; and dynamic, which occurs randomly and unpredictably. Of 
the two sorts, static errors are normally the more readily 
corrected or resolved because of their predictability through 
programming compensating values into the FMS software.
Craft skill is most valued in the ability to deal independently
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with dynamic errors, because these are not easily programmed out. 
The scope for dynamic errors in FMS is considerably greater than on 
single machines. For two of FMS’s main selling points, minimal 
staffing and the possibility of processing different parts on 
several machines simultaneously, are also its greatest drawbacks if 
precision machining is to be achieved (Hannam 1986). Because of 
these features FMS brings an alarming increase in the tardiness and 
difficulty of tracing back the source of errors that might occur. 
Detection of the origin of tolerance errors could result from tool 
wear or interface misalignments between spindle, tool, part, 
fixture, pallet or machine. This already extensive list of 
potential culprits is further complicated in systems incorporating 
duplicate tooling, as it becomes necessary to identify precisely 
which equipment was used on any given job (Charles Stark Draper 
Laboratory 1984, pp 146-147; Hannam 1986).
The FMS at Plant H provides an example of such problems. Here the 
difficulties caused by dynamic errors resulted in management 
operating policy decisions to confine each job within the system to 
running on only two machines if possible, and to restrict the 
number of pallets in the FMS at any one time to eight (of a 
possible maximum of twelve), to minimise the difficulty in tracing 
back the correct source of such errors.
The role of craft skill in tackling the variances of dynamic error 
is well illustrated by the FMS at Plant P. At this plant production 
normally centred on a small spectrum of high-value components,
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which were nevertheless complex, fashioned from difficult metals to 
work, and included tight tolerances. One machinist (in this case 
trained initially as a turner) described the importance of craft 
apprenticeship as follows:
how are you going to recognise tool wear, or how 
are you going to recognise if a tool's not cutting 
properly, if you've never actually had the 
experience of standing right next to it when it's 
cutting? It's all very well to press the button and 
shut the job in and to run a program and at the end 
of it it comes out wrong; but you've got to be able 
to recognise why it's wrong, and what you're going 
to do about it. You're never going to be able to do 
that unless you understand about the cutting 
process and so on...
Moreover (and referring more specifically to the nature of this 
FMS) he added:
You could certainly have a semi-skilled or even an 
unskilled person loading the bits providing he 
knows what he's doing... but what's going to happen 
when something goes wrong, which it does regularly?
With nuts and bolts, fair enough, not much can go 
wrong, but (with) the complicated bits we make here 
and the limits we work to, which are very tight,
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things drift on a daily basis. Obviously your tools 
wear, even the outside temperature can have an 
effect on it, even how long the machine’s been 
running can have an effect, things like this.... 
that’s where your skill comes in, that's what you 
have to find out, you know, recognise and sort it 
out.
Thus, as the following quote from an engineer at Plant F 
acknowledges, the knowledge base of craft skill in FMS is seen as 
conferring sufficient responsibility to enable its possessor to be 
entrusted to independently intervene in the system:
(The operator) needs the basis so that he 
recognises there could be problems within the 
system, that he might by ear know that there was a 
problem coming up before the system saw it. He 
could interfere with the system then. He’s got to 
be of a skill such that he's allowed to interrupt 
the system.
Returning to Plant P, a second machinist (apprenticed as a jig 
borer) expanded on the use of a craft training background to 
diagnose dynamic faults:
Quite often you put in a back-up tool, and you’ve 
got a problem, and you put another tool up, you’ve
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still got the same problem. You’ve got a choice 
between the machine, the program and the tooling, 
so you can break it down a bit. (Fixtures are 
dedicated to pallets, and so the problem rarely 
lies here.) And you start eliminating one or two of 
them.... well, program, you can normally eliminate 
that, so you've finally got the machine itself, or 
the tooling. You can probably bet on the tooling 
really.... You've got to have a little bit of 
basics to know what you're talking about.
The importance of the theoretical background lies in the ability to 
look beyond what appears to be the immediate reason for a fault to 
a possible deeper cause, however:
it’s knowing what does what, a little bit about the 
program and quite a bit about the machine itself, 
because you could get a fault that you think 
happened, you think it's something to do with the 
tooling, it could turn out to be the machine 
itself.
Further evidence from machinists indicates that attempts to 
formalise decisions in computer software can sometimes be 
misleading, and thus still require the knowledge to carry out 
further investigation. For instance, diagnostic codes intended as 
an aid to maintenance, which are displayed on the machine tools'
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VDU screens when a fault occurs, often refer to only a subsidiary 
error (such as a tool conveyor out of position), which has been 
created in turn by a more basic underlying problem remaining 
undiagnosed by the software (such as a power failure). Manual 
investigation will be required to deduce this deeper error.
To sum up our argument on craft skill, such an input into FMS is 
valued for both the combination of theoretical reasoning and 
practical "hands-on" experience of machining it brings. Craft 
skills are still of value as a repository of largely tacit 
knowledge, which can be independently applied to the production 
process, of the separate and synergetic properties and behaviour of 
tools, materials and machines.
The fourth type of skill input to flexible manufacturing systems is 
characteristic of low-level manipulative or highly proceduralised 
tasks needing little discretion, although such tasks may carry a 
high burden of responsibility for the achievement of optimum FMS 
operation. Skills at this level tend to consist of one of two 
components. They can concern firstly low-level physical 
competencies, often substituting for activities that are too 
difficult or expensive to mechanise. Alternatively they may involve 
the ability to understand, and respond to, system-generated 
commands by means of the simple selection of displayed options or 
the input of the required coded information. Examples of tasks at 
this skill level include the loading of tools, transmission of tool 
offset data into machining programs, the actuation of mechanised
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functions (such as the system start-up procedure), deburring and 
swarf removal, and response to system-generated instructions. 
Inspection and the initial setting-up of components normally come 
into this category also, although evidence from many of the FMSs 
studied, and especially Plants G and P, indicates that - depending 
upon the degree of mechanisation employed - craft skills can still 
be important in loading tasks in certain circumstances [7]. In some 
FMSs, loading clearly involves little of the traditional discretion 
regarding decisions on clamping positions and pressures. For 
example, at Plant H loaders are instructed by the central computer 
of the precise torque levels at which to clamp components.
Thus we see that the hybrid nature of FMS as a production process, 
bearing features of each of the three forms of manufacture 
discussed above, creates a quite unique combination of skill 
requirements. As with previous advances in machining technologies, 
FMS places further emphasis on the pre-planning of working methods 
and residual servicing functions (many of which undeniably require 
little skill) rather than machining. Planning tasks increase in 
extent compared to numerical control, but the skills required are 
essentially similar in nature to craft planning skills. At an 
operational level, the skills required to control FMS begin to 
resemble certain aspects of those encountered in continuous flow 
process technology. However, at least in the cases studied, they 
still retain an important engineering craft content because of the 
little-changed nature of the machining process. A role will be 
retainable for craft skills inasmuch as unpredictable machining
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errors occur in the production process. Indeed, the greater 
integration of FMS compared to previous machining systems makes it 
more likely that, when faults affecting part or machine do occur, 
they will be more complex, and thus require considerable diagnosis.
iv) Recombining task functions
So far in this chapter we have catalogued the human task functions 
required as a result of FMS technology, and shown that these call 
for four differing types of skill. It now remains to assess how the 
various tasks described can be combined into work roles. In 
Chapters Four and Five we reviewed the historically pervasive 
"scientific management" job design principles, which have partially 
succeeded in stripping functions away from craft work roles, and 
contrasted these with recent forms of horizontal and vertical task 
flexibility which could allow the recombination of tasks. In this 
section we shall compare the possibilities for the recombination of 
tasks into more flexible work roles with the practice in the FMSs 
studied.
Existing studies of labour roles in FMSs [8] find examples of job 
designs based both on broadly "scientific management" principles 
and on the idea of the "autonomous workgroup". It is clear from 
this literature that the first type is the more common of the two. 
Previous studies do however contain a significant weakness. For 
virtually none of these investigations relate to British systems, 
although several authors agree that (contra CNC) distinct national
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patterns of work role allocation seem to be observable with FMS 
(Jaikumar 1984; Jones 1986a; Kelley 1985)* In the US, for example, 
the continuation of "scientific management" approaches and labour 
inflexibility within FMSs is encouraged by peculiarities of the 
American system of industrial relations, notably tightly specified 
and legally enforceable employment contracts. How homogenous, 
therefore, are workgroup structures in British FMSs?
The influence of scientific management principles was diluted in 
the FMSs studied, being clearest in the almost ubiquitous tendency 
to separate planning and management from operational tasks. In some 
instances the latter tasks were also subdivided. Plants A, and, 
above all, B and H were the closest approximations to the 
scientific management approach. At these plants work roles were 
broadly bounded vertically within three skill classifications, 
although operational tasks were interchangeable within grades. The 
lowest grade of job consisted of the loaders and/or labourers, who 
were normally classified as semi-skilled. Above this, a skilled 
operator category was responsible for changing tools; (sometimes) 
toolsetting; general checks, monitoring and perhaps adjustment of 
operations; and responsibility for contacting specialist help (in 
the form of maintenance engineers and part programmers, etc). 
Finally, a supervisory grade of employee undertook overall 
management and control functions within the FMS. Ancillary 
functions necessary, such as part programming, determination of 
work methods and maintenance for the FMS, were normally added to 
the workload of the organisationally separate departments already
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performing these tasks for the rest of the machine shop. The aid of 
these supernumerary personnel was enlisted as necessary.
Horizontal labour flexibility in flexible manufacturing systems was 
found to take the forms of either job enlargement or, more rarely, 
job rotation. Job enlargement, consisting of FMS workers expanding 
their sphere of competence beyond their conventional machining 
skills (in cases where more than one worker was employed on a given 
grade) was found at most plants. Typical of this were the skilled 
FMS operators at Plant A, who were assuming tool grinding and 
toolsetting tasks as well as machine monitoring functions.
More extensive horizontal flexibility at craft level in the form of 
multi-skilling of apprenticed machinists, particularly as regards 
the expansion of task roles into maintenance duties to create what 
has been called "polyvalent” craft workers (Cross 1985). was very 
rare [9]. The only examples encountered were at the greenfield 
sites of Plant P and R, where machinists were expected to perform 
certain maintenance tasks, and (at Plant P only) to undertake post­
machining processes such as heat treatment and cadmium plating of 
components. In other plants expansion of work roles into 
maintenance duties only progressed as far as the performance of 
routine maintenance checks (such as at Plants C and J).
It was noted in Chapter Four that job rotation does not of itself 
signify a departure from Tayloristic principles of job design. Job 
rotation schemes for FMS operators were encountered most
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prominently at the large automotive plants D and L. Such forms of 
shopfloor flexibility were nevertheless relatively unusual in the 
plants concerned. At Plant L the four direct workers in the FMS 
themselves determine who should perform the necessary task 
functions of tool setter, roving operator and two loaders as they 
think fit, but subject to the important underlying condition that 
each worker is required to be capable of undertaking all of these 
jobs in order to cover for absence. Plant D, on the other hand, 
adopted a more formal job rotation scheme whereby the team of four 
workers per shift interchange the jobs of tool setter, operator for 
a shaving machine, and a loader/unloader for each of two FMS cells, 
on a weekly basis.
Vertical flexibility of workers to assume tasks of different grades 
- and particularly higher grades - is more corrosive of Taylorist 
principles of division of labour. This form of mobility, it was 
suggested in previous chapters, is eased by new control 
technologies, which allow direct workers to assume certain 
supervisory and post-production tasks. Instances of vertical 
flexibility were common to most of the FMSs studied. Only at Plants 
G, K, M and R did these extend to the crucial programming and 
planning tasks, and (in normal circumstances) at Plants F, G and R 
to scheduling tasks. Elsewhere such tasks remained the prerogative 
of production engineers and production controllers respectively, 
both of which groups were external to the FMS work crew as such.
Most frequently "vertical flexibility" in fact tended to mean one
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or both of two things. Firstly, craft-trained FMS operators at 
nearly all FMSs except B and H additionally assumed lower grade 
tasks, such as loading tools or parts. Secondly, and part of a 
phenomenon becoming more widespread in British manufacturing, 
direct workers at plants such as C, H and K became responsible for 
certain residual indirect tasks (such as quality control) which can 
be performed at any point during the production cycle.
The greatest challenge to neo-Taylorist forms of job design lies in 
the formation of autonomous workgroups. Such groups would display 
both horizontal and vertical flexibility between the full range of 
tasks within an FMS, including programming and management duties. 
Unsurprisingly, in view of the prevalence of the rather more 
limited patterns of labour flexibility described above, few 
examples could be found of truly flexible workgroups in the cases 
studied. Plant R, which will be discussed more fully in subsequent 
chapters, provided the only genuine example of this alternative 
approach involving flexible workgroups, especially under its 
original management team; although two of the one-person-operated 
FMSs, Plants F and M, also allowed the assumption of many 
management functions.
Workgroup structures in the FMSs studied varied sufficiently for it 
to be difficult to identify a distinct indigenous "pattern" of job 
design. There is certainly a tendency, albeit uneven and 
incomplete, for the collapsing of both horizontal and vertical 
demarcations at an operational level. At this level, near complete,
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or total, task interchangeability is the more common arrangement 
(Plants C-F, J and L-R), although more restrictive formal vertical 
demarcations apply in as many as one third of the systems 
investigated (Plants A, B, G, H and K). Despite these often quite 
significant changes, instances of extensive multi-skilling, or the 
expansion of direct workers* (nearly all of whom are craft-trained) 
jobs into programming and management functions, are still very 
rare.
v) Conclusion
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that FMS, despite 
attenuating machine operating tasks at the expense of overall 
planning, servicing and control functions, has not dispensed with a 
role for traditional engineering craft skills. At a technical level 
FMS has created a need for a hybrid range of skills requiring a 
wide range of planning, control, and diagnostic abilities and tacit 
learning of system capabilities (the extent of which may not yet be 
fully understood).
The existence of the different types and levels of skill described 
above can exert pressure for the formation of work roles according 
to these distinct bands of ability and responsibility. But this is 
offset by counter-pressure towards the reduction of direct and 
indirect labour and, with it, greater job flexibility. The hope 
that this latter tendency might permit the consequent devolution of 
many of the necessary planning and decision-making functions to
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operators has been largely disappointed. There certainly appears to 
be general evidence of the adoption of more flexible forms of work 
organisation than found on either conventional machinery or stand­
alone numerical control. However, in most cases this mobility seems 
to have stopped some way short of the multi-skilling necessary for 
autonomous workgroups of the kind promoted by sociotechnical 
authors. Let us therefore turn to finding out why this has proved 
so.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: The problem of labour control
i) Introduction
Increased labour flexibility is apparent in the FMSs studied, but 
there is only limited and partial evidence that the staffing 
policies applied have thereby succeeded in escaping from the 
tendency to delimit labour’s control over the production process. 
The manner in which work roles are formulated within a given 
technological innovation, as we argued earlier, is affected by 
managers' labour control preferences. These are conditioned in turn 
by pre-existing organisational and industrial relations contexts, 
and previous working practices. With FMS, staffing arrangements 
with existing GT cells or numerically controlled machine tools (as 
discussed in Chapter Six) are particularly influential.
But, if our thesis is correct, some choice exists regarding whether 
to duplicate these arrangements, or to modify them in the direction 
of tighter or looser direct management control over the labour 
process. Given the high capital cost of FMS, the firms into which 
it has been introduced tend to be large, characterised by well- 
established demarcations and industrial relations procedures; we 
might reasonably expect such plants to attach considerable 
importance to undermining the system of craft control of work and 
its legacy of labour inflexibility which, although now weakened, 
remains important in British batch engineering.
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This chapter investigates how labour control is achieved by both 
technical and hierarchical means, the importance management accord 
to it, and its relation to demands for task flexibility in FMS.
One of the most striking findings to be illustrated is the largely 
ad hoc nature of much of the managerial decision making on labour 
control. Because most (but not all) of the plants studied exhibit 
Fox's (197*0 pattern of "low trust" relations, as stated above, it 
is unsurprising that FMS job design reflects aspects of this 
pattern too. However, there is also a management countertendency to 
permit work group autonomy simply to get the necessary work done.
The rarity of the explicit adoption of autonomous work groups,
often recommended in the literature, is explained by reference to a 
relevant case study (Plant R). This study assess the extent to 
which explicit management policies for job redesign in FMS are 
realisable within the wider context of plant-wide labour policies.
ii) Technical control
As we saw earlier, writers such as Brighton Labour Process Group 
(1977). Edwards (1979) and Palloix (1976) allege that direction and 
supervision of the performance of workers' tasks in computerised 
systems is now enabled by "technical control" (rather than the 
"hierarchical control" of supervisors). FMS, because of its degree 
of computerised integration, provides an ideal opportunity to 
assess the extent to which management tasks have really been 
superceded by technical control.
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The technical system management functions in FMS are subject to a 
varied, but generally fairly high, level of technical control. This 
applies particularly to a number of functions that would have been 
human tasks prior to the advent of DNC and FMS. These tasks include 
the scheduling of parts through the system, transmission of 
instructions to machine tools and loading stations, and the 
collation of data on system status and utilisation. Managers 
interviewed tended to consider a high degree of technical 
sophistication in such uses conducive to the achievement of 
improved inventory control and machine utilisation through better 
management information.
A further advantage for management is the ability to enhance the 
level of technical control over the discretion exercisable by 
operators by restricting access to the higher levels of software 
control. This can be achieved by the use of password protection to 
access of certain facilities and the assignment of "levels of 
responsibility" to different classes of employee, thus limiting the 
functions each is able to access from the FMSs computer terminals. 
Such mechanisms were employed in the software at the majority of 
the FMSs studied (although not at Plant’s C or M), usually at the 
request of the user firms. Occassionally, as at Plant G, the system 
suppliers had stipulated such restrictions, which therefore limited 
the degree of interchange between the personnel in the system it 
would be possible to achieve [1].
A particular advantage of the electronic collation and processing
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of data available with DNC, especially compared with stand-alone 
machine tools, lies in minimising the need for increased paperwork, 
and supervision and labour control costs (and therefore numbers of 
indirect workers required) that would be otherwise incurred by 
hiring additional workers. This was explicitly stated as a reason 
for adopting FMS at Plant C; and at the two expanding companies, 
Plants G and K, for whom FMS was intended to diminish their need to 
hire additional machinists and associated supervisors.
Many aspects of the traditional role of the supervisor or foreman, 
notably in the allocation and routing of work, are largely 
superceded by the technical sophistication in FMS. As the 
discussion in Chapter Seven indicates, the host computer control 
normally incorporates work scheduling, and instructs operators on 
which tools and parts to load. In theory, therefore, a very high 
level of technical control could be achieved. At our most extreme 
case in this respect, the shoe machinery maker Plant C, 
manufacturing managers had deferred consideration of the need for a 
supervisory job within the FMS until running experience indicated 
whether such an appointment was actually necessary. The shop 
foreman remained solely responsible for personnel management of the 
FMS operators, having been stripped of his work allocation 
functions elsewhere in the machine shop because of managers' wish 
to exert more direct control over the work going through the FMS.
By and large, however, the degree of technical control achieved 
over supervisory and management functions is in practice
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incomplete. The rather ambiguous situation at Plant C was not 
encountered elsewhere. Other plants normally employed a system 
supervisor or manager to oversee personnel, deal with sundry 
administrative matters and coordinate with other departments (such 
as Production Engineering and Inspection). This grade of personnel 
also decides on broad system priorities (such as overriding 
computer-generated schedules in the case of an urgent job) which 
are too complex or variable to be incorporated in system software.
There are also important technological, economic and social 
limitations to total mechanisation in FMS which deny the realistic 
possibility of complete technical control. Technological 
limitations derive from the restrictions of particular items of 
equipment design. For example, in two cases, Plants F and R, the 
technical specification of the scheduling software still 
necessitated the manual selection of component routes; and at Plant 
A the use of adaptive control was incompatible with the original 
machine-level control systems used. This technological limitation 
became an example of economic limits to mechanisation, however, as 
adaptive control became available when new machine control units 
were purchased. In this instance, the additional cost of adaptive 
control was not deemed cost-effective compared with the alternative 
of manual monitoring of machining operations.
By "social" limits to mechanisation I refer to the deliberate non­
use by personnel of even such mechanised facilities as are 
available because traditional methods using existing know-how are
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seen as adequate or as more reliable. Numerous examples of this 
were discovered. Instances include the frequent overriding of 
system-generated component scheduling priorities by the loader at 
Plant G to minimise the necessity to retool the FMS for machining 
different materials; and the personnels' preference at plants such 
as F and H to record details of system problems and malfunctions 
longhand in a loose-leaf book. One operator at Plant P's 
observation of the fate of system management information on tool 
life status printed out via the host computer: "Most of the time it 
just ends up in the bin," was perhaps the most instructive of all.
Overall, therefore, technical control is not ubiquitous in FMS, 
although system operations themselves are subject to a generally 
high level of mechanisation. Personnel management functions are 
still necessary, despite the reduced numbers of employees in FMS 
compared with stand-alone systems. Furthermore, complete control by 
technical means is not yet possible. Even were it so, however, most 
managers still see a role for human intervention because of both 
the frequent expense and inefficiency of mechanisation compared to 
the retention of some labour intervention. The issues of the degree 
to which employees can attain control over FMS operations, and the 
extent to which local conditions in plants may help or hinder this, 
remain contentious, however. These questions will be tackled below.
iii) Programming: the frontier of control
The main site of debates over the locus of control of new machining
196
technologies in small-batch engineering remains the question of who 
is responsible for the determination of the machining methods and 
sequence of operations to be employed, which must still be decided 
by human conceptual labour. That is: who writes, and who is 
responsible for "proving out", the programs for the probing 
devices, transfer mechanisms, and the all-important machining of 
components? We must ask why it is that methods decisions are still 
normally treated as the prerogative of separate occupational groups 
in the FMSs studied. Do such arrangements reflect a further sub­
division of labour, a reduction in direct control, or essentially 
similar arrangements to those applying elsewhere in the plants 
concerned with NC and CNC machine tools? In particular, what 
circumstances have enabled the examples of more devolved control in 
our case studies?
The locus of decisions on working methods, and the construction and 
amendment of programs to machine parts, has traditionally been a 
contentious issue. Such tasks have normally been split between 
different occupational groups. This division had already been 
established with numerical control at all bar two (Plants G and K) 
of the firms studied. A management desire for even closer control 
over the determination of programming and editing procedures 
through the transfer of responsibility for these tasks to part 
programmers and manufacturing engineers was evident in most of the 
cases studied. Thus there is strong evidence that FMS tends to be 
used to achieve a further separation of conception and execution. 
This pattern was part of a process of diminishing craft control
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over methods decisions. In most plants, long histories of what 
manufacturing and supervisory levels of management considered to be 
the abuse of craft control over the labour process had imbued them 
with strong labour control objectives in the introduction of FMS.
It was argued that management control over the machining process 
would have to be enhanced to monopoly levels in order to debar the 
direct worker from introducing unanticipated and uncodified 
variables into machining operations. This was stated explicitly by 
the FMS project manager at Plant J, who considered that it was no 
longer acceptable to permit the degree of operator freedom that 
existed on the firm's older NC machining centres:
(With FMS it is) vital that the operator should not 
interfere with the programs.... If the operator 
does, and doesn't tell the Programming Department, 
he is throwing a spanner in the works because he is 
creating an uncertainty that was not there before 
in the production process. Now a job has to be 
exactly as it's programmed - for better or worse.
Such arrangements were often stricter than, and ran counter to, the 
procedures established elsewhere on the shopfloor for editing 
stand-alone CNC machine tools, where the balance of authority was 
weighted more in favour of operators as opposed to programmers. The 
difference in approach arises because of the closer direct control 
of production engineers over the work allocated to the FMSs 
concerned. At Plant C, for example, the FMS operators have been
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forbidden to write or edit part programs (although prove-outs are 
conducted by the programmer who wrote the program and the operator 
together). Even during the latter stages of a prove-out, when the 
operator will usually officiate on his own, he is still debarred 
from making any amendments himself. Instead he must note them down 
and tell the programmer, who has the responsibility for the actual 
editing. In contrast to this procedure, operators of the plant's 
stand-alone CNC machine tools are allowed to edit the programs 
themselves. At certain other plants slightly fewer restrictions on 
operator editing of tape "prove-outs" applied. For example, at 
Plants A and (even) J operators were allowed to make minor 
modifications on the proviso that they were required to tell the 
programmers what changes had been made, but amendments were 
otherwise definitely discouraged.
In one extreme instance (Plant H) senior management objectives of 
gaining increased control over working methods as a result of past 
disputes led them to use FMS against the power exercised by the 
firm's part programmers as well as its craft workers. Here a 
manufacturing engineer has been added to the FMS work crew. This 
person is responsible for tooling, programming, determination of 
manufacturing methods, the introduction of new components to the 
FMS and any necessary modifications and "fine-tuning" of existing 
components, and possesses the major responsibility for proving-out 
and subsequent amendment of programs [2].
Management felt that in the past, with stand-alone NC, the
199
Production Engineering department had created internal 
demarcations, which had produced industrial relations problems, by 
managing to gain an unjustified monopoly of expertise on part 
programming. In one manager’s phrase, by virtue of their monopoly 
the programmers had suceeded in giving part programming the image 
of a "black art". The FMS has been deliberately used to spread 
programming knowledge beyond the existing part programmers in order 
to prove that it is not that difficult a task to learn. Management 
also consider it important that the manufacturing engineer (rather 
than the setter/inspector within the FMS work crew) retains control 
over programming for reasons of accountability to overall company 
manufacturing objectives. The manufacturing engineer is charged 
with the task of programming according to the criterion of 
achieving "the most economical workable method" for the job. 
Managers interviewed thought that setter/inspectors would be 
unlikely to accord this objective their highest priority if they 
were allowed the major say in programming. Instead it was believed 
that they would probably be "too concerned with perfecting the 
job."
Where methods decisions had long been under the control of well- 
established engineering departments, and operator editing not 
permitted, the advent of FMS as part of the process of increasing 
overall manufacturing control made no difference to established 
policy on programming. This status quo was found in the two 
aerospace plants, B and P, and in Plant D, the large manufacturer 
of earthmoving equipment. Here it was considered that exacting
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quality specifications required the abrogation by operators of 
discretion for amending standards.
The removal of operator control of methods decisions need not be an 
inevitable goal of FMS introduction, however, for the role of 
managerial control preferences remains crucial. In certain 
circumstances the existing industrial relations context and level 
of technical knowledge may favour the devolution of planning 
decisions to the direct workteam itself. Beneficial conditions were 
encountered in a few plants where the continuation of craft 
autonomy in controlling FMS was considered by managers to have an 
important role. Here we focus on two: Plants G and K, both small 
but expanding companies, where the introduction of FMS was seen by 
management partly as a means of absorbing increased production 
while changing the nature of the companies' modus operandi as 
little as possible. (Situations with certain parallels at Plants M 
and R will be discussed in section v)).
At Plant K, the automotive subcontractor specialising in relatively 
high volume and low variety work, a high degree of devolution of 
production decisions on the FMS is attributable to the previous 
history of CNC within the plant. The company had some prior 
experience of CNC lathes of the type used in the FMS, the 
programming for which has always been done by craft-trained setters 
at machine tool level by manual data input (MDI). Thus there has 
never been a separate NC tape preparation department. Managers, who 
were concerned to minimise the extent of the additional
201
infrastructural support required, saw no reason to change this 
state of affairs simply because of the introduction of the FMS.
From the outset, therefore, manual data input by setters was very
much part of the firm's philosophy for FMS programming.
At Plant G, on the other hand, the development of a high degree of
workforce autonomy on the FMS resulted mainly from the lack of any 
experience of CNC (or any other forms of computerisation) 
whatsoever prior to the introduction of the FMS. Because of this, 
the fragmentation of functions between part programmer and 
operator, entrenched at many of the other plants visited had never 
become established.
Moreover, the company had no real internal resources or knowledge 
to support the development of FMS because of its small size and 
lack of previous CNC experience. Thus, uniquely, the only 
"tradition" of labour practices within the company on which the FMS 
project could draw was of a small, tightly-knit, but highly skilled 
workforce, to which management granted very considerable autonomy. 
Because of this lack of expertise, the two senior of the three FMS 
personnel concerned with implementing the project had to be 
externally recruited. One of these, the project manager was given a 
free hand by senior management on staffing decisions, and thus had 
no entrenched opposition from the plant's existing staff on 
appropriate working practices to contend with.
Overall, then, in the majority of plants in the study (mainly
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Plants A-D, H, J, L and N) improvement of overall manufacturing 
control appeared to be a major aim of the introduction of AMT 
generally. Within the overall control of the production process, 
though, labour was seen one of the least predictable (albeit in 
fact one of the least expensive) elements. FMS was therefore 
visualised in important respects as enabling the reduction of 
labour variability through residual control over manufacturing 
methods which had not always successfully been removed by previous 
innovations. The contingency of this objective is however 
demonstrated by the evidence above from other plants, which shows 
that managerial attitudes to craft autonomy are crucial in 
determining the degree of control managers wish to gain.
iv) Servicing and ancillary functions
The greater prevalence of labour flexibility between servicing and 
and ancillary functions in FMS (as opposed to programming and 
management functions) reflects the fact that the former kind of 
labour flexibility impinges upon craft control of the machining 
labour process. As such, it represents an aspect of more general 
occupational trends towards eliminating demarcations between trades 
(and particularly production and maintenance), achieving the 
multiple operation of machine tools, and amalgamating directly and 
sundry indirectly productive functions. The latter two of these 
tendencies were found to be the more common in the systems studied.
A considerable lack of uniformity was observed as to which
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particular unmechanised servicing functions (most notably, tool 
setting, maintenance and inspection) were performed within the FMS 
workgroup. These differences reflect dissimilar organisational 
attitudes to certain categories of indirect worker depending on 
whether managers desire to maintain the existing division of 
productive functions or to make the FMS concerned as self-contained 
a facility as possible.
On the shop floors of most of the plants studied (A-D, H-N), levels 
of labour mobility between tasks remained low outside of the FMS. 
Examples of multi-machine staffing were very uncommon, even with 
CNC machine tools, let alone expansion into additional task 
functions. But, normally under the banner of technical necessity, 
managers tended to use the adoption of FMS as one method of 
attacking pre-existing labour demarcations in order to begin the 
process of promoting labour flexibility more generally within the 
plants concerned. To be sure, however, evidence at the time of 
interviewing suggested that the recombination and integration of 
necessary activities was still specific to the FMSs concerned.
Most particularly, there is a pronounced tendency to end the 
separation of tool- and machine-setting, and manual inspection, 
tasks, from "operating” and machine-tending functions. The 
assunption of quality control tasks by FMS workers, and the 
engineering of many supervisory functions into the computer 
scftvare, were intended to begin the process of reducing the 
separation of direct from indirect functions in order to increase
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labour productivity. At Plant Ct where this process was perhaps 
most explicitly articulated, two justifications were given by 
management for allowing FMS inspection by operators. The first 
reason is to instill a sense of responsibility in the operators for 
the quality of the work coming off the FMS. As one manager put it:
the company are trying to eliminate the idea that 
the operator’s job ends with making the parts, and 
that then it is an inspector's job to decide 
whether or not the operator made them correctly.
The second reason is a deliberate decision to give the operators 
something to do while the machine tools are running automatically, 
and to supply some involvement in the production process now that 
they are not actually cutting the parts themselves.
At this plant the assumption of many unmechanised indirect tasks by 
the direct FMS workteam was intimately connected to an overall 
management strategy of reducing certain categories of indirect 
labour cost (mainly inspection, progress chasing, stores, and some 
supervisory occupations), numbers of which had remained stubbornly 
static over the period 1981-84, while still limiting the overall 
management control relinquished.
At the time of final interview the procedure for inspection was 
that every part was inspected by separate inspection staff. But by 
moving to operator quality control, as well as instituting a system
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of random rather than 100% Inspection on the FMS, the company will 
be able to further its aim of reducing indirect labour by cutting 
the number of inspectors. At this time the only indirect labour in 
the FMS area itself already consisted of the occasional inspector 
and a foreman [3].
Moves toward labour flexibility are geared to the breaking down of 
craft control, but have only interfered marginally with inter-craft 
divisions. Thus flexibility does not seem to have extended to the 
thorny issue of breaking down the division between production and 
maintenance craft skills, as the barriers between these remained 
firmly intact (with the partial exception of the greenfield sites,
P and R, which had no on-site maintenance back-up). Certainly there 
was no evidence of the conscious development of the multi-skilled, 
or polyvalent, craft worker.
Intra-craft control, and particularly the issue of craft workers’ 
ability to dictate the skill level and numbers of machinists who 
will operate a given type and number of machine tools, is under 
general attack in FMS. Plant H provides an illustration, which 
holds good for most plants studied. Here the FMS is seen as being 
an important means of introducing more multi-disciplinary work and 
breaking down demarcations, particularly those between machine 
setters and inspectors, throughout the factory. Here the final 
occupational structure in the FMS consisted of a system manager, 
two setter/inspectors and a loader per shift.
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One of the reasons given by senior management for the introduction 
of FMS was to attack what were perceived as existing overstaffing 
and bad working practices which were felt to have developed when 
three stand-alone CNC machining centres had been introduced onto 
the shopfloor some years previously. At the close of negotiations 
on staffing levels the unions had succeeded in obtaining the 
staffing of each machine by a skilled operator. The production 
engineer currently in charge of valve production thought this level 
of skill had proved excessive, preferring a semi-skilled operative 
at each machining centre coupled with the introduction of one 
roving skilled machinist. It was felt by the management that FMS 
represented a sufficiently radical technological break with stand­
alone CNC equipment to force the issue of job flexibility and 
relevant skill levels to be confronted head-on, rather than simply 
treated as an evolutionary extension of CNC.
Flexibility between servicing and ancillary functions can prove a 
contentious issue between workers and management, however, and is 
often subject to formal and informal pressure for reversion to more 
fixed arrangements. The FMS at Plant P is an excellent example to 
choose of this tendency because (to a greater extent than anywhere 
else except Plant R) such labour flexibility objectives were an 
integral, initial part of the rationale behind the use of a 
greenfield site. At Plant P management objectives of improved 
labour mobility compared to that applying at the headquarters plant 
(at which the principle of one skilled machinist to each CNC 
machine tool still prevails) were intended even before the product
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to be manufactured was finalised. Shopfloor workers for Plant P 
were internally recruited from the headquarters plant largely on 
the basis of their willingness to adopt more flexible working 
practices than those applying at the latter plant.
When Plant P first began production a number of impressive claims 
were made by the company’s management, technical journals, and at 
least one academic study regarding the degree of labour flexibility 
prevailing. Fieldwork reveals these claims to have been very much 
exaggerated. Such reports have omitted to mention the fact that the 
company management has been wary of trying to press for greater 
flexibility than that to which the AEU would agree. Likewise the 
AEU are unwilling to concede significant additional degrees of 
flexibility than pertain at the headquarters plant in view of the 
potential "knock-on" effects. Nevertheless, a higher degree of 
flexibility between separate production processes undoubtedly 
pertained at this plant than any of the others visited [4].
In practice flexibility is limited by a de facto specialisation of 
work tasks among the machinists. Only three workers on each of the 
three shifts take prime responsibility for the plant's machine 
tools and, of these, one is responsible for the machine tools in 
the FMS (although the loading of pallets is performed by all these 
personnel). Vertical flexibility extends only to minor maintenance 
(the nearest permanent maintenance team being based ten miles away 
at the headquarters plant), first-line inspection and occasional 
iminor reprogramming (for example, if a tool becomes unavailable and
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a new one of different dimensions has to be substituted to perform 
operations). In other respects - typically for the aerospace 
industry on the grounds of high quality requirements - indirect 
functions remain firmly under the higher-level operating control of 
the headquarters plant (to which Plant P is linked on-line and 
which provides part programmers for the plant) rather than being 
delegated to the FMS work crew. Final inspection after the testing 
of assemblies is also performed by two inspectors based on-site and 
toolsetting for the whole plant including the FMS is performed by 
one worker in Plant P’s toolroom.
Such problems are even more acute in those FMSs installed within 
existing sites. As a result of management's inability to insulate 
working arrangements on these FMSs from wider considerations of 
extended shopfloor labour flexibility and craft control relatively 
restricted moves toward flexibility have had to prevail. Management 
pressure to achieve flexibility has resulted in workforce 
resistance to aspects of the changes, some of which are likely to 
be of long-term consequence if labour’s bargaining position 
improves. The flexibility of job descriptions, or (more commonly) 
demands for regrading and higher pay in return for flexibility, 
have been the most common causes of disputes. At Plant H the issue 
of the flexibility of job descriptions caused a dispute with the 
shopfloor unions, which is now resolved largely in the company's 
favour. In several cases (such as Plants E and L) management have 
headed off such disputes by upgrading FMS workers to take account 
of the additional levels of responsibility, and even (at Plant B)
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by putting all craft workers on "staff" pay scales and working 
conditions, a long-term demand of the main shopfloor union. In 
other cases, such as Plant K, increased management bargaining power 
had been used to keep FMS workers’ pay rates in line with the rest 
of the shopfloor, despite admittedly increased responsibility. To 
illustrate this, at Plant A the ten skilled operatives on the FMS 
are paid on the same level as all the time-served employees on the 
shopfloor throughout the rest of the factory. But, because 
management are looking for a novel degree of task flexibility on 
the FMS, the skilled workers have put in a claim for higher grading 
which the company was unwilling to concede. The system supervisor 
did not think that this claim would be successful, because the 
management believe that there are other groups of workers on the 
shopfloor in the factory who have claims for regrading of equal 
merit to that of the FMS crew, and acceptance of the FMS workers' 
claim could open the floodgates to many more.
Overall, then, FMS's enhanced ability to break the dependence of 
the machining cycle on the direct presence of an operator has 
facilitated widespread labour flexibility between servicing and 
ancillary functions. In most plants this process has formed a new 
stage in the attempt to break down craft control over the machining 
process. Importantly, though, no less significant a development in 
some plants has been an attack on the exercise of certain 
indirectly productive functions as activities separate from the 
work of the FMS operator. These moves have normally been somewhat 
tentative, largely specific to the FMSs at the time of interview
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(rather than yet having wider application on the shopfloor), and 
occasionally subject to contention in the forms of informal 
restrictions on working practices and pressure to limit the 
extension of mobility between ancillary functions.
v) Plant politics versus the “autonomous workgroup”
The persistence of "low trust" employment relations, which 
underpinned the ad hoc approach to FMS job design, in most plants 
studied, has largely stifled the explicit adoption of labour 
policies allowing a high degree of devolution of control over 
operations and methods. In two cases, Plants M and R, such policies 
had been adopted. Yet labour deployment preferences of this ilk 
appear to be distinctly vulnerable to the former, more established, 
principles of job design. In this section evidence from one of 
these FMSs in particular, the machine tool makers Plant R, 
demonstrates the frequent inability of companies to come to terms 
with reorganising their pre-existing personnel policies [5].
At Plants M and R, the devolution of control to operators was part 
of an explicit personnel strategy decided at a relatively high 
management level. In both cases the organisation of industrial 
relations within the parent plants suggests that labour control 
policies more akin to the majority of the plants discussed above 
were likely. Both FMSs were originally set up on new sites, 
however, which facilitated more liberal arrangements. Plant M’s FMS 
was however eventually dismantled and transferred to the company’s
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large headquarters plant, where more rigid labour demarcations 
prevailed: Plant R's FMS was given over to an entirely different 
management team during the period of fieldwork.
This section gives detailed consideration to Plant R. The fate of 
the flexible workgroup consequent to the changeover of management 
is instructive as it emphasises the role of existing management 
policies and organisational industrial relations structures, and 
their tendency to stifle the devolution of control and self- 
contained workgroups. The changes at Plant M, where one worker was 
responsible for most system management as well as operating duties, 
will simply be noted here, as its transfer to the headquarters 
plant properly occurred after the project fieldwork ended.
Plant R, which began as an example of an FMS development in a 
dedicated building, is not on a ’’greenfield site” in the strict 
sense. However, the FMS did originate as an essentially technical 
research and demonstration exercise in high technology on a 
dedicated site for the parent group that owned it. This means that 
Plant R nevertheless bears the essential features of such a 
project, which have affected the subsequent development of its 
labour policies. The FMS project was originally set up as a new and 
entirely separate company by Plant R’s parent firm and installed in 
a spare building on the production site of Plant R. For some time 
the FMS was used for experimental and demonstration purposes and 
was not integrated into the business activities of the sister 
company on the same site. Most of the FMS managerial, technical and
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operating personnel were however recruited from this sister company 
(referred to henceforth as the "main” company on the site). Since 
the beginning of 1985 the FMS itself has been handed over to the 
main company on the site and gradually absorbed (in managerial and 
manufacturing senses) into this company’s own production 
facilities. The former management no longer bears any 
responsibility for the FMS.
At the time of final interview there were five personnel employed 
within the FMS. These consisted of a supervisor (or system manager) 
and four operating personnel, comprising two direct workers and two 
programmers, of whom only one is permanently with the system [6]. 
The permanent programmer, recruited from the main company, has been 
with the project since the start of its construction in the early 
’eighties when the FMS was first assembled. The system supervisor 
was employed in a technical capacity by this same firm before it 
was shut down, but was only brought into the FMS project in mid- 
1984 mainly for the twin purposes of helping change the system into 
a production project and breaking down labour demarcations among 
the lower-grade employees. His job is itself very fluid and 
overlaps with some of the functions performed by the operators 
themselves. Prior to his appointment no intermediate level of 
supervisory line management existed between the three FMS workers 
and the directors of the plant-based company (as it then was) (see 
Figures 4 and 5 below). The two direct workers had been employed on 
the shopfloor at the main company before being hired to work in the 
FMS at an early stage of its installation.
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The original management team for the FMS, who had been transferred 
from the main company on the site, had undertaken a world tour of 
existing FMSs during the time that the specification for the 
project was being conceived in order to assess the contemporary 
technical state-of-the-art and labour profiles. The managers 
decided, on the basis of their observations of the division of 
labour in the (mainly Japanese) systems viewed, that the philosophy 
of FMS required broad-based jobs rather than the conventional 
specialisms of Taylorism which had diffused to batch companies. To 
this end they hand-picked a number of operating personnel without 
CNC or computer experience but whom they thought would be 
sufficiently adaptable. These personnel were granted "staff" status 
on the relevant payment scales applying in the sister company as it 
was considered that the piecework-based payment system according to 
which "works" personnel were paid was rendered obsolete with the 
predetermined cycle times of NC.
The managers* approval of these international observations were 
reinforced by their own past domestic experiences. They had 
concluded that the multiple tiers of skill levels and hierarchy in 
traditional machine shops like that of the main company (of which 
they had had lengthy experience) and the consequent lack of 
accountability for management, were the main labour problems to be 
tackled in the FMS. Moreover the managers* previous experience with 
NC had led them to conclude that utilisation rates were too low. It 
was felt that the established division of labour, especially the 
provision of indirect programming and maintenance functions,
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resulted in an excessive number of personnel demarcations between 
different aspects of the productive process. The major disadvantage 
perceived in this was that accountability for faults and delays in 
production could never be attributed to any one person.
The installation of the FMS on its own site, from which the main 
company's unions and even its own managerial personnel were 
originally excluded, enabled these problems to be more easily 
addressed. By introducing multiply-skilled workers into the FMS the 
management felt both that it would gain the elusive accountability 
and the workers' job satisfaction would be improved. Therefore this 
policy was adopted at an early stage. The three workers were 
encouraged to learn everything about the system including 
programming, inspection, scheduling, operation and maintenance of 
the machines (see Figure 4 overleaf), and thus they gained an 
unusually broad and deep level of understanding of the system. The 
workers appear to have dictated the level of mechanisation adopted 
within the system, with production scheduling, inspection, and tool 
life monitoring being retained largely on a manual basis, while 
software was written at the operators’ request to facilitate the 
incorporation of tool offset data into part programs.
To motivate personnel, and to accelerate the learning process, 
operators were originally encouraged to gravitate towards the tasks 
they most preferred. However, in retrospect members of the original 
management team soon came to see this policy as mistaken, as it 
reintroduced (however informally) the demarcations it had been
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FIGURE 4
ORIGINAL FMS WORKGROUP STRUCTURE AT PLANT R (1981-84) 
2 Company directors - 1 responsible for hardware development
1 responsible for software development
System supervisor (May 1984 onwards only)









intended to break down. Individual workers tended to guard 
particular areas of expertise gained and became unwilling to share 
them with their fellows. The original management team had 
considered it important to break down this reluctance once it had 
begun to develop, this being one of the reasons for the 
introduction of a supervisor, but had found it difficult to do so.
However, at this time the resistance was limited and tacit. By and
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large all operators Involved themselves in the many tasks needed to 
keep the system running. The managers freely admitted that by 
sealing the FMS off from the main plant in this way they were 
"ducking out" of labour problems they knew would arise when they 
had learned sufficient and had to relinquish control over the 
system. The original management team surmised that labour 
classification within the cell would be the gravest assimilation 
problem when the management of the FMS was transferred to the main 
company on the site. Further interviews after the changeover, when 
the FMS had ceased to be a "special case", tend to confirm this; 
although other technical and organisational problems have also been 
encountered (Jones and Scott 1985. pp 15_33)•
At Christmas 198  ^the FMS operatives were given the choice by the 
personnel management side of the new employers of choosing between 
classification as "works" or "shopfloor" employees (weekly paid 
manual) or as "staff" employees (monthly paid). In Plant R's case 
workers on shopfloor scales actually tended to earn approximately 
£100 per week more because of a works bonus scheme exclusive to the 
production workers, although the staff scale is usually considered 
as possessing greater prestige and career structure. Moreover, from 
the commencement of their employment on the FMS until this time the 
operatives had been classified and paid according to staff rates.
Neither the former managers of the FMS nor Plant R's new production 
engineering management had wanted this "choice" to occur as it 
implied a more formal reversion to the traditional job demarcations
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between direct and indirect labour largely jettisoned on the 
original FMS. The FMS operators themselves and the production 
engineer in charge of adapting the system had wanted the company to 
adopt a new skill classification of "cell technician" entailing 
total flexibility between jobs in the cell. However the personnel 
management of the company adopted a more traditional approach. 
Personnel management was already in conflict with the shopfloor 
unions because it was attempting to change the basis on which the 
works bonus system was calculated. It did not want the additional 
problem of creating a new skill level.
To compound matters "works" and "staff" personnel are (as in many 
other British engineering plants) represented by different unions, 
each of which also preferred to keep the classification of the FMS 
workers along traditional lines in order to be able to recruit the 
personnel. In the event a compromise solution was reached whereby 
the management washed its hands of the issue and allowed the FMS 
operatives a choice of payment scales while job titles remained 
unchanged. Of the three main FMS workers one stayed on staff rates. 
The other two transferred to "works" status in order to receive the 
financial benefits of the bonus payment scheme.
With the adoption of different types of job classification for the 
FMS operatives (based upon their preference for "shopfloor" or 
"staff" payment scales) a more distinct division of labour has 
become entrenched (see Figure 5 overleaf). The two employees who 
chose to be transferred to payment on "shopfloor" scales together
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FIGURE 5
NEW FMS WORKGROUP STRUCTURE AT PLANT R (1985“) 
Senior plant management (production and personnel sections)
I
System supervisor - supervision and productionising system.
Also takes some de facto responsibility for 
electrical maintenance and loading the FMS.
/—   -----------------
1/2 "staff" personnel - responsible for programming










Major maintenance by Plant R’s Maintenance Dept.
N_______________________________________   V.
deal with the tasks more usually associated with work on such 
scales. One now assumes responsibility mainly for the robots and 
the scheduling for the system. According to managers interviewed,
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the latter task may well become one of the responsibilities of the 
:system supervisor in due course. The second operative attends 
largely to the machine tool hardware and tooling. The remaining one 
<of the principal three workers who chose to stay on ’’staff” scales 
mow takes exclusive responsibility for the system programming.
It can be seen that the initial intentions of the original senior 
managers, who wished explicitly to allow operators effective total 
control over the system, were thwarted by the partial replication 
of the divisions troubling the rest of the main site. The point of 
this example is therefore to demonstrate the practical difficulties 
in adopting more enlighted control policies specifically as a 
result of the adoption of FMS. It was only possible at Plant R to 
shield the system from destabilising personnel policy influences in 
the rest of the site as long as the FMS remained organisationally 
separate. If the FMS was to be integrated into Plant R's wider 
manufacturing facilities, the option of segregating labour 
classifications proved no longer viable. In principle the 
difficulties that occurred latterly could have been sidestepped by 
the adoption of the new "cell technician" grading. Yet this was not 
possible while power remained (not atypically) in the hands of 
relatively unsophisticated managers unwilling to countenance the 
extensive devolution of control originally adopted.
vi) Conclusion
A combination of the technological components of FMS and the
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opportunities presented to management by the poor bargaining 
position of labour due to recession has provided an ideal 
opportunity for increased management control of machinists' labour 
in FMS. Has this chance been taken up?‘This chapter demonstrates 
the existence of two tendencies - as opposed to irrevocable laws - 
in labour control as a result of the adoption of flexible 
manufacturing systems (although, as much of the evidence was 
provided by managers, precise working arrangements may differ 
slightly). These tendencies are stimulated by the existence of "low 
trust" employment relations in many of the plants that have adopted 
FMS rather than inherent in the technology itself. Firstly, there 
is increased technical control over labour through the extension of 
mechanisation to cover more areas of the transfer and control 
process in particular. Secondly, enhanced task flexibility, and 
managerial control over manufacturing methods for the relatively 
restricted range of FMS components, at the expense of craft control 
appear to be important in most plants. These latter aims are 
achieved particularly by the removal, or reduction, of a role for 
operators in programming, editing, and overall system control, and 
the substitution instead of additional ancillary tasks.
The most typical forms of labour flexibility - functional 
flexibility between machines and often assumption of a number of 
indirect functions - can be conceded by management relatively 
easily while only marginally increasing the overall discretion or 
control exercisable by workers. Nevertheless such limited 
opposition as seems to have occurred to management demands for
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labour flexibility have concentrated on these attacks on 
demarcations. This may well be because of the fact that programming 
tasks had already been largely removed from machinists in most of 
the plants studied.
The evidence in this chapter suggests, however, that labour control 
objectives have been a subsidiary motive for the adoption of FMS, 
and are far from ubiquitous. As a general rule the extent of 
technical control established and labour control policies are 
determined on a largely ad hoc basis, taking the pre-existing 
status quo as a starting point. Thus aims of minimising the amount 
and level of labour input appear to be pursued by only the largest 
case study plants, like B and D, where such policies were at an 
advanced stage irrespective of FMS. Conversely, in cases such as 
the small plants G and K, the reluctance to introduce new 
institutionalised divisions between conceptual and executive tasks 
explicitly facilitated the continued unity of conception and 
execution tasks within the FMS work group (although see also 
Chapter Nine for some qualifications to this statement).
Overall, managers appear generally '.usLinterested in closely 
defining labour roles in FMSs, partly because of this ad hoc 
approach, and further due to a difficulty in being sure of the 
level of competences required from workers. These factors have 
often enabled some de facto measure of devolution of labour 
control, as operators are left to define their own jobs within 
certain boundaries.
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This relatively uncoordinated approach is considerably more common 
than the explicit specification of conscious policies for expansion 
of job boundaries, which was best demonstrated at Plant R. Indeed 
the former approach may well be more successful as it skirts the 
issue of confronting the frequent mismatch between companies' pre­
existing personnel policies and the desirability for technical and 
operational reasons of broadened work roles. As the example of 
Plant R 's transfer to new management shows, wider institutional 
constraints tend to diminish the extent to which managers are 
prepared to ojivertly relax labour controls in FMS.
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CHAPTER NINE: Productivity, flexibility and labour control
i) Introduction
The preceding argument reveals tendencies towards both an increase 
in control over labour through both technical and hierarchical 
means as one effect of the introduction of FMS; and, running 
counter to this, the beginnings of a trend towards the relaxation 
of control and greater worker autonomy. The question that arises 
from this finding, however, is: does increased management control 
over labour in FMS actually matter in terms of being able to 
respond successfully to traditional manufacturing requirements of 
productivity and - even more so - of new demands for various types 
of flexibility?
We raise this doubt because of the belief that new manufacturing 
technologies such as FMS need to achieve both quantifiable 
manufacturing goals and the so-called strategic production 
objectives in order to improve overall competitive positions. Yet 
analysts are divided on the subject of whether the continuation in 
FMS of "low trust" employment relationships, orientated 
predominantly towards the control of workers, is capable of 
achieving these aims. Writers such as Shaiken et al (1986) have 
argued that no necessary incompatibility is involved.
Alternatively, Piore and Sabel’s thesis of "flexible 
specialisation", upon which the debate, and my line of argument, is 
predicated, proposes that manufacturing versatility requires what
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one might call "autonomous flexibility" from labour. The latter 
view is given some support in some recent empirical trans-national 
evidence on FMS (to be reviewed below).
Such an incompatibility is no doubt involved. However, these type 
of arguments underestimate the difficulties plants may face in 
relinquishing traditional objectives of increasing control over 
labour in order to pursue eventual manufacturing goals. These 
problems are exemplified in many of the plants studied. 
Nevertheless, FMS operators are able to regain - sometimes 
officially, sometimes not - a considerable degree of control within 
the production process as they use their expertise to optimise the 
running of such systems. Where such openings are created by the 
simultaneous conjunction of a number of factors then theories of 
increased management control are at least partially contradicted. 
These factors include the willingness of managers to surrender a 
high de facto degree of autonomy in order to meet more pressing and 
overriding manufacturing goals; the extensive learning curve in FMS 
technology necessitated by its very complexity, novelty and 
customisation; and the lack of - indeed, the inadequacy of much - 
formal training for FMS operation.
ii) Labour and production goals: the literature
Some of the scant literature on labour flexibility and other 
managerial manufacturing objectives in FMS, while acknowledging the 
pursuit of different sorts of technical and of labour flexibility,
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mistakenly fails to consider how these categories might impinge on 
each other. Lim (1986), for example, does not consider in his study 
of three British FMSs a possible interrelationship between 
technical and labour flexibility, or apparently believe that the 
interaction between the two may impact on overall production 
versatility.
Significant contributions to the literature by Jaikumar (1984,
1986) and Kelley (1985) [1] have however drawn attention to the 
importance of the relationship between managerial policies for 
labour deployment and the ability to achieve particular externally- 
oriented manufacturing goals. Jaikumar (1984) finds a great 
difference in technical flexibility and manufacturing philosophy 
between flexible manufacturing systems operating in Japan, the USA 
and West Germany, despite a high degree of similarity between the 
market conditions faced and FMS technology employed in these 
countries. He argues that a major reason for the disparity is the 
different average skill levels of the labour inputs, and managerial 
attitude to worker autonomy, characteristic of each country's 
approach.
In US systems Jaikumar (1984, 1986) finds a low degree of product 
flexibility, coupled with an emphasis on traditional quantitative 
benefits such as high machine utilisation and productivity at the 
expense of qualitative gains. These aims are underpinned by the use 
of semi-skilled direct labour and a continuation of the techniques 
of scientific management [2],
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In Japanese FMSs, and even more so in West German systems (Jaikumar 
198*0, much evidence suggests an alternative emphasis on the Use of 
FMS for qualitative gains (while still achieving high quantitative 
benefits), continuous development of system capabilities and 
expansion of part capacity. Achievement of these benefits is based 
on the use of relatively autonomous teams of skilled workers.
Particularly in Japanese systems there is believed to be greater 
integration between the designers of the system and the operating 
personnel, and consequently a higher degree of customisation, than 
in American systems, and more emphasis on incorporating workers' 
skills into system software in order to achieve the benefits of 
unstaffed running (Jaikumar 1984, 1986; see also Jones 1986a).
These claims are tempered, however, by Driscoll's (1984) study of 
some of the most highly mechanised Japanese systems, which finds 
that the ability to minimise the need for operator intervention in 
FMSs, particularly on the much-publicised "unstaffed" nightshifts, 
is enabled as much by cautious operating policy decisions as 
incorporating skills into software. The technical "fixes" employed 
include such methods as deliberately reducing cutting speeds below 
the optimum to minimise tool wear and breakage, and running only 
the simpler, longer cycle components during unstaffed nightshifts.
Jaikumar's emphasis on national cultural factors does not see them 
as rigidly delimiting the possibilities for the emulation of (in 
practice) Japanese success elsewhere. Indeed he believes that a 
conscious managerial strategy of importing Japanese production
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philosophies and labour practices is readily feasible, given only 
the will to do it.
Kelley (1985), on the other hand, analyses the predominance of 
managerial preferences in determining labour roles within national 
industrial relations frameworks. She finds that eventual labour 
roles are strongly influenced by the production goals desired of 
the system and its technological capabilities and complexities 
compared to more orthodox equipment used. Thus the preference for 
traditional modes of labour control in American FMSs described 
above is tempered by the extent of implementation problems 
encountered, and management’s long-term production aims for the 
system. On the basis of US evidence she distinguishes between three 
management approaches to work organisation, which she terms 
scientific management, technocentric participative, and worker- 
centred participative. ’’Participation” in Kelley's scheme can be 
equated to the accordance of autonomy to workers in problem-solving 
and in experimentation to achieve process improvement.
Kelley suggests that FMSs managed according to the criteria of 
Tayloristic scientific management tend to possess the following 
characteristics. Demarcations between direct and indirect labour 
are very marked, and the necessary skills to develop and operate an 
FMS tend to become the preserve of the latter rather than the 
former group. There is an emphasis on the elimination of human 
skills and judgement wherever technically or economically possible. 
Production workers' jobs are subject to overt deskilling, by which
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is meant a reduction in the degree of discretion and control they 
are able to exercise over the production process. Solutions to 
technical or economic limitations to system mechanisation are 
visualised in terms of both further investment (and possibly 
research and development expenditure) to obviate the need for 
continued human inputs. Moreover, projects managed according to 
these perspectives are seen as having a distinct "beginning and 
end" in terms of being dedicated to the production of only a narrow 
part family of static design.
FMSs with such characteristics tend to be inflexible in terms of 
the variety of parts produced on the system and are managed with 
overwhelmingly traditional Fordist quantitative benefits in mind 
(notably volume production and high machine utilisation). Thus, it 
is visualised that relatively high labour requirements during the 
start-up period (although still low in absolute terms) will reduce 
to lower "steady-state" needs as knowledge becomes incorporated 
into the control software.
The technocentric participative approach occurs when the expense 
and complexity of FMS obstructs management’s ability to obtain such 
all-embracing production control without relinquishing some 
elementary control over labour (see also Shaiken 1985). Thus it is 
a compromise between utilisation of the available skills of the 
workforce and the costly pursuit of continual technical refinements 
to the "automatic" capabilities of the system (such as adaptive 
control). The hierarchical, "low trust", pattern of labour
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relations characteristic of scientific management is not breached. 
However, technocentric participation informally relinquishes some 
detailed managerial authority over labour, demands workers to be 
motivated to tackle problems, and permits (or, at worst, condones) 
a degree of fluidity between formal job boundaries [3]. 
Technocentric participation acknowledges that it is impossible 
(particularly in the small-batch environment) to anticipate every 
variable in the production process - a difficulty augmented by 
manufacturing technologies as complex as FMS. This approach grants 
FMS operatives some discretion to use their job knowledge 
independently in responding to contingencies and unanticipated 
production problems. It is intended that this should facilitate 
improved response to system requirements and production performance 
overall, while minimising the modifications necessary to pre­
existing labour organisation.
In a worker centred participative approach nearly all the FMS tasks 
(including secondary programming) are devolved to a work team, who 
operate as a largely autonomous flexible multi-skilled craft 
workgroup, and are jointly responsible for the performance of 
tasks. Jones (198^a) has termed authentic examples of this fluid 
pattern of labour roles within FMS "organic” to emphasise the 
internal unity and cohesion of such workgroups and the presence of 
"high trust” labour relations dynamics. Here the division of labour 
within FMS personnel is minimal, traditional job demarcation lines 
are more extensively breached and task boundaries fluid, and the 
average skill level is higher than in the approaches outlined
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above. This approach, which is akin to that observed in Jaikumar's 
Japanese and German FMSs (although largely hypothetical elsewhere), 
is believed to facilitate increased technical flexibility in terms 
of both high utilisation and product innovation through the use of 
human, as much as technical, resources.
From the above literature it appears that there is no reason in 
principle why a strategy of reducing labour intervention and skills 
in FMS should not be possible. However, success is contingent on 
certain conditions being met. Firstly, the learning curve necessary 
for the absorption of FMS technology should be short; and the 
portfolio of components to be machined should preferably be static 
and of well-understood variations. Secondly, manufacturing 
objectives should be fairly traditional, preferably calling for 
production of relatively high volumes, and not requiring continual 
or extensive adaptability between different products. If these 
conditions are met then it may well be that traditional Fordist 
labour control methods are the most appropriate (although perhaps 
still morally objectionable).
The fulfillment of either of the above conditions seems somewhat 
unlikely in the current UK circumstances (see earlier chapters). 
Relative technological backwardness, low production volumes and 
fragmenting markets require more rapid organisational responses.
The rest of this chapter examines the extent to which British 
conditions have favoured a return of autonomy and discretion to FMS 
workers and, if so, whether this has in fact transpired.
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iii) Labour autonomy, informal learning and system development
Both the literature reviewed in section ii) and other authors (see 
especially Jones (1984c), following Piore (1968b)) suggest that 
workers* skill and expertise is essential to make process 
technology satisfactorily operational. This section investigates 
the significance of a role for operators* intervention in the cases 
studied. This question is given particular pertinence by the 
relative recency of FMS in Britain. The crucial point to 
demonstrate about such autonomous expertise is the manner in which 
the potential to develop and utilise tacit process skills allows 
operators to exercise control.
The take-up of FMS in Britain is still at a potentially youthful 
stage. This being so, there is an understandable paucity of readily 
transferable expertise in FMS projects. Part of the reason for this 
is the fact that few who claim to be FMS suppliers either produce, 
or have all-round experience in, the range of technologies that 
combine to form FMS. The projects studied therefore tended to 
involve several suppliers (with one taking on the role of 
coordinator) developing, assembling and debugging an idiosyncratic 
assortment of equipment. Inevitably, unique difficulties are 
encountered. This was found particularly in early projects such as 
Plants A, G and L, although the majority of plants alluded to such 
problems.
Plant G (where even CNC experience only existed as a result of
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external recruitment) was a prime example of problems with 
suppliers. Here the FMS project was supposed to have been developed 
and controlled by the major machine tool supplier, for whom the 
project was very much experimental. Yet, according to Plant G’s 
system manager, the project ultimately - albeit reluctantly - had 
to be user-led, with the plant's engineers (and himself in 
particular) having to undertake large portions of the software- 
related aspects of the project. Interviewees felt that in the end 
the company had taught the suppliers more about the system than 
vice versa, to the extent that the system supplier actually decided 
against sending a commissioning engineer to the plant on the 
grounds that the FMS workteam probably knew more about the machines 
than any of their engineers.
The difficulties of supplier inexperience are exacerbated because 
of the specifity of each project to a given application. Although 
the hardware components (like machine tools and transfer equipment) 
are fairly standardised, the particular configuration of equipment 
and accessory features required is tailored to the project 
concerned. System software is highly customised to the particular 
production requirements of a given system. Overall, then, no true 
"off-the-shelf" system can yet be supplied, although a number of 
standardised modules do now exist. This lack of experience, we 
argue below, tends to limit the possibility of being able to absorb 
FMS in a ready and untroubled manner without the additional need 
for considerable informal in-house knowledge.
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FMS suppliers are poorly versed with the vital in-house production 
expertise accumulated through years of manufacturing a particular 
group of components to be machined on an FMS. Their own efforts to 
incorporate this knowledge in the programs and methods they provide 
in "turn-key" projects are often sadly inadequate. Evidence of this 
surfaced, for example, at Plants D and M, where plant engineers 
more or less scrapped and rewrote the programs originally supplied; 
and Plant A, which was forced to change nearly all of the part 
fixtures supplied. The value of in-house production expertise is 
demonstrated by the relative success of the plants studied, such as 
B, H, and M, that elected to perform the majority of the FMS 
development work themselves.
One may ask how the knowledge necessary for FMS control and 
operation is transferred to its eventual workers, given the 
difficulties discussed above of the limited technical experience of 
many FMS suppliers, and the plant- and product-specific nature of 
much of the developmental work necessary to make systems 
operational. At the extremes two distinct methods are of course 
possible: a formal period of training, or informal on-the-job 
learning. The former method of structured, formal learning appears 
more prevalent for higher-level management and engineering 
personnel concerned with FMS, although much of the specific methods 
and engineering knowledge is gained in the plant on the job itself.
One finding of the fieldwork which stands out prominently was just 
how little of the training provided to FMS operators consists of
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formal teaching or courses. As far as we are able to ascertain, 
direct operatives received the benefit of short formal courses on 
the machine tool suppliers’ premises in a mere four cases (Plants 
C, L, N, and the setter/inspector grade only at Plant H). In two 
further cases (Plants F and J) the user organisation was itself the 
supplier of the equipment used, and so such formal training as took 
place still occurred within the plant. In only one case was an 
external training organisation officially employed. This was at 
Plant D, where the FMS operators attended a nearby government 
skills centre course to learn the basics of computer numerical 
control, of which they had no previous experience. All operator 
training was carried out in-house at the remainder of plants 
studied.
The formal courses on suppliers’ premises tend to be of relatively 
short duration - two weeks (as at Plant N) being fairly typical - 
and the syllabus restricted to gaining familiarity with the 
specific makes of machine tool control, and so on. It seems that 
such courses are mostly quite adequate for such factual 
instruction, although occasional complaints of insufficient length 
were encountered. In such a short space of time it is nevertheless 
only possible to transfer a limited degree of the expertise 
necessary to successfully operate systems as complex as FMS, for 
only a narrow spectrum of the conditions and eventualities likely 
to be faced can be raised [4]. These difficulties are eased 
somewhat when the supplying companies' engineers are present for 
some weeks on-site as the component parts of the system are
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gradually installed. These personnel are then available to help in 
debugging problems and aiding the informal transfer of expertise at 
the critical introduction phase. This occurred at Plant N, and also 
at Plants such as E and K where operators were not provided with 
formal external courses.
The lack of formal training and retraining for FMS operatives is 
perhaps unsurprising in view of the more general absence of such a 
policy in British small-batch engineering firms. The subject of 
limited indigenous training opportunities has been discussed in 
earlier chapters and is of course frequently regarded as a 
reprehensible phenomenon. The plants studied were no different to 
the general trend in that few possessed any formal on-site training 
facilities to speak of. My argument, specifically as regards FMS, 
is that the virtual absence of formal training does indeed have 
some disadvantages, the most particular of which are the 
difficulties caused by its non-availability within the firm for 
those technical subjects for which it is appropriate, and the 
limits it places on the rapidity with which new skills designed to 
enhance operator flexibility can be learnt. On balance, however, 
the expertise necessary for FMS operation tends to be so system- 
specific - once the initial machining skill base has been laid - 
that the prevalence accorded to on-the-job training is probably an 
inevitability.
Let us briefly dispose of the disadvantages first. Instances were 
found where the possibility of workers upgrading their skills and
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prospects had become dependent upon the voluntary use of external 
training facilities. For example, one of the workers involved with 
the FMS at Plant P, whose apprenticeship had been on conventional 
machine tools, had voluntarily taken an evening class on NC 
programming in his own time in order to be able to better 
understand the workings of the FMS. Secondly, the learning of 
additional task functions, designed to enhance the versatility of 
workers grounded in a single trade, can only be gained haphazardly 
and at varying speeds without formal training, depending upon the 
urgency of production exigencies. At plants such as A and P, for 
example, management goals of labour flexibility were being retarded 
by the fact that not all the skilled workers had yet been trained 
to do every job at the time of interview. For example, only five of 
the ten skilled men had been trained to operate the system's tool 
grinding machine. Thus the much-vaunted additional flexibility is 
conditional on the time and cooperation being available for the 
informal transmission of expertise between operators.
Despite these undoubted limitations, on-the-job training assumes 
its importance because the time and resources available for formal 
teaching are unequal in practical terms to the successful transfer 
of the amount of knowledge needed, and also because much of the 
type of knowledge required for successful FMS operation is simply 
not amenable to transfer by means of formal instruction. To take 
the first reason, the attainment of well-rounded knowledge requires 
more time and resources than could be reasonably incorporated in 
formal instruction by suppliers, who have thus far been unable (or
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unwilling) to coordinate and construct integrated programmes of 
instruction for technological systems that are so user-specific. A 
typical estimate given by the machine tool supplier Plant J of the 
time required to train an FMS operator to a standard where he or 
she is capable of assisting with tape prove-out was from two to 
three months, having previous NC experience, or one to two years 
without such a background (see also below) [5]. A manager at Plant 
H suggested that craft-trained CNC machinists would require three 
to six months further learning to successfully fulfill the intended 
role of a setter/inspector. An additional problem is that formal 
operator training for FMS, where given, is only supplied to a 
limited number of a system's initial workers. Formal operator 
instruction is restricted by the fact that managers tend only to 
see it as a one-off event [6]. Training for new shifts of workers, 
replacement employees entering the FMS, or back-up capability in 
case of absence, must therefore be provided by the existing job 
incumbents.
But, more important than the above, formal teaching is inherently 
incapable of facilitating the accumulation of the experiential 
expertise in system control characteristics that is acknowledged 
(by workers and many managers interviewed) to be necessary for 
successful FMS operation. Gradual, in-house, on-the-job learning is 
the most effective means of transferring such knowledge. At least 
one plant studied found this out the hard way. The following, 
rather jaundiced, view from the project manager at Plant L of the 
effectiveness of a supplier's formal FMS operator training
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programme encapsulates the difficulties that can occur in the 
transfer of expertise:
I don't think they've got their act together - 
maybe because they don't understand what they're 
trying to teach.... Quite frankly, at the end of it 
all we wonder why we didn't do it ourselves.... we 
tend to spend so much time explaining to the 
teachers what we want them to teach us that... you 
wonder whether you spend more time trying to 
explain to them what you want; and whether it might 
have been better to do it yourself in the first 
place. So we're tending to do more and more in- 
house, on-the-job training__
With technology as complex as FMS the discovery of system 
parameters, shortcomings and idiosyncracies, and the evolution of 
working methods to evade or absorb these limitations, can only 
unfold gradually as running experience accumulates. For example, 
operators must become aware of the product- and process-related 
causes of quality fluctuation, such as the role of thermal factors 
and the initial inaccuracy of machine tools after restarting, and 
how to compensate for these. Idiosyncracies that can only be learnt 
through experience also play a part. For instance, although the 
machining centres in Plant P's FMS are of an identical model, in 
practice personnel have to get used to the particular cutting 
accuracies of each, and route components onto the machining centre
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they believe will best be able to machine the job.
In practice the necessity to allow for a lengthy learning curve had 
been acknowledged at most of the plants visited (although subject 
to senior management pressures for more rapid progress, as Chapter 
Six showed). This is reflected firstly in the prevalence in most 
FMSs (especially the more recent systems) of an incremental 
approach to installation, introducing and gaining experience in one 
system component at a time before adding further hardware [7]* 
Additionally, at least one worker was usually assigned to the 
system before it was "up and running" (often as soon the machine 
tools were delivered on-site). In this way a gradual build-up of 
expertise was facilitated, and this could subsequently be passed on 
informally to new workers.
The vital role of on-the-job learning is underscored if we look at 
the recruitment and personnel selection criteria for FMS operatives 
utilised by managers. The overriding impression is that selection 
criteria are geared towards minimising formal training needs. This 
results in a management dilemma. The high technical content of the 
job, coupled with the profusion of control systems, might suggest 
the employment of technician grade personnel. This possibility was 
considered at Plant M. It was however rejected on the grounds that 
such personnel would be difficult to retain once the system was 
operational, and thus expertise would be lost.
Thus, almost without exception, FMS workers consisted of craft-
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trained machinists with a number of years experience on stand-alone 
CNC machine tools. There was some dispute as to the precise value 
of CNC as against conventional machining experience hitherto, with 
one manager at Plant C arguing for the latter because of the more 
direct "feel” it engendered for the cutting process. Against this, 
the dominant view was that the advantage of prior CNC experience 
consisted of the general familiarity gained with machine controls. 
At Plant M, for example, managers had picked one FMS operator 
without CNC experience, who they argued had been considerably 
slower in familiarising himself with the system as a result of this 
lack of experience.
It is apparent, however, that most of the managers interviewed 
ranked motivational factors, and a willingness to tackle production 
problems independently, as perhaps more important than their 
technical skill per se. This quality in craft workers was 
particularly noticeably used as a means of incorporating the 
expertise of skilled workers in order to minimise the delay in 
operationalising FMS projects. This evidence parallels Piore's 
(1968b) findings. At the last named plant, for example, managers 
sought to use the problem-solving expertise of skilled machinists 
to minimise delays in installation and shorten the necessary 
learning period, so as to achieve the aim of rapidly doubling 
machine utilisation, partly through the potential for unstaffed 
running as the control of potential variables was gradually 
incorporated into the system software.
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How can we be sure, however, that the employment of craft-trained 
workers with expertise in making the product results from genuine 
need rather than "social construction" of skill? To seal the 
argument in this section let us relate the evidence of the 
following dispute at the valve-making FMS at Plant H. Because of a 
dispute with the AEU in the valve production area over pay levels 
in the FMS the company suffered several months’ delay in recruiting 
and training workers for the system as a result of union 
"blacking". It had originally been hoped to recruit craft-trained 
machinists with previous experience in both valve production and on 
stand-alone CNC machining centres of the same make as, and using 
similar control panels to, those employed in the FMS. As a result 
of the dispute, two of the first group of workers selected were 
skilled workers from the firm’s development shop. However, they had 
no real experience of production work, valve manufacture, or even 
of CNC machine tools. The same disadvantages applied to an 
essentially unskilled ex-boilerman also recruited, who wished to 
change trades and has become the loader on the first shift. The 
final person recruited was a machine operator who resigned from the 
union in order to work in the FMS area.
These unpropitious circumstances, coupled with the fact that the 
firm were on the bottom of the learning curve with the FMS anyway, 
were cited by managers as the main factors resulting in low initial 
utilisation levels of between 40-50#, rework rates of 20# and scrap 
rates of 10#. These problems have declined as experience with the 
system has grown. At the time of final interview scrap and rework
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rates had been reduced to some 5# while utilisation levels had 
increased considerably. Inability to recruit in the valve area 
continued at the time of final interview because of the dispute 
and, for example, two of the workers recruited for the second shift 
had to be transferred from other companies within the parent group 
(despite the original intention to recruit internally). It is 
significant however that, despite the recent improvements in scrap 
and rework rates obtained with even these workers, company policy 
still remains negotiation with the union to resolve the dispute 
with a view to recruitment of the valve shop CNC machinists 
originally desired.
Overall, the importance of the almost ubiquitous internal 
recruitment of skilled, craft-trained workers to FMS, coupled with 
the heavy reliance upon in-house, informal learning, is the element 
of control this may give to FMS operatives through the unique 
knowledge they are able to develop of system capabilities. In 
important senses they become the only personnel with the necessary 
detailed knowledge of FMS operation. As Piore (1968b) also found, 
this trend of the monopolisation of expertise is intensified as 
second generation workers are recruited to the system. The initial 
operators then informally teach them the required tacit skills.
I stress the conditional nature of the monopolisation of expertise 
by workers. The degree of control they are able to exert can be 
reduced - although not altogether eliminated - if (as Kelley and 
Jaikumar suggest in section ii) above) workers' expertise in
24 3
managing product and process variability can be incorporated into 
system software during the introduction period. This is most likely 
if an FMS is managed as a "steady-state" unit for the volume 
production of a static range of parts. In their pure form such 
circumstances were relatively uncommon in the cases studied, 
although elements of this approach were noted particularly at the 
aerospace plant B, automotive manufacturing plants D and K, and the 
diesel engine making plant N.
Nevertheless, as Blumberg and Gerwin (1984) argue, the price of 
trying to minimise human intervention is often to uncover new 
sources of variability requiring additional skills. At Plant H, for 
example, the company had to learn a lot about making parts under 
FMS conditions that it had neither encountered before nor 
anticipated confronting, despite its considerable previous CNC 
experience. One example quoted concerned the cutting tool geometry 
requirements for the setting of drills for machining in an 
unstaffed mode. On the other machine tools in the machine shop a 
drill would normally be used to cut only a relatively small number 
of parts before being returned to the toolroom for regrinding. With 
the FMS, however, it is intended to minimise necessary toolchanging 
by keeping tools in the machining centres’ tool magazines for as 
long as possible before having to remove them.
Once the company instituted this policy, however, it discovered 
that if the lip height of a drill varies by more than two 
thousandths of an inch it becomes too inaccurate to use for
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repeated threading operations without resetting. On the former 
manual system this had never been encountered as a problem because 
of the frequency with which machinists took tools out to regrind 
them. It had been necessary in this instance to retrain the 
personnel responsible for tool regrinding to take the new discovery 
into account.
If FMSs become more "steady-state” then the danger is that employee 
motivation will diminish as production variables are increasingly 
incorporated into software-based control. Evidence on this point is 
presently sketchy because of the relatively limited time that FMSs 
have been operational in Britain. However, all operators at Plants 
P and R (two of the country’s earliest FMSs) clearly considered 
their jobs to have been more interesting during the period that the 
projects were being set up and debugged. Motivation had tailed off, 
particularly at Plant P, as production settled into an established 
and regular pattern of components and production schedules.
The important point here is that "steady state" FMSs are unlikely 
to be able to retain the motivation of skilled workers, who have 
been proven so useful during the commissioning process, after the 
development phase ceases. The danger is however that less skilled 
workers introduced will not be as adept in recognising or dealing 
with new problems that occur, and will also have to relearn the set 
of tacit skills needed to run the system. Preserving the motivation 
so important for efficient operation and quality output appears to 
be dependent on the continual development of system capabilities.
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iv) Productivity, flexibility or labour control
The main question remaining unanswered from the argument above is: 
to what degree are such factors as the level of equipment 
utilisation, system flexibility, and (perhaps less frequently 
discussed) product quality responsive to the amount of skill and 
control devolved to craft-trained workers in FMS in everyday 
production? Here I concur with the "flexible specialisation" thesis 
that devolution of control - or "autonomous flexibility" - appears 
to be important. Opportunities for operator intervention in 
programming are the most significant instance of such an assumption 
of control. Yet "autonomous flexibility" is frequently resisted by 
managers because of their continued reluctance to relinquish 
control over labour, even if this could enhance control over 
manufacturing operations as a whole.
In several systems productivity constraints, reflected in goals of 
high machine utilisation, favoured workers autonomously monitoring 
the quality of work in-process. Few plants (except the large 
aerospace plant B and earthmoving equipment plant D) judged the 
expense and time of programming in mechanised checks of tool or 
part condition and position justifiable in terms of the relatively 
low labour cost saving. For example, at Plant C managers refused to 
program in many automatic probing routines to verify part or tool 
condition on the grounds that such programming would result in 
precisely the increased indirect labour input the FMS had been 
designed to avoid in the first place. Most FMS managers tended to
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restrict mechanised monitoring to a form of risk analysis based on 
historic data (where available) of the life and wear patterns of 
individual tools, incorporating automatic probing checks of parts 
only prior to, or after, the use of critical tools (such as drills 
or taps) to determine the condition of tool and/or part. A common 
objection to more extensive probing, based on a desire for maximum 
machine utilisation (and specifically stated at Plants H and J), 
was that in-process checks, once programmed in, would add to total 
cycles times and thus increase the machine tool’s non-productive 
time. The machine shop manager at Plant J spoke for many by saying 
that it would simply ”have to be hoped that an operator was around 
and had his ears open” in the case of tool breakage in an 
unprogrammed circumstance. By choice such functions were 
relinquished to the direct operatives.
Traditional characteristics of limited flexibility of workers, 
adversarial industrial relations, and low trust between managers 
and employees often remain difficult to reconcile with the 
pressures generated by FMS to allow operatives greater autonomy in 
system control. This was most visible in the FMSs at Plants A and 
L, both of which were large plants characterised by a well-defined 
demarcation between direct and indirect labour, and in which 
operators have traditionally been dissuaded from adjusting the 
methods control established by the manufacturing and production 
engineers. Management at Plant L believed that the desired degree 
of labour flexibility and teamwork could only be maintained if 
operators had a wide knowledge of system capabilities, methods and
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functions. Managers also wished to minimise possible resistance to 
the FMS from the workforce and system operators (who were recruited 
from the most highly skilled CNC machinists). To this end a policy 
was adopted that the direct workteam should not be barred from 
access to any level of the system. Operators have therefore been 
trained in understanding the method of host computer control and 
part programming to the standard of being able to identify faults 
in tapes. However, having granted operators this knowledge, 
management have then discouraged them from making any use of this 
information to amend the system functions and part programs. 
Managers' argument for this was that the production methods for the 
limited range of components on the FMS should be solely determined 
by the plant's manufacturing engineers.
Similarly, at Plant A managers allowed operators access to the host 
computer and control room and have shown workers how to operate the 
password-protected higher levels of computer control unaccessible 
from their own terminals. Managers did so to avoid operators 
becoming suspicious that parts of the system are being kept secret 
from them. Likewise, management recognise that operators cannot be 
physically prevented from editing programs at the machine tool 
level or amending feeds and speeds because of the presence of 
machine level editing and override facilities. However, management 
intend that programming for the limited number of components in the 
system should remain the responsibility of the production 
engineers, who alone are supposed to establish the programs rather 
than allow any subsequent development. Therefore supervisors have
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made it clear that operators are discouraged from changing the 
programs and must relay any changes back to host computer level.
Evidence from this project suggests that "low trust” relations, are 
encouraged by the context of many of the plants into which FMS has 
been introduced. These conditions in turn make the achievement of 
production flexibility and productivity gains more difficult. Let 
us return to the machine tool manufacturer. Plant R, at which the 
management team running the FMS was changed, as proof of the 
particular role of managerial policies [8]. One effect of the 
alterations in labour classification described in Chapter Eight was 
the re-emergence of labour demarcations between programming and 
"operating” functions. This allowed communication barriers to form 
between the FMS workers, and caused their reluctance to take part 
in aspects of FMS tasks which were no longer seen as their "own". 
For example, employees other than the operative remaining on staff 
scales are now unwilling to optimise part programs for components 
by editing them, as any of the three would have done previously. As
one of the operators, now paid on "shopfloor” rates, explained:
Now if I walk past the machine and I think it's
been programmed to run too slow I'll do one of two
things: I'll either tell the programmer and he’ll 
make the changes; or I'll just think, "Oh, he's 
made a mess of that one!", and let it go rather 
than tell him for the sake of saving thirty seconds 
on the job. There's no incentive to now, really.
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Neither production engineers nor the FMS operators themselves 
thought this rigidity was really for the best in terms of the 
efficient operation of the FMS and they blamed the traditionalist 
attitude of the personnel management for this state of affairs. The 
development of such a situation was ascribed directly to the 
personnel policies of the FMS's new owner.
Further, the more rigid labour structure now adopted is designed to 
facilitate a new emphasis on quantitative operational production 
objectives at the expense of the former, more "strategic”, outlook 
geared to the achievement of a wide degree of product and process 
flexibility through allowing all operatives to learn the full 
capabilities of the system. These new goals were reflected in 
senior management attempts to increase batch sizes processed on the 
FMS (a batch size of six hundred in comparison to a typical batch 
size of fifty was specifically mentioned by one operator) and to 
raise the level of machine utilisation by concentrating on 
production of already proven components. However, in the operators' 
view, these new short-term goals precluded the availability of the 
machines and considerable development time to prove out programs 
for new products.
At the time of final interview these new management policies were 
about to receive what Plant R's production managers considered 
would be a more significant test. A second shift on the FMS was 
shortly to be introduced, for which new operating personnel 
recruited from Plant R's"shopfloor were to be trained. Managers and
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workers expressed a number of fears. Firstly, the recent changes in 
labour classification would hinder the breaking down of labour 
demarcations as the new personnels’ experience from Plant R’s 
shopfloor was limited to a magnified form of the divisions of work 
roles emerging on the FMS. Secondly, the existing operating 
personnel alluded to the necessity of gaining a comprehensive depth 
and breadth of knowledge of the FMS as a prerequisite to being able 
to work and control it successfully. Emerging demarcations would be 
unlikely easily to facilitate the attainment of such a breadth of 
expertise, thus confirming the pessimistic expectations of the 
original project managers. Operators and managers interviewed were 
certain that the recent divisions, leading to less labour 
flexibility and inability to experience system-level requirements 
directly, could only prolong the training process. Introduction of 
new products, the work group’s responsiveness to breakdowns, and 
recognition of programming and processing errors would be adversely 
affected as a consequence.
Thus, if workers are to be able to exercise the wider knowledge of 
programming and system capabilities necessary to respond rapidly 
and flexibly to production requirements, a relatively high degree 
of workgroup flexibility, autonomy and discretion is necessary in 
practice. Whether this is conceded is a matter of managerial choice 
and local constraints. Evidence from at least one of the systems 
studied (Plant G) indicates that this is sometimes recognised by 
managers. At this plant the relaxation of the rather hierarchical 
workgroup structure originally intended was found to be advisable
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if the aim of achieving a high level of product flexibility was to 
be met. In the initial planning stages at Plant G the project 
manager was uncertain about the level of skills that could be 
expected from each of the system’s workers. This doubt led to a 
rather restrictive hierarchical designation of job titles (system 
manager, cell technician, and cell loader) and plans for similarly 
limited responsibilities. A limited degree of overlapping was 
envisaged, but merely to provide back-up capability in case of 
temporary absence. However, the high amount of part programming 
work required, coupled with the low absolute numbers employed, 
limited the possible degree of job rigidity. As a result the 
division of labour within the system became considerably more fluid 
than was originally intended to be the case. The high degree of 
craft autonomy permitted at the plant, coupled with the lack of 
institutionalised restrictions on responsibility for determining 
working methods, ensured that there was no in-built resistance by 
managers outside the FMS to these developments.
By the time of final interview (when the system had been running 
for three months) job responsibilities were being enlarged on a 
more permanent basis. Managers now intend to gradually increase the 
overall capabilities of the three workers above in running the 
system, although the main interchange will still be limited to that 
between the two senior jobs (cell technician and system manager), 
either of whom now engage in part programming and overall system 
control. Any of the FMS’s three workers now perform the 
occasionally necessary manually controlled operations at the CNC
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machine tools, and load the system if necessary. But perhaps more 
significantly, the less skilled "loader” is now being trained in 
toolsetting and part programming, for which the other two workers 
are already responsible.
In sum, it appears that the propounded productivity, manufacturing 
flexibility and control benefits claimed for FMS cannot be obtained 
without some changes to more conventional work organisation. 
Moreover, these gains are still to some extent alternatives, being 
difficult to harmonise simultaneously. The most important point is 
that, if FMS is to be used as anything other than a slightly 
modified transfer line, all of the above benefits are facilitated 
more readily by relinquishing tight labour control policies, and 
allowing space for FMS workers to utilise their particular 
expertise. This is acknowledged by managers to some extent in the 
recognition of the role of tacit skill and informal learning, the 
almost universal preference for craft-trained workers, and the fact 
that actual job boundaries are often less rigid than their official 
titles (as Plant G shows). It can be seen, however, that the 
continuing - and in some cases - increased reluctance to concede 
operator intervention in the determination of working methods can 
undermine the achievement of greater overall production control, 
productivity and system adaptability.
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CONCLUSION: The craft worker in flexible manufacturing systems
This thesis has tried to assess some of the human implications of 
the gradual progress towards the so-called "automatic factory" in 
Britain through a study of flexible manufacturing systems. The 
objective was to discover whether, and how far, conventional craft 
workers' skills were eliminated by FMS-type technology. FMS, by 
linking machine tools under overall computer direction, is one of 
the furthest steps yet achieved in practice to so-called computer- 
integrated manufacturing, whereby all stages of the production 
process are connected by mechanised transport and computerised 
control.
It is often believed that FMS will allow significant steps towards 
the resolution of some of the more deep-seated structural problems 
of batch engineering. The claims of management and technical 
commentators suggest that flexible manufacturing systems can 
facilitate greatly increased productivity through higher machine 
utilisation and constant production. Greater control over the 
manufacturing process will ensue, it is said, because of the 
ability to better calculate total manufacturing times of components 
in the system and improved control over the tracking and progress 
of parts. These benefits are now thought to be possible without 
sacrificing the production flexibility so crucial in small-batch 
manufacturing. Hitherto these three gains have been unavailable 
simultaneously with previous technical changes (notably numerically 
controlled technologies) or, more rarely, organisational changes
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like group technology.
Our focus has been on the consequences for labour, and in 
particular for the craft-trained machinist, of the innovation of 
FMS. For the traditional centrality of craft labour as an element 
in the production process in small-batch engineering has not been 
lost on those analysing the take-up of flexible manufacturing 
systems. According to some, a major purpose of FMS is to reduce 
management dependence upon the control exercised by such workers by 
virtue of their ability to dictate working practices and to 
monopolise particular skills. Freedom from this burden will be 
possible through the eclipse of the need for each machine tool to 
be dependent on an individual operator, the ability to cater for 
product and machining variations with minimal human attention, more 
precise management definition of procedures, and closer 
prescription of many remaining human tasks. Thus the realisation of 
manufacturing productivity, control and flexibility gains is 
conceived of largely in terms of enhancing control over labour.
This aim is not seen as being inconsistent with greater labour 
flexibility between hitherto separate operational and ancillary 
tasks necessary to service semi-automatic production systems. This 
view has been taken by certain managerial and technical analysts, 
such as Dempsey (1983) and the National Economic Development 
Office's Advanced Manufacturing Systems Group (1984). Less 
sophisticated adherents of the "regulationist" school, such as 
Shaiken et al (1986), concur with such sentiments.
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Other commentators argue the reverse case that such sophisticated 
technologies may require a higher level of skills on the shopfloor 
and demand greater devolution of control over operations to direct 
workers in order to accomodate more complex products and production 
processes. This is the position of more sophisticated 
"regulationist" analyses, notably that of Blackburn et al (1985). 
Sociotechnical analysts, such as Hirschhorn (I985) and Sorge et al 
(1983), those I called "technicists" in Chapter Four (for example, 
Hatvany et al (1983)), and proponents of "flexible specialisation" 
(Piore and Sabel 1984) take the same position more emphatically.
My evidence, gained by study of a cross-section of fifteen British 
FMSs, shows that much of the literature and supposition on the 
labour implications of FMS is flawed in important respects. One of 
our main observations is the very diversity of FMS application in 
terms of profile of the user plants, the production problems they 
face, and therefore the main benefits sought from this technology. 
If it were true that work roles in FMS are largely technically 
determined, or that (as Shaiken et al (1986) suggest) the 
achievement of different marketing objectives is uncorrelated to 
the form of work organisation employed, we would except this to be 
reflected in essentially similar working arrangements. However, 
this only appears to be the case to a limited extent. How are we to 
explain this anomaly?
To untangle the contradictions of the literature we have adopted a 
distinction between tasks and work roles. Tasks are technically
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generated and call for certain skills. Work roles, on the other 
hand, are subject to a number of external influences and dictate at 
which level of personnel these skills are to be exercised (thus 
bringing in the question of labour control). The tasks necessary 
with FMS are less concerned with direct operation (as was required 
on conventional machine tools) or the management of the machining 
process at a single tool (as was still the case with numerical 
control) so much as overseeing an interconnected system of 
computer-controlled work stations. Two types of tasks thus remain, 
although their extent is subject to the somewhat variable degree of 
technical sophistication it is decided to employ. Firstly, 
managerial functions of overall system coordination and control, 
and of the determination of methods for parts on the FMS, are 
required. Secondly, a number of servicing and ancillary functions, 
such as maintenance, inspection and the loading and unloading of 
tools and parts, are called for to keep the system running 
smoothly.
These task functions, although now exercised through the medium of 
computerised (rather than physical) control, are still essentially 
the same as those comprising what we described in Chapter Five as 
the machining labour process: that is, conception, setting-up, 
monitoring, regulation and quality control (although not the actual 
control of cutting). The necessary tasks are more extensive in some 
respects as the worker is now responsible for a group of machines. 
Many of the craft skills appropriate to earlier forms of machining 
technology are still of value because of the fact that the process
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of material transformation remains unchanged. FMS is simply a more 
sophisticated machining technology. With the proviso that 
additional training would be required in the more advanced methods 
of computer control, there is no reason in principle why the 
entirety of the labour process in FMS could not be under the 
management of the craft-trained worker [1].
The relatively limited evidence of such developments in the cases 
studied brings in the question of the determinants of work roles, 
and confirms our hypothesis that the reasons for the non-trial of 
skill-maximising forms of division of labour are institutional and 
political as opposed to technical. We have identified managerial 
preferences for labour deployment as being the main variable 
affecting the division of labour on the basis of the findings of 
this project. This approach thus places a heavy emphasis on the 
distinct role of company manufacturing, marketing and industrial 
relations policies, and the extent to which these are coordinated, 
in assessing the outcomes for work roles of the introduction of 
particular technical and organisational changes. The importance of 
this factor derives from the fact that new technologies are not 
introduced in a vacuum. Rather, the existing organisational context 
into which technologies are introduced colour the dimensions of 
work role changes sought and realisable.
Supplementing this factor of managerial control preferences, and 
often containing the potential to undermine it, the variability 
inherent in the task functions required, and product and labour
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market characteristics, also play a part. The variability of tasks 
necessary in FMS depends on the degree of complexity and 
uncertainty inherent in the technology and the spectrum of parts 
machined. As we shall see, this has been significant in denying 
several managements in the plants studied the opportunity to 
exrecise the degree of labour control that they originally wished. 
In confirmation of Sabel's (1982) thesis, product markets were 
almost universally found to be increasingly unstable, characterised 
most prominently by requirements for faster delivery, higher 
quality and lower batch sizes.
Labour market factors were not found to be very important in 
delimiting management wishes in this study. There are several 
reasons for this. Firstly, there is a widespread shopfloor 
acceptance of technical change. Secondly, the considerable 
weakening of labour's bargaining power in most plants (other than G 
and K) as a result of job losses during the recession has resulted 
in the availability of a glut of skilled workers willing to ensure 
their future security of employment by staffing FMS. Lastly, there 
was a virtual absence (apart from Plant H) of any organised labour 
opposition to management proposals regarding the staffing levels 
of, or working practices to be employed on, flexible manufacturing 
systems. The few disputes that did occur tended to focus on 
traditional bargaining matters such as shift systems or the 
negotiation of a satisfactory price to relinquish control over 
working practices.
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Despite recommendations (Ashburn et al 1986; Thompsone and Scalpone 
n.d.) job design policies for FMS are conspicuously haphazard, 
receiving little or no strategic thought, and being treated as a 
belated adjunct to the technical parameters and purposes of the 
system. This finding is important within its own terms, for it 
reveals that allocation of work roles in FMS is normally given 
little more conscious thought than the installation of any other 
technical innovation on the shopfloor. The exceptions to this, 
where some explicit consideration was given to the degree of 
flexibility required, and the extent of autonomy to be granted to 
workers, were - significantly - greenfield sites (Plants P and R) 
or the small, overspill machine shop at Plant M, which had a 
reputation for considerably more flexible working practices than 
this company's headquarters plant. The fragility of such 
enlightened arrangements, depending upon institutionalised 
industrial relations cultures and contexts, was however 
demonstrated by the unique example of the transfer of the FMS at 
Plant R to a more traditional management team.
In many plants, therefore, job design policies continued to be 
informed by motives of reducing craft control over working methods 
and job demarcations more substantially than had been hitherto 
possible with previous technical or organisational changes. These 
aims were realised by several means. Firstly, workers' access to 
some higher level operating functions, such as scheduling, could be 
shut off technically. Alternatively, responsibility for methods 
decisions could be restricted to a supervisory grade of worker
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within the FMS crew, or even to external personnel in Production 
Control and Production Engineering departments.
The allocation of responsibility for part programming in particular 
is often regarded as the touchstone for questions of who controls 
the machining process. Most of the plants studied, because of their 
size and previous NC experience, had established programming 
departments which already performed the majority or all of the 
required programming work. Nevertheless, most plants (with the 
exceptions of B and D) made at least some use of manual data input 
facilities for operator programming or, even more commonly, 
subsequent editing of programs. With FMS there came a tendency to 
reduce the level of intervention permitted to FMS workers in 
constructing and/or editing the programs for components. We have 
shown that, where this occurred, it was explicitly intended to 
increase direct management control over manufacturing methods.
Yet the specificity of such control objectives, depending on firms’ 
particular goals, can be demonstrated by those plants without 
programming departments (G and K) which chose to retain all 
programming facilities within the FMS workcrew itself (albeit that 
not all members of the crews were able to program) and Plants M and 
R in particular, at which programming functions were actually 
devolved to the FMS workers.
The advent of FMS was however used by management in several 
companies to explicitly achieve job design objectives by the
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promotion of increased labour flexibility. This was the final 
method by which managers sought to undermine craft controls over 
the labour process in FMS. The purpose of labour mobility 
initiatives, as has already been hinted above, was rarely to 
sanction the formation of the autonomous flexible workgroups 
described by sociotechnical commentators. A minority of plants (F,
M and R) experimented with such extensive labour flexibility; but 
in the first two of these plants there was only one direct worker 
anyway, and in no cases were sociotechnical prescriptions 
explicitly used by managers as a reference point in job design.
It is clear that FMS is seen by many managers as technically 
forcing a requirement for more flexible working patterns as a 
result of its automatic cycle times. Labour versatility in FMS most 
commonly involves varying degrees of increased horizontal and 
vertical flexibility between system servicing and ancillary 
functions. The extent of this varies according to the degree of 
mechanisation employed, and to which the functions of existing 
indirectly productive personnel can be added to FMS operatives. In 
general, however, the forms of mobility pursued consist of more 
than what "regulationists" have termed work intensification through 
the agglomeration of semi-skilled tasks. The addition to operators' 
work roles of tasks such as inspection, tool grinding or tool 
setting will allow them a greater measure of discretion than the 
assumption of responsibility for, say, swarf clearance.
Having said this, management approaches to labour flexibility often
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appeared rather half-hearted, as no great willingness could be 
found to Invest in Increased skills. There was a noticeable lack of 
formal training for the additional tasks that operators were 
supposed to undertake (see also below).*Neither, contrary to 
initial expectations, was there more than a minimum of evidence for 
the yielding of still strong inter-craft demarcations between 
production and maintenance functions; and certainly none for the 
coherent development of the polyvalent, multi-skilled craft 
worker. This project also finds, in common with other studies 
referred to in the text, that the much-vaunted flexibility is 
diminished in practice by workers mutually guarding particular 
tasks as their own (as at Plants A, L, P and R).
The argument above leads to the conclusion that the innovation of 
FMS has normally undermined the level of craft control that 
machinists are able to exercise. But this does not preclude a 
continued requirement for skills originating from craft training 
for the successful operation of FMS in nearly all of the systems 
studied. This was reflected in the fact that managers deliberately 
recruited craft-trained workers in virtually all cases. The example 
of Plant H, where the initial recruitment of less skilled workers 
hampered the efficiency of the system, demonstrates that there is a 
real basis to the need for such expertise.
In this study craft skills were found to be valuable in providing a 
ready source of expertise on the practicalities of machine tools 
and machining in order to facilitate the absorption of FMS
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technology. The independent problem-solving ability instilled by 
craft training acts as at least a partial substitute for the lack 
of thorough practical knowledge on ’’productionising" technology as 
novel and complex as FMS on the part of system suppliers and plant 
engineers (documented in Chapter Nine). In part, machining craft 
skills therefore plug a gap left by the lack of investment by 
plants in the formal training of FMS operating staff.
Yet I want to argue here that formal teaching alone cannot dispense 
with the need for craft skill in most of the systems encountered. 
One of the crucial points of this thesis is that craft skills 
contain an all-important tacit element, which cannot by definition 
be formally expressed. Tacit skills are essentially practical, and 
must be learnt experientially over time. By recruiting craft- 
trained machinists (with either previous conventional or CNC 
experience) to staff FMSs managers are simply trying to reduce the 
necessary amount of additional - specifically FMS-related - 
technical expertise that must be digested, and thus enabling 
curtailment of the necessary commissioning period. This role was 
found to be important in most of the plants studied, given the 
early phase of FMS development in Britain. Managers’ continued 
dependence on these skills allows FMS operators to retain an 
element of control in the production process, even if their primary 
jurisdiction over working methods is lost and the new skills are 
more process-specific than generalised.
There is however a more vexed question of whether such skill is
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still needed when the commissioning period is over, the FMS is in 
production, and the technological teething troubles have been 
eliminated. Our evidence suggests that it is still a useful input, 
and often essential. The opportunity to* continue to use craft 
skills will depend on the purposes for which the FMS concerned is 
being managed, the variability inherent in the part spectrum being 
machined, and the continued uncertainty of the FMS itself as a 
machining process technology.
I have observed that British FMSs have been introduced for a wide 
variety of purposes. At the outset it must be accepted that a 
flexible manufacturing system, comprising a number of work 
stations, is likely to become less adaptable (in terms of the 
component spectrum machinable) the larger it becomes and the more 
specialised its constituent work stations. Any FMS is therefore 
semi-dedicated in comparison with stand-alone conventional or CNC 
machine tools. Thus there is a need for a choice of manufacturing 
objectives and the types of technical flexibility sought.
There is no necessary inconsistency, therefore, between an FMS 
being used as a modified transfer line, with the capability to 
produce a limited component spectrum at any of a number of 
identical machine tools (such as Plant D), or to manufacture an 
expanding range of products on dissimilar machine tools (such as 
Plant G). Most plants fell somewhere between these two extremes, 
although there was certainly a tendency to prefer short-term 
quantitative gains such as reductions in work in progress levels
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and higher machine utilisation. The point is, however, that the on­
going skill requirements of FMS operators are likely to be lower if 
the system is treated as static in terms of its component profile, 
as has been found in many American systems. The American-owned 
Plant D, the only plant to use exclusively semi-skilled operators 
for production purposes, was the only plant to fit this mould 
particularly closely. The use of such personnel did not preclude 
engineers satisfactorily amending programs to incorporate design 
changes into components machined. This form of adaptability, which 
I have called modification flexibility, is precisely that seized on 
by Shaiken et al (1986) and some of the less rigorous prophets of 
"neo-FordismM as evidence that versatile marketing strategies do 
not require a high level of skills and labour flexibility.
But, if one looks at what I have termed product flexibility (the 
ability to use FMS to expand the product range), evidence from most 
plants (and particularly G, P and R) suggests that the continued 
expertise of skilled workers is essential in enabling the use of 
FMS to respond speedily to changes in product demand. Where the 
necessary skills are lacking (as at Plant H), or demarcations are 
hindering the transfer of information between personnel (as at 
Plant R under its new management), the response times to new 
flexibility requirements will be slower.
Neither were productivity or overall manufacturing control found to 
be aided by excessive labour demarcations or management 
unwillingness to allow operators to employ their skills in problem­
266
solving autonomously. The complexity of FMS has created a profusion 
of new sources of error in the technology which, because of its 
unprecedented level of integration, is reflected in the difficulty 
of detecting the origin of defects in components coming off the 
system (particularly when identical machine tools are used). 
Paradoxically, as Blumberg and Gerwin (1984) also find, the cost of 
attempting to compensate by mechanised means for all possible 
sources of product error - and thus limit the necessity for skilled 
intervention to rectify matters - is potentially lengthier cycle 
times and the creation of new process-related problems.
In practice it is by and large still valuable to permit genuine 
devolution of FMS control procedures to skilled FMS operatives in 
order to enable the achievement of productivity, manufacturing 
control and the more extensive flexibility benefits. To be sure, 
this is often conceded somewhat reluctantly, particularly in those 
larger plants (such as A and L) where labour control objectives 
have become more institutionalised. And certainly managers tend to 
undertake the policy of devolving labour control in British FMSs 
very much in response to ad hoc production pressures rather than as 
part of a preconceived plan.
My argument, based on the importance of the particular 
manufacturing objectives desired from FMS, and the specificity of 
pre-existing policies for industrial relations and labour control, 
contradicts the stress of advocates of flexible specialisation, and 
many of those proposing "neo-Fordism", upon coherent and well-
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coordinated linked strategies for marketing and manufacturing 
objectives and work organisation. We can only point to a tendency 
for the reduction of craft control in FMS, largely due to 
institutional factors in the firms that have been able to afford 
such systems, which only in the most extreme (and atypical) cases 
of mechanisation (Plants B and D) denies an input for craft skill.
The take-up of FMS in British small-batch manufacturing firms has 
been slack as yet in comparison with the potential for its 
application in small-batch engineering (see also Jones and Scott 
1985)» Large-scale systems, which can then be electronically 
integrated with other parts of the manufacturing process, have been 
confined to the biggest firms with the necessary financial and 
engineering resources to undertake such projects. For the majority 
of batch engineering firms smaller-scale, less mechanised, systems 
incorporating a pivotal role for skilled workers in extracting the 
optimum performance are likely to be more affordable and 
appropriate. Of necessity this study has only been able to draw its 
conclusions from observation of FMS in its formative stages. 
However, the indication is that as FMS technology becomes more 
widespread, and is fully mastered by manufacturing managers and 
engineers, the value of relaxing direct labour controls is more 
likely to be appreciated. This does not preclude the likelihood of 
a polarisation of forms of work organisation, as previously 
occurred with CNC. This thesis demonstrates that, even in flexible 
manufacturing systems, the eclipse of craft machining skills is an 




See Avlonitis and Parkinson (1983). Bylinsky (1983),
Hatvany et al (1983), King (1984), Mitchell (1984) inter 
alia.
See especially Ashburn (1986), Hirschhorn (1985), Ingersoll 
Engineers (1985) and US Congress, Office of Technology 
Assessment (1984) for recent studies of the introduction of 
advanced manufacturing technology into manufacturing 
companies.
See especially Berger and Piore (1980), Piore and Sabel 
(1984), Sabel (1982), and Sabel and Zeitlin (1985).
It is reasonable to assume that the recession and changes 
in product markets of recent years have further increased 
the proportion of small-batch production within engineering 
manufacture. This cannot, however, be conclusively proved 
owing to the lack of statistics.
A number of recent reports by the National Economic 
Development Office provide a wealth of detailed evidence of 
market fragmentation, and changing product and 
manufacturing requirements, in sectors of British small-
batch engineering. See National Economic Development 
Office, Diesel Engines Economic Development Committee 
(1984), National Economic Development Office, Heavy 
Electrical Machinery Economic Development Committee (1983). 
and National Economic Development Office, Technology, 
Skills and Manpower Group (1985) inter alia.
See for example Altschuler et al’s (1984) discussion of 
these two possibilities applied to the evolution of the 
automobile industry in the coming decade for a concrete 
example of this dilemma.
For discussion about the link between manufacturing and 
corporate strategy as a whole see especially the pioneering 
work of Skinner (1978) and the subsequent debate, mainly in 
the pages of the Harvard Business Review. See the 
collection of papers in Kantrow (1982). Further discussion 
can be found in Slack (1984).
The formation of this hypothesis was influenced by Littler 
and Salaman’s (1984) contention that "design space" for 
alteration of job design exists when a technology is first 
introduced, but disappears in practice once a particular 
pattern has been established and accepted as the norm.
Useful discussions of FMS technology can be found in Anon 
(1983a), Charles Stark Draper Laboratory (1984), Hartley
(1984), Ingersoll Engineers (1982), Jablonowski (1985b), 
and Ranky (1983).
[10] To preserve the anonymity of case study plants (codenamed 
from A through to Z) sources of articles in technical 
journals on named British FMSs visited will not be cited. 
With few exceptions these articles have in any case proved 
grossly inaccurate regarding the labour requirements of 
such systems. To give a not atypical example, one article 
on Plant A reports confidently that it requires staffing by 
only two workers for each of three shifts. In fact, when 
the plant was visited the operating team was found to 
consist of twelve direct workers on the one shift being 
operated!
CHAPTER TWO: The research project: flexible manufacturing systems
[1] Definitions of FMS in the literature fall into two classes. 
Some emphasise the possession of a set technological 
configuration of equipment. For examples see de Barr
(1985). Department of Trade and Industry (1984), and NEDO. 
Advanced Manufacturing Systems Group (1984). Other 
definitions prefer the more abstract view that FMS is ”a 
way of thinking” about organising the manufacturing 
process. These include Charlish (1983). Cranfield FMS Group 
(1984), Dempsey (1983), Hartley (1984), and Jablonowski 
(1985b).
271
In the full sense of the term flexible manufacturing 
systems are intended to encompass application to a wide 
range of manufacturing processes, including machining, 
sheet-metal working, paint-spraying, assembly and others 
(Hartley 198*1; Ingersoll Engineers 1982). To date only the 
first of these applications has shown growth of any 
significance whatsoever. This is largely because of the 
technological maturity of computer numerical control in the 
metalcutting sector in comparison to the levels of 
mechanisation currently achievable in these other uses.
This claim to originality has been belatedly buttressed by 
the controversial granting of a US Patent in 1985* At the 
time of writing (June 1987) several American firms 
operating FMSs are in the process of establishing a fund to 
finance contesting this patent in the courts!
The history of Molins System 24, its demise, and its exact 
location as a "Fordist", "neo-Fordist" or "post-Fordist" 
production system are interesting subjects in their own 
right, although not strictly relevant here. Accordingly, 
these subjects are considered in a paper currently in 
preparation by the author. Analysis is hindered both by the 
paucity of available information and the considerable 
internal contradictions in the writings of the main source, 
system designer Theo Williamson, on the system's labour 
implications. Variously, Williamson seems to put forward
views influenced by Taylorite, "post-industrial" and 
sociotechnical perspectives. See Williamson (1967, 1968a, 
1968b, 1968c, 1972).
[5] Table 1 is compiled from fieldwork evidence and published 
information in The Engineer, The FMS Magazine, Metalworking 
Production, and Production Engineer inter alia. Thirteen of 
the projects (ten companies) included in Table 1 had not 
been announced when fieldwork was completed in August 1985.
[6] The observed diversity of FMS applications has led to what 
Bignell et al (1985. PP 99“100) rightly consider a largely 
sterile, though prolific, debate on the classification of 
FMS which has tended to transfer focus away from the more 
crucial subject of flexibility in manufacturing. Groover 
(1980) and Jelinek and Goldhar (1983) have tried to 
subdivide the practical manifestations of flexible 
manufacturing systems by contrasting respectively 
"dedicated FMS" or "programmable systems" (what are really 
in effect modified transfer lines) with "random FMS" or 
"flexible systems", which refers to those systems 
undertaking manufacture of wider product ranges and 
volumes. Browne et al (1984) and Dupont-Gatelmand (1982) 
have also introduced their own, similar, forms of 
classification. Aside from the dubious merits of such 
endeavours, these classifications inevitably result in a 
high degree of overlap between the different categories of
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FMS proposed. In Jelinek and Goldhar's (1983) 
classification, for instance, it is never explained when, 
and under what circumstances, a "programmable system” 
becomes a "flexible system"?
Benchmark Research (1985, PP 13~1*0 » Bessant and Dickson 
(1982b), Capes (1985), Harrison and Dunn (1986), Pullin 
(1986b), Rodger (1986). Ross (1981), and Wyles (1983) among 
others, discuss the lack of diffusion of advanced 
manufacturing technologies such as FMS. See also the 
additional references cited in the body of the text.
It has been suggested that payback periods of three to 
seven years are realistic expectations for FMS (Anon 1984). 
Certainly FMSs are very expensive investments. Current 
British systems have cost between about £600,000 and £7 
million, with an average figure of probably some £3 
million. In view of this an interesting sidelight of the 
fieldwork evidence was the discovery that the availability 
of government support for FMS was the factor decisively 
influencing purchase in a large number of cases.
Evidence from two of the first firms studied in this 
research illustrates these reasons for the lack of take-up 
of FMS. Both of these firms originally had a definite plan 
for the installation of FMS but were subsequently either 
rethinking the initial concept or had abandoned the plan
altogether. At Plant T a plan for linking a lathe and 
machining centre by FMS had been abandoned. A number of 
reasons were given for the abandonment of the FMS proposal. 
In the first place the project had been "championed" by the 
company’s manufacturing director and general manager, both 
of whom left the company during an early stage of the 
planning. There was little support for the FMS idea from 
the replacement manufacturing management personnel, who 
viewed the project as overambitious and associated it with 
other alleged failings of the personnel who had left.
The project was felt to be unrealistically ambitious for a 
number of reasons. Little expertise existed on the problems 
of interlinking machining centres and turning machines in 
an FMS, especially the different handling problems posed by 
prismatic and turned components. It was also felt that too 
much of the considerable developmental work needed had been 
left to the company (who claimed to have insufficient time 
for this) rather than the supplier. Finally it was also 
felt that the company's manufacturing environment resembled 
a job-shop (with average batch sizes of about fifty) too 
much to derive any benefit from the higher volumes thought 
to be necessary for FMS. Furthermore the company machined 
very few parts requiring operations on both machining 
centre and lathe, and thus no justification could be 
provided for the proposed interlinking conveyor.
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At Plant X lack of planning time, due to an attempt to have 
the FMS working in time for a machine tool exhibition in 
mid-1984, resulted in the original FMS plan having to be 
abandoned as too ambitious. At the time of interview the 
company was intending to produce a more feasible, scaled 
down concept. One of the major problems with the initial 
scheme had been an underestimation of the costs of 
providing tooling and other services to allow the 
flexibility to produce the planned components in minimal 
batch sizes in order to achieve the main aim of reducing 
work in progress.
[10] Quantitative methods of investigation were felt to be 
inappropriate for this research project. Quantitative 
methods seemed to be unable to effectively cope with the 
complexities and ambiguities of the introduction of new 
technologies into the production process, or to capture the 
essential subjectivity of feelings towards the process of 
technical change on the part of those affected. Such 
methods also appeared unable to give expression to the 
uneasy mixture of feelings and contradictory beliefs held 
even by the same participants in this process. For 
instance, a questionnaire survey administered by Blumberg 
and Gerwin (1981) to shopfloor workers on an American FMS 
informs us that a majority of those surveyed feel they have 
skills they would like to use but now cannot. On its own, 
however, this information is not of much use. It neither
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tells us what these skills might be, whether all the 
workers are referring to the same types of skill, nor even 
gives us any information to judge how justified their 
claims of redundant skill may be.
[11] It was believed that semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews would be the best way of gaining the subjects' 
initial cooperation. It was also felt to be the most 
flexible way of adapting to the many differences between 
the plants studied, and pursuing relevant issues in greater 
depth as they arose. The paucity of conclusions that a 
recent structured qualitative telephone interview survey 
(Benchmark Research 1985) was able to draw appears to have 
subsequently vindicated the correctness of this original 
decision. This survey aimed to establish details of 
diffusion of advanced manufacturing technology, 
understanding of the terms conventionally in use, reasons 
for lack of diffusion and suggestions to aid introduction. 
The combination of tightly structured questions, the 
difficulties posed by a telephone interview format, and a 
very diffuse subject and range of interviewees, result in 
merely trivial conclusions, in this author's opinion.
[12] Access proved relatively unproblematic, usually being 
obtainable by means of a telephone call to relevant 
production engineers. A certain amount of delay in actually 
arranging interviews (almost a year and a half in the most
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extreme case), owing to the early stages of many of these 
projects, was however fairly common. Only in one case was 
access actually refused.
CHAPTER THREE: Understanding "automation" in manufacturing
[1] I am grateful to Mr John Styles of the School of Humanities 
and Social Sciences, University of Bath, for helping to 
clarify a number of points concerning the "American system" 
of manufacture.
[2] Taylorism has been a much discussed and abused phenomenon. 
Good expositions can be found in Rose (1975). Kelly (1982b) 
and Littler (1978, 1982). Littler (1982) is particularly 
useful in questioning the scale of the direct influence of 
Taylorism. The idea that Taylorism involved the extreme 
subdivision of labour appears to be attributable to 
Braverman (197*0 and also to claims made by Davis and 
Taylor (eds.) (1972) (see Littler 1978). Kelly (1978b, 
1982b) has convincingly argued that maximum subdivision of 
labour was no more integral to Taylor's system than to any 
other management approach. The principle of the division of 
labour dates back after all to Adam Smith (197*0 and 
Charles Babbage (see Council for Science and Society 1981, 
pp 12-13). Taylorism did undoubtedly divide up the 
conception and management of tasks from their execution. To 
perform the former set of tasks Taylorism introduced a new
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bureaucracy of indirectly productive personnel.
Fordism had other unique features also. One of these was 
payment of high wages to many of the workers (known as the 
"Five Dollar Day"). This was partly a compensation for the 
soul-destroying tedium of the jobs Ford had created. Also, 
though, it was intended to help provide the purchasing 
power to form a mass market for Ford’s cars. A concern 
quite foreign to Taylor with the moral well-being and 
behaviour of his employees outside of the factory gates was 
also a feature of Fordism. See Gartman (1979) and Hounshell 
(198*0 for accounts of Ford's production system.
For all types of automation concerning us in this thesis 
the source of basic motive power is provided by 
electricity. Clarity will therefore be aided by discounting 
power technology as a variable.
In fact the self-acting mule replaced complex human control 
skills by eliminating the need for them rather than by 
trying to imitate them (see also the discussion in Chapter 
Three). Despite giving this example the Council for Science 
and Society (1981, pl8) go on to argue the case for 
preserving a distinction between mechanisation and 
automation on the logically weak grounds that the imitation 
of human feedback abilities is now better understood!
CHAPTER FOUR: Mechanisation, skills and the division of labour
[1] Useful and concise reviews of the debate on the social 
analysis of skill can be found in Littler (1982) and Rolfe
(1986). The following account draws considerably on these 
sources.
[2] Similiar distinctions have been drawn by Beechey (1982) and 
Cockburn (1983)* who also point out that these are often 
used interchangeably when in fact they mean rather 
different things.
[3] Occasionally such approaches have also attempted to 
incorporate and measure what they term discretionary 
skills, by which is usually meant the application of 
discernment and flexibility in the method of achieving a 
given task. See for example Hazlehurst et al (1969). This 
is a confusing addition, as it once again introduces 
extrinsic factors connected to the division of labour and 
technology used.
[4] Even in this theory some degree of technical basis to skill 
is rarely completely ruled out. See Littler (1982, pp 9“ 
11).
[5] See Turner (1962), especially pp 110-114) and also Lazonick 
(1979).
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The possession of skill may not lead to control if 
management also possesses the necessary job knowledge. 
However, see the discussion in section iv) on tacit 
knowledge, which may limit management's ability to delimit 
workers' control over the labour process. Conversely it is 
possible that the possession of control over one’s labour 
process may not lead to skill, as for example in some 
agricultural work.
See Stinchcombe (1959) for a comparison of decision-making 
structures under craft and mass preoduction.
It is ironic that those proposing a generalised deskilling 
cite as their most frequent and typical example the highly 
sub-divided labour of workers on car assembly lines in view 
of the relatively small numbers so employed. In Blauner's 
(1964) study of the assembly line worker he has to note 
that in 1959 only 18% of U.S. car workers were employed on 
assembly lines, a proportion certain to have further 
declined as a result of the substitution of capital for 
labour.
Braverman's approach has been subsequently applied to a 
number of industries (see especially Zimbalist (ed.) 1979)* 
More recently, several writers such as Cooley (1980) and 
Shaiken (1985) have been responsible for popularised 
accounts of the application of microprocessor-based
technologies that draw heavily on Braverman's approach.
[10] Braverman’s thesis has generated an extensive literature of
its own, which has been critically reviewed by Thompson 
(1983) and Storey (1983). For further criticisms of 
Braverman's approach see notably Wood (ed.) (1982) and 
Salaman and Littler (1982).
[11] We wish to differ from Manwaring and Wood's otherwise 
useful account of tacit skill in their contention that: 
"Tacit skills are tied to the firm or industry... unlike 
the craft skills of the apprentice trained worker." 
(Manwaring and Wood 1985, pl90). By so saying, Manwaring 
and Wood limit the use of the concept of tacit skill as an 
analytical tool to those semi-skilled workers in a firm's 
internal labour market. Such workers' skills are firm- and 
process-specific, informally learnt on the job itself, and 
not readily transferable elsewhere (Doeringer and Piore 
(1971)* Presumably Manwaring and Wood take this view on the 
basis that, as Berger and Piore (1980, pp 19-21) say, craft 
skills are required to be wide-ranging rather than process 
specific, and are characterised by a need to use abstract 
principles (usually inculcated by a period of formal 
apprenticeship) to independently solve a spectrum of 
problems. Craft workers can thereby exercise craft controls 
based on social exclusion as discussed above in section 
ii). Here we agree instead with Wilensky (1964, pl49) that
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craft control (in the sense of exclusive jurisdiction) is 
also based on the power conferred by the posession of 
necessary, but relatively inaccessible, tacit knowledge.
Yet the possibility that craft workers may be able to exert 
craft control over the labour process does not override the 
fact that they also possess and exercise tacit knowledge 
over a wide variety of tasks. The bulk of their necessary 
job learning is acquired practically in the work situation, 
as is the case with the semi-skilled workers studied by 
Kusterer and Manwaring and Wood. Where the kind of tacit 
skills exercised by craft workers will differ from semi­
skilled workers is in the greater likelihood that those 
employed by the former will consist more of "development of 
perceptual accuracy, predictive judgement, and the 
knowledge of decision rules" in fault prevention, and:
the ability to select, and continually 
review and control, (planning) methods 
which are appropriate to the successful 
completion of a given task. (Engineering 
Industry Training Board 1971. p22).
[12] See also Perrow's (1970, pp 75~80) use of the concepts of 
"variability" and "search". "Variability" refers to the 
number of exceptions encountered in production processes. 
"Search" refers to the either formal or tacit basis of the 
mental processes that must be employed to manage this
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variability.
[13] See for example Jaikumar (1984, p34), Kelley (1984), and 
Shaiken (1985) for descriptions of this phenomenon. Polanyi 
(1962, p604) and Polanyi and Prosch (1975. P33) contain 
further illustrations of tacit knowledge.
[14] Wilkinson (1983) studies this phase of introduction.
[15] One notable and early exception is Williamson (1972), the 
inventor of Molins System 24, who claims that FMS 
technology is capable of extending what he sees as the 
labour benefits of process flow technology to batch 
manufacturing industries. See also the discussion in 
Chapter Two.
[16] See Buchanan (1979* PP 13"l4), Klein (1978) and Littler and 
Salaman (1984) for discussion of the wide influence of 
Taylorist principles on job design. Piore (1968a) and 
Davis, Canter and Hoffmann (1955). followed up by Taylor 
(1979). provide empirical evidence of the pervasiveness of 
this influence among industrial engineers.
[17] The continued existence of these low-skilled manual jobs 
should come as no surprise. Even at the time of Blauner's 
(1964) study only 38# of the manual jobs in the oil 
refining industry comprised skilled grade workers.
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[18] For criticisms of the sociotechnical approach see 
especially Buchanan (1979). Kelly (1978a, 1982a), Silverman 
(1970), and van der Zwaan (1975)*
[19] Child (1985. PP 134-135), summarising previous research, 
identifies an additional three factors which are likely to 
influence managerial preferences for strategies for labour 
control, and therefore forms of work organisation and skill 
requirements. These factors - government policy, 
institutional industrial relations frameworks, and national 
cultural factors - operate primarily at the level of the 
nation-state and are therefore largely outside the scope of 
direct investigation in this thesis. Several cross-national 
studies of skills, managerial control systems and 
technology have however alluded to the importance of these 
factors. These studies will be introduced as appropriate in 
later chapters.
[20] See Burnes (1984) and Wall et al (1984) for a case study of 
one firm's adoption of two generations of CNC machine tool 
that illustrates both these points in practice.
[21] Wilkinson argues this against the view that available 
technologies determine the labour market, which he terms 
the "impact of innovations" approach. He attributes this 
school of thought particularly to the work of the Science 
Policy Research Unit at Sussex University, although he
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concedes that their later work moves away from this 
position to some degree. However, he rather unfairly 
ignores the fact that his prime example of the "impact" 
approach (Bell 1972) claims to have found evidence which 
would support the contrary position. So, although 
proceeding "on the assumption that technology is a major 
determinant of the type of employment that is available" 
Bell concludes that:
Company and industry objectives to... 
minimise difficulties associated with the 
labour market are, to a greater or lesser 
extent, objectives also of those who 
develop new technologies.... the labour 
market may partly determine the 
technologies in use rather than the 
reverse... (Bell 1972, p92).
[22] Other evidence (Challis 1982; Sorge et al 1983) discussed
in later chapters throws doubt on the accordance of primacy 
to labour substitution objectives in the adoption of 
certain technologies.
CHAPTER FIVE: The labour process of small-batch machining
[1] We define mechanical engineering according to Standard
Industrial Classification sub-headings 331“3^9 inclusive.
Harrington (1973. Chapters 2 and 3) and Kelley (1984) 
provide fuller explanations of these points. Even today, 
however, considerable informal overlapping of departmental 
specialisms takes place within machine shops. Shaiken 
(1985, pl9). for example, observes that it is commonplace 
for craft workers to redesign from component drawings parts 
drawn by draughtsmen when the practical experience of the 
machinists suggests that the parts cannot be machined in 
their originally drafted form.
This section draws considerably on information contained in 
Burawoy (1979. especially pp 51“57); Engineering Industry 
Training Board (1980c); Kelley (1984, pp 38-44) and 
numerous EITB Module Instruction Manuals. It should be 
treated as indicative of the nature of craft work as 
research indicates that there are considerable differences 
in the extent of work planning, use of written information, 
etc, undertaken by craft workers (Engineering Industry 
Training Board 1980c). Kelley includes fabrication and 
assembly tasks as part of the contemporary machining labour 
process. I have chosen to omit this on the grounds that, 
unlike the other tasks described, no assembly tasks were 
performed by machinists in any of the machine shops 
visited.
See for example EITB. H2 (n.d., pp 10-20).
The information in Table 2 is adapted from various 
Engineering Industry Training Board Module Instruction 
Manuals.
See Shaiken (1980, p9); Jaikumar (1984, p34); cf. Polanyi 
(1958, plOl).
See for example EITB. H27 (n.d., p97)* EITB. H29 (n.d., pp 
104-105).
The militancy of craft workers, documented by Goodrich 
(1975)# Hinton (1973). and Jefferys (1946), has led these 
and other radical writers (notably Braverman (1974) and 
some of his disciples) to argue that prospective 
revolutionary socialist sentiments are part of the craft 
tradition.
See Jefferys (1946) and More (1980).
Some management commentators have argued in recent years 
that this division of labour and its effects constitute 
another disadvantage to the functional organisation of 
production (Edwards 1971; Skinner 1971; Williamson 1968b; 
1972; inter alia). Marglin (1976) argues that such 
"problems" were accepted as a part of the production system 
at its outset.
[11] The main craft union in engineering has indulged in 
increasingly regular name changes as the result of various 
amalgamations and schisms. The most important of these 
changes for our purposes are as follows. From I85I to 1920 
the main craft union for machinists was known as the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE). Then, until 1967 it 
was called the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU). After a 
three-year interlude with another name as a result of 
further amalgamations, from 1970 it entered into a loose 
federation known overall as the Amalgamated Union of 
Engineering Workers (AUEW). The old AEU became the 
engineering section of this (AUEW (ES)). The new, white- 
collar, part of this federation became known as its 
Technical and Supervisory Section (AUEW - TASS). This 
section recruited white-collar "staff" employees in 
engineering companies, such as draughtsmen and part 
programmers. Following a troubled relationship the 
federation finally dissolved in early 1986, with the craft 
section reverting to the former name (AEU) and the white- 
collar section now being simply known as TASS.
[12] The Institute of Manpower Studies' model of the "flexible 
firm" makes a useful distinction between three forms of 
labour flexibility. These are functional, numerical and 
financial flexibility (Atkinson 1985). In this study we are 
mainly concerned with management attempts to gain 
functional flexibility, which refers to the ability to more
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easily redeploy or transfer employees between a number of 
types of task or activity. Of the other two types of labour 
flexibility mentioned by Atkinson (1985* PP 11-12), 
numerical flexibility is defined as ability to change 
either numbers employed or shift patterns, etc; and 
financial flexibility as ability to reflect in wages the 
state of supply and demand in the external labour market.
[13] The introduction of new technology is one of the most 
common reasons behind a decision to locate on greenfield 
sites, combined with a consequent wish to streamline 
working practices and organisation (Incomes Data Services 
1984b). See also Daniel (1987), who finds that changes in 
working practices (organisational change) are only 
widespread and readily accepted when they occur in 
connection with technical changes.
[14] The variety inherent in small-batch production makes it 
difficult to justify setting up machines to produce 
components solely in the quantity required. The economic 
batch quantity (EBQ) for a component is the minimum batch 
size calculated to be necessary to recoup the costs 
incurred in the time and skill required to set up machines 
for a particular part. Those items not immediately required 
from a batch will of course go into stock. This inventory 
represents capital unavailable for use for more productive 
purposes.
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CHAPTER SIX: Technical and organisational change in small-batch
machining
[1] References to "numerical control" in this chapter concern
this type of programmable technology in general (i.e. NC, 
CNC and DNC). References to "NC" concern solely the 
original, paper tape-controlled variant of numerical 
controlled machine tools.
[2] See Gallagher and Knight (1986) and Welch and Enang (1982)
for discussions of the role of group technology as a 
precursor of FMS. For similar discussion tracing the 
development of FMS through NC and CNC see for example Cook 
(1975), Gunn (1982) and McKeown (1981).
[3] Lack of diffusion has been most marked in the case of GT,
where optimistic estimates suggest that no more than 10# of 
batch engineering companies ever adopted the system, even 
in its heyday of the early ’seventies. Indeed some of these 
subsequently returned to functional organisation (Gill 
1985; Swords-Isherwood and Senker 1978), often preferring 
to pursue improvements in efficiency through the use of 
numerical control. GT and NC were originally pursued as 
alternative paths of development, despite the fact that 
some commentators argued - as with FMS now - that the 
greatest manufacturing benefits came from using GT and NC 
together. Crookhall (1968), for example, sees the effective
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usage of NC being dependent on the rationalisation of the 
type of components which it is used to machine. By contrast 
with GT, diffusion of NC machine tools has gradually 
increased, albeit from a very low base. Despite the 
particularly severe effect of the recession on the 
engineering industry sales of this type of machine 
accounted for some 32# of total domestic machine tool sales 
in 1984 (Machine Tool Trades Association 1985)*
Nevertheless one authoritative recent claim suggests that 
4# or less of the British machine tool population consists 
of NC and CNC machines (Holland 1986a).
[4] See New and Myers’ (1986) study of British manufacturing 
competitiveness. This finds that firms’ current performance 
on delivery reliability and manufacturing throughput times 
is little better (and, in some cases, worse) than in 1975* 
Overall it concludes that British manufacturing companies 
are concentrating disproportionately on reducing the costs 
of production, and especially direct labour costs, to the 
exclusion of innovating and improving products.
[5] See for example Blois (1984), Gold (1982), Goldhar (1986), 
Jaikumar (1986) and Jelinek and Goldhar (1983), all of whom 
argue that deliberate and preemptive use of the "strategic” 
manufacturing advantages afforded by flexible manufacturing 
technology is the key to its successful exploitation.
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For instance, Crookhall (1968) observes that the 
availability of intangible benefits from numerically 
controlled machine tools such as improved product 
consistency and quality, and the ability to machine more 
complex workpieces, was often unanticipated by firms using 
traditional methods of justification for new equipment 
based on labour cost. In such cases firms found difficulty 
in taking these new forms of benefit into account, and thus 
potential business advantages remained unrecognised or fell 
by the wayside.
Originally, and particularly in the pioneering work of the 
Soviet engineer Mitrofanov (1966), group technology was 
conceived of largely as a technical, predominantly 
mathemetical, aid to part coding and classification.
As Edwards (197*Ja) says, originally GT was only applied at 
the level of the individual machine tool, and above all to 
two-axis, lathe work (which is easiest to classify by 
shape), as another means of incrementally reducing set-up 
times. Thus it did not presuppose the abandonment of 
functional organisation (Edwards 197*Jb).
Nevertheless Fazakerley (197*0 denies that labour 
flexibility between machine tools, and a necessity for the 
dispersal of skills related to particular machines, is 
central to GT applications.
[10] According to Burbidge (1976, p3) such GT production cells 
share seven common characteristics. A cell should contain a 
given team of workers (of around ten members); produce a 
specified "family" or set of products; and be equipped with 
a specified set of machines and/or other production 
equipment. In addition facilities should be laid out in one 
reserved area; the workers in the group share a common 
product output target; and each group can usually work 
independently once production materials have been received.
[11] See Burbidge (1979)» Edwards (1980), inter alia. Criticisms 
of GT are considerably harder to find in the engineering 
literature. Rare exceptions are two articles by former GT 
proponents Leonard and Rathmill (1977a, 1977b), who give 
detailed reasons for rejecting the appropriateness of group 
technology cells in batch production. It is noteworthy that 
Bornat (1978) and Green (1978) appear to be unaware of 
these contributions, which nullify some of the latters’ 
conclusions.
[12] This approach originates in Marx (1976) and Braverman 
(197*0 • Brighton Labour Process Group (1977) extends the 
critique to what it considers to be the idealist claims of 
the socio-technical school and examples of the 
"humanisation of work". For Brighton Labour Process Group, 
an appearance of worker control and job enlargement 
conceals what it sees as the fact that this "humanisation"
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can only be enabled by the prior deskilling and 
fragmentation of labour routines. See Blackburn et al 
(1985), Bomat (1978), and Green (1978) for an application 
of these arguments to group technology.
[13] In view of the later argument in this chapter it is 
interesting to note that Leonard and Rathmill (1977a) 
believe the same applies to DNC systems.
[14] Of the plants in our study, Plant J investigated the 
feasibility of GT in the ’seventies but did not proceed 
further, because of the work thought to be involved in 
classifying a wide variety of parts into families. Only 
Plants C and X had actually adopted a group technology 
approach in their machine shops. As also appeared to be the 
case with these firm’s introduction of FMS, adoption of GT 
was spearheaded by a small number of manufacturing managers 
who had been ’’converted” to the approach.
[15] Proponents of GT have tended to claim, with limited 
plausibility, that the system failed because of a 
misunderstanding of what it actually was. See for example 
Burbidge (1978).
[16] Compare this with Atkinson and Meager (1986), who also find
trade demarcations and training costs to be the two factors 
limiting the wider pursuit of labour flexibility today.
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[17] A considerably less common form of numerical control, known 
as record/playback, was also experimentally developed at 
this time. Noble (1979. 1985) in particular argues that 
record/playback was not commercially developed because it 
retained craft skill in the hands of the machinist, thus 
denying management control of the labour process. In 
practice the reasons advanced for the lack of development 
of record/playback in the past, and its superiority over NC 
in terms of machinists' skill retention, seem unconvincing. 
As Sabel (1982, pp 64-65) points out, technical obstacles 
did exist to the applicability of record/playback in the 
aerospace sector for which the alternative method of NC was 
eventually developed. Even though such difficulties would 
be less significant for the majority of machining 
applications there remains no reason why labour could not 
be sub-divided to render the use of record/playback 
technology "deskilling". This could be achieved by the 
assignment of one skilled machinist to make the recording 
of the cutting of the first part. For all subsequent runs 
of the part concerned the use of this method represents 
deskilling by virtue of the operator's skill being built 
into the machine's program, as indeed Rosenbrock (1982, pp 
107-108) admits with reference to robots programmed by this 
method.
Moreover, the extent of the skills exercisable would be 
variable depending on such factors as the frequency with
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which new programs must be made, batch sizes, etc. It would 
be repeating Braverman's mistake of overemphasising 
equipment suppliers1 claims to argue that record/playback 
technology will invariably be used according to 
"deskilling" criteria. Yet some suppliers are indeed 
explicitly marketing machine tools with record/playback 
facility with claims that they can be used to deskill 
operators (to dispel any doubts see for example the 
advertisement by Formtecnic Machine Tools in ’Metalworking 
Production', March 1986, p98)!
It is interesting, therefore, that in recent years 
engineers influenced by ’socio-technical” ideas, most 
notably a team at the University of Manchester Institute of 
Science and Technology, have led a resurgence of interest 
in record/playback as a means of retaining craft skills on 
the shopfloor in NC (and indeed in FMS) operation (Boon 
1981; Rosenbrock 1981, 1983)• In view of this renewed 
interest it is striking how little (if at all) the above 
criticisms of record/playback have been taken on board by 
those endorsing the UMIST project.
[18] At a purely technical level operator programming by MDI is 
becoming increasingly feasible as more powerful control 
systems are developed, enabling more of the mundane 
calculations necessary in programming to be performed by 
the computer software. Programs are created by the
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machinist keying in information as requested in a set 
sequence of steps. With the latest control systems the 
machinist can then visualise and verify the program created 
by means of its simulation in graphic form on a visual 
display at machine level.
[19] In turning work the four-axis CNC lathe is a parallel 
development to the machining centre. This lathe possesses 
two turrets of tools and can thus work on a component with 
two tools simultaneously. Five-axis lathes capable of 
milling operations, etc, have also been developed (and 
indeed were in the FMS at Plant R) but are not yet believed 
to be commercially available.
[20] Ross (1981, p30) notes that set-up times were normally 
longer for NC than for conventional machine tools, and thus 
EBQs were often larger.
[21] See for example Nicholas (1984, pp 233”234), Scott (1985). 
US Congress. Office of Technology Assessment (1984, p235)* 
Further evidence supporting the argument in this section 
about CNC machinists' skills in the small-batch environment 
can be found in detailed case studies by Buchanan (1985) 
and Wilson (1985).
[22] The everyday control and monitoring of operations with CNC 
is based upon symbols, numbers and written commands
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displayed on the control panel rather than by direct 
"feel", as was the case with conventional machine tools. 
Thus CNC presupposes an additional requirement for literacy 
and numeracy over and above the* ability to interpret 
production drawings and instruction cards, even if 
machinists do not program or edit tapes.
[23] Overwhelming evidence of the importance of part programmers 
having previous machining experience was gained during the 
fieldwork for this study, occasionally as a result of 
bitter experience with part programmers unversed in 
machining (as, for instance, in the recent past at the main 
site at Plant R). The recency of direct experience also 
seems to be important, as even ex-machinists tend to 
gradually forget everyday machining "know-how” when they 
leave the shopfloor for positions as part programmers. This 
was mentioned by both operators and programmers at a number 
of plants. For example, at one of the CNC plants visited, 
Plant Z, the machinists had a standing joke that the more 
time that passed since a programmer had been promoted from 
the shopfloor the faster their programs tended to run. As 
one operator commented:
They start programming every job, no matter how 
flimsy and whatever it’s made of, as if it were 
a solid aluminium block.
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[24] Sorge et al's (1983) Anglo-German study of CNC applications 
finds significant cross-national differences in managers' 
control preferences, which partly determine whether or not 
operators are allowed to program. They relate the higher 
incidence of operator programming in German plants to a 
greater management willingness to devolve authority to 
craft workers. This, they suggest, is a function of the 
importance attached to vocational qualifications in 
Germany, and the greater integration of craft and 
technician training than in Britain.
For discussion of the importance of cross-national factors 
in aspects of industrial organisation in the USA and Japan 
see Jones (1985b, 1986a, 1986b). Other cross-national 
comparisons of the organisation of engineering firms can be 
found in Daly et al (1985)# and Maurice et al (1980).
[25] Machinists tend to argue as follows: The technical design 
of CNC allows for operator input, and therefore such 
intervention must be intended. Furthermore, intervention is 
appropriate because skilled machinists (rather than 
programmers) have the best knowledge of machining, the 
idiosyncracies of particular machines, and the greatest 
accumulation of practical shopfloor experience. Machinists 
can therefore be trusted to partake in programming and 
editing. Programming is not too complex a task for 
operators, as current control systems are increasingly
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simple, relatively easily and quickly learnt, and 
information is presented in a style with which operators 
are already familiar. Program construction by MDI is 
quicker, simpler and therefore cheaper than if office-based 
programming procedures are invoked. If a fault occurs in a 
program the operator should know how to rectify it, and is 
best placed to make the necessary alterations without the 
delay incurred by waiting for a programmer and having to 
explain the problem and/or amendments needed.
[26] Part programmers argue that operator programming is slow 
and creates machine downtime on very expensive capital 
equipment, as it is normally impossible to program a new 
job while an existing one is running. This obstacle to 
higher machine utilisation applies especially to complex 
jobs, which are more easily programmed away from the 
distractions of the shopfloor, thus eliminating the chance 
of programming in potentially costly mistakes. It is 
believed that programmers have a better technical 
programming ability than operators as a result of their 
training, and a greater grasp of the most efficient 
contemporary machining methods. Operators, it is said, tend 
to program on CNC using obsolete methods more suited to the 
conventional machines from which they graduated. Thus, for 
example, they will run jobs at metal removal rates well 
below those now possible. Alternatively, if operators are 
being paid on piece rates, it is argued that they will be
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tempted to set dangerously excessive feed and speed rates. 
Finally, it is argued that changes made by operators to 
programs may not be communicated to programmers or 
operators on following shifts, who will waste valuable time 
in tracing faults that occur as a result of unnotified 
changes.
[27] Studies demonstrating a variety of possible patterns of 
skill deployment and the division of labour with CNC 
include Asher (1983), Burnes (1984), Elsaesser and Lindvall 
(1984), Rempp (1982), Shaiken (1985), Sorge et al (1983), 
Wall et al (1984) and Wilkinson (1983)* Challis (1982) 
contains interesting responses to Sorge et al's work by 
representatives of CNC machine tool manufacturers, which 
indicates considerable diversity of belief within this 
influential interest group as to whether CNC is designed 
for on- or off-shopfloor programming.
[28] Hill (1981, pp 116-117) puts forward an exaggerated account 
of the "deskilling" of programming techniques to support 
his case that technological development is geared to the 
removal of control from successive occupational groups 
exercising pivotal positions in the production process. It 
is true that the latest control systems reduce the 
discretion employable in planning methods. For example, 
there is a need to follow a set order of procedures and 
therefore to be more methodical in planning than was the
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case on conventional machines. The increase in 
proceduralisation is a commonly observed phenomenon of 
tasks centred on computers. However, Hill's example hardly 
supports his case if, as is argued here, machinists may 
thereby more easily regain some of the control they 
formerly exercised.
[29] See Dunn (198^a) for supporting evidence of two conflicting 
patterns of diffusion of CNC control systems in Britain 
depending on organisational preferences, and product 
requirements and range. Typically, companies that are 
small, operating in a job-shop environment or with a large 
proportion of fairly simple components are tending to opt 
for operator programming using MDI. Large companies with 
predictable production requirements, large batches, or 
complex components of exacting quality standards prefer the 
centralised response of off-shopfloor programming, minimal 
or no machinist intervention, and a preference for 
downloading programs from a powerful central DNC computer 
(known as a "host") to perfunctory CNC controls at machine 
level.
[30] Some idea of the possible scale of the quantitative 
benefits obtainable can be gleaned from a survey conducted 
by Bessant and Hayward (1986), who claim to have identified 
average reductions in lead times of 1*\%, work in progress 
reductions of 68# and increases in machine utilisation from
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40# of available working time to 90%. These figures should 
be treated with greater caution than do the above authors, 
for they are frequently based on incomparable data, e.g. 
where the FMS is first used to machine a new product. 
However, such comparisons do establish a general principle 
that abnormally large manufacturing benefits of this type 
may be possible through FMS.
[31] Pullin's (1986b, p69) survey (which includes reasons for 
adoption of other forms of computerised automation as well) 
strikes a contrary note by downgrading the importance of 
quantitative aims somewhat. In descending order of 
importance Pullin cites increasing profits, improving 
product quality, reductions in labour cost, need to 
increase output, and inventory reduction as the main aims 
of introducing FMS. See Appendix Three for how these 
reasons rate in comparison with the systems in this study.
[32] The Automated Small Batch Production Committee's Technical 
Study mentions a reduction in lead times in its summary 
foreword, but actually seems to be referring to reductions 
in component throughput times if anything (National 
Engineering Laboratory 1978, p xiii) cf. pp 8-9). Thus 
quantitative benefits are again stressed.
[33] See Buzacott (1982), Browne et al (198*1), Gerwin (1982), 
Gerwin and Leung (I98O), Jaikumar (198*0, Zelenovic (1982).
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[34] It was thought most appropriate (although perhaps 
regrettable) to assemble a further classification of 
flexibility types specific to this research project. This 
was done because of a number oi* shortcomings found in the 
categorisations employed by the above authors. Some types 
appeared irrelevant (for example, Gerwin and Leung's (1980) 
concept of "customising flexibility" in the systems 
studied) or insufficiently precise (such as Jaikumar's 
(1984) "product flexibility"). Additionally previously 
unidentified usages were recorded (such as what I have 
termed "size flexibility").
[35] Rembold et al's (1985) classification of FMSs distinguishes
between systems according to the criteria of whether or not 
parts must be presented sequentially to a set order of work 
stations. In the former case the FMS would not possess 
routing flexibility: in the latter it would.
[36] The opposite may of course apply equally: FMS may be found
to be insufficiently flexible to meet the criteria for 
which it was originally specified. This was noted at 
several plants.
CHAPTER SEVEN: Changes in tasks, skills, and work roles in FMS
[1] The tendency of FMS to force the more precise definition of
hitherto haphazard manufacturing procedures was noted at
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several plants. At Plant Gf for example, production 
drawings used to be highly idiosyncratic before the advent 
of the FMS, suffering such mistakes as the omission of 
tolerances. Matters worked in practice because the craft 
workers on the shopfloor subconsciously adapted, using 
their own accumulated knowledge and experience. The FMS is 
forcing a return to more standard engineering drawing 
procedure. The method to be followed for part programming 
has also been standardised at this plant to obviate 
inconsistencies caused by the different approaches of the 
two programmers.
[2] As the fieldwork evidence will suggest, the extent to which 
one can describe any British FMS as ’typical" is 
debateable, as technical configurations vary considerably 
within the basic specification. The example given in this 
section is loosely based upon a hypothetical FMS comprising 
three or more machining centres, transportation within the 
system undertaken by AGV, and direct numerical control 
based in an adjoining room. On these criteria one can 
directly include the FMSs at Plants A, H and L; while most 
of the other systems studied differ in only minor details 
(such as type of transport system).
[3] Turned components, as handled by the FMSs at Plants K, M 
and R, cannot be loaded by this means because of their 
shape. In such cases components are manually loaded onto
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conveyor belts or into loose fixtures for loading to 
machines by robotic means.
This viewpoint is well illustrated in the following qoute 
from an engineer at Plant F:
You try and limit human intervention down to a 
minimum and that is the idea of FMS to a large 
degree.... the thing that you're aiming to do 
is to increase the utilisation of those new 
machines. And to do that you take away the 
operator.
See Bainbridge (1978) and Crossman (i960) for studies of 
the skills of operators of continuous processes.
I am grateful to Dr Mark Dodgson of the Technical Change 
Centre, London, and to Dr Malcolm Hill of Loughborough 
University, for comments and criticisms received on this 
paper.
See Scott (1985) for more detailed information and further 
discussion on manual intervention in setting-up at these 
plants.
See for example Jaikumar (198*1, 1986), Jones (1986a,
1986b), Jones and Scott (1985. 1986), Kelley (1985), Kohler
and Schultz-Wild (1983) Remp (1982).
[9] Several firms, and Plants A, B, H and M in particular, 
observed that demarcations within their maintenance 
departments between hydraulic, electrical, electronic and 
mechanical specialisms were proving more difficult to 
eradicate than any inflexibility among craft-trained 
machinists.
CHAPTER EIGHT: The problem of labour control
[1] The loader will be allowed access to five data retrieval
options. The programmer shares the system manager’s
password, and can use the whole system excepting the base 
software information, to which only the system manager 
himself has access.
[2] The one manufacturing engineer employed only works on one
of the three shifts over which the FMS is intended to run,
however. Thus this grade of worker is not on continuous
call in case of problems.
[3] These low figures are rather deceptive, for of course 
considerable numbers of indirect labour provide necessary 
support for FMSs away from the shopfloor, such as in 
Production Engineering departments, etc. Indeed, one 
engineer at the FMS supplier, Plant F, categorically stated
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that overall labour requirements with FMS were normally 
similar to those for stand-alone CNC machine tools.
[^] A small number of the workers employed at the plant either 
on a permanent basis or as temporary stand-ins from the 
headquarters plant have not found a high degree of 
flexibility to their tastes and have tended to perform one 
job only (such as final assembly, benchwork, or plating).
In the extreme case a few workers have been deemed 
insufficiently willing or able to adapt and re-transferred 
to the headquarters plant.
[5] The evidence below from the author's study of Plant R is an
amended version of work previously published in Jones and 
Scott (1936)
[6] There are two programmers only because of the large amount
of programming work while the cell is being changed over. 
There will only be one programmer permanently with the 
system, therefore, and in the text below the second 
programmer, who was drafted in from the main site solely to 
perform this job, is not considered to be a part of the 
workgroup proper.
CHAPTER NINE: Productivity, flexibility and labour control
[1] Kelley's study encompasses other forms of programmable
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machinery (notably NC machine tools) as well as FMS.
See also Ingersoll Engineers (1982, pp 97-98), Jones 
(1985c, 1986a), and Jones and Scott (1986).
The "technccentric participative” approach to work role 
management is exemplified by the American FMS case study 
codenamed "Alpha” discussed in Jones and Scott (1986, pp 
357-360).
Computer simulation packages, which allow personnel to test 
the consequences of courses of action in articial 
production situations, are sometimes available for 
operators to use (as at Plants A and L, for example). These 
have been found helpful in facilitating the learning 
process *
It is perhaps noteworthy, in view of these suggested 
training times, that managers at Plant J conceded that 
their own FMS operator training programme should have been 
started sooner than it was.
Compare also the American findings of Thompson and Scalpone 
(n.d.).
Another important reason for the contemporary preference 
for an incremental (rather than the so-called "big bang”)
approach to FMS installation is the possibility thereby of 
deferring the costs of introduction over a number of years. 
This approach allows curtailment of system expansion if 
expected funds or projected product demand do not 
materialise.
[8] The evidence below from the author's study of Plant R is an
amended version of work previously published in Jones and 
Scott (1986)
CONCLUSION: The craft worker in flexible manufacturing systems
[1] This is no longer merely an academic point. For instance,
the Japanese machine tool manufacturer Yamazaki is 
currently marketing a small-scale FMS explicitly designed 
for shopfloor management, programming and control.
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APPENDIX ONE: FMS case study plants visited for project fieldwork
i) Overview
This appendix gives background details of the fifteen plants 
(Plants A to R) used as the principal data source for this study, 
and of the flexible manufacturing systems they operated. The 
information given is adapted from the format used in Jones and 
Scott (1985) (from which more detailed descriptions of Plants A, B, 
C, F, G, K, M, P and R can be obtained). In each case some basic 
information is firstly given about the company itself. This is 
followed by details about the introduction of the FMS and the 
technical configuration and features of the system. We also give 
information about the parts produced on the system and batch sizes. 
Finally brief information is given on the division of labour and 
composition of staffing within the FMS.
ii) Plant A
This system is one of the UK's earliest planned FMSs. The company 
is an important manufacturer of underground mining equipment 
organised into three operating divisions. Its total sales in 1985 
were worth £170,000,000. One of the three divisions is responsible 
for the production of coal-cutting machinery. Its major customer is 
British Coal (at the time of interview still known as the National 
Coal Board). Following the end of the 1984/85 miners' strike the 
company's market has been expanding again, but at a lower rate than
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the company anticipated. The company would normally expect to 
produce about 1,000 coal-cutting machines per annum but at the time 
of interview was still only manufacturing (an averaged out annual 
figure of) 400 units per annum due to tTie effects of the strike. 
Thus the whole factory, including the FMS, is currently only 
working a single shift, and the double shift operation of the FMS 
that had been planned will not occur in the immediate future. 
Nevertheless, the firm has been able to bring back in-house 
machining work that was previously sub-contracted to outside 
companies, thus partially offsetting the drop in production 
volumes.
The coal-cutting machinery division of the company operates from 
two plants in the same geographical area of Scotland and one plant 
in Northern England. The company employs about 2,200 workers in 
total. The FMS in this study is located at the company's main 
Scottish plant, which is in a region of traditional industries 
(such as steel production) subject to considerable industrial 
decline in recent years. There are 1800 workers altogether on the 
site, of whom some 730 are directly involved in production.
Planning for the FMS started in 1981. The system was originally 
intended to be commissioned in July 1983 but a number of problems 
delayed commissioning to the turn of the year 1984/85. At the time 
of interview the FMS had been running on a single-shift production 
basis for about eight months. The whole system was supplied on a 
turnkey basis by the nearby Scottish subsidiary of a major American
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machine tool manufacturer with whom the customer had already 
previous experience with stand-alone machine tools. The total 
project was originally budgeted to cost £6,000,000 although costs 
ultimately escalated to £7,500,000, thus making it one of the
largest FMS projects to date in Britain.
The system consists of six very large identical machining centres 
capable of handling prismatic parts within a two metre by one metre 
by one metre "envelope”, each with a magazine for one hundred 
tools. A further three hundred tools are stored in the tool library
area of the FMS, giving a total tool inventory of nine hundred.
Locations of all tools, both in the machines and the tool library, 
are stored in the system software. The sixth and final machine in 
the system is equipped with a horizontal CNC facing head. The 
component units of the system can be run either automatically or 
manually. Policy is to run automatically as far as possible. The 
main exception to this is the facing head machine, the cycle for 
which must be started manually even though it is connected up to 
the DNC, from which its machining programs are downloaded.
The line of six machining centres is served by an automatic guided 
vehicle (AGV) controlled through impulses in the floor. The system 
has thirteen pallets, four feet by six feet in dimensions, which 
carry loads of up to two tons. These are coded for identification 
by the host computer. The FMS has twenty one dedicated fixtures. 
Behind the machines lies the load/unload area, castings store, 
fixturing store and tooling area.
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The system is controlled by a DEC minicomputer situated in a raised 
control room overlooking the FMS. Software features are continually 
being updated both by the firm’s own programmers and also students 
from a local technical college who have been seconded to the firm 
as part of a joint scheme between company and academic institution. 
At the time of interview, for example, a graphics facility for the 
proving out of programs was being worked upon. In addition the 
software engineers have written a number of ’’utility programs" made 
to aid the running of the system. The biggest of these has been a 
utility program for the management of the tool warehouse. An 
extension of the software is also taking place to provide for the 
possible provision of a sister tool for every one currently in the 
system.
Parts required and due dates are keyed into the host computer 
manually. The computer then provides a suggested schedule (which 
can be overriden if desired) if it calculates that the parts can be 
produced on the FMS by the stipulated date. If it believes that 
production cannot be achieved in time then manual rescheduling must 
take place. When a schedule has been calculated it is printed out 
for the operators. Parts are loaded in accordance with this and the 
operator at the loading terminal signals the host that the part has 
been entered into the system. A crosschecking facility on the 
loading station (working according to a binary coding on the 
pallet) checks that the right pallet has been loaded.
Tool life is monitored by the assignment to each tool of a historic
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life. The DNC computer's tool management program monitors the 
progress of tools towards this level, and this information is made 
available to the system's operators on print-out. Probing is now 
available although its use is limited to checking critical bore 
sizes and broken tool detection on smaller tools used on the FMS. 
Further use is ruled out on the grounds that probing adds to the 
cycle time. Tools are pre-set on a toolsetting machine, which is 
connected to the host computer and automatically feeds back tool 
offsets to the latter.
In technical terms the FMS runs almost self-sufficiently from the 
rest of the plant's production facilities and has no call on
outside equipment or personnel. There are two exceptions to this:
crack detection and inspection. Quality control facilities have not 
been located within the FMS area, mainly for reasons of space. At 
some critical points of the total cycle the castings must be 
inspected for cracks. However, the crack detection facilities are 
outside the FMS at the moment and so the castings have to go 
outside the FMS for this and then be brought back into it. In the 
medium-term future it is intended to bring crack detection 
facilities within the FMS. There is 100% inspection on the FMS 
components. All FMS component inspection takes place on a 
coordinate measuring machine outside of the FMS, but parts must 
queue to get onto it. The two reasons for the lack of an inspection 
machine within the FMS itself are a lack of room in the FMS area, 
and the fact that there is not really enough work in the FMS yet to
keep an inspection machine fully occupied.
316
Several sizes of coal cutting machine are produced, tailored to 
different sizes of coal face, and there is considerable 
customisation of design for particular underground applications. At 
the time of interview the FMS was being used to produce seven of 
the larger parts for one model of machine. Components on the FMS 
include gearbox parts and a boom, which are machined (normally in 
batches of one) from solid steel castings weighing up to two and a 
half tons. Cycle times within the FMS for these parts are upwards 
of four hours per set-up and parts require three set-ups on the FMS 
in all. The tightest tolerances are of half a thousandth of an 
inch.
Originally it was intended to put some fifteen parts onto the 
system. Hitherto, however, the tooling management problems have 
defeated expansion above the seven currently on the system. Six of 
these seven parts apparently now run without the need for further 
adjustment. The aim at the time of interview was to introduce one 
new part per month onto the system. Some of the new parts have 
already had their programs proved out on stand-alone CNCs (it is a 
policy decision to try and do this first), and this will 
considerably reduce the development work necessary to get the parts 
running on the FMS. At the time of writing one of the next new jobs 
will be the electric motor for the same model of coal-cutting 
machine.
The FMS is currently staffed over an eight hour shift by the 
following full-time employees: system supervisor; one foreman; ten
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skilled workers (which includes allowance for a worker for each 
machine tool to compensate for the lack of adaptive control); and 
two labourers. Administratively one senior production engineer has 
taken on the responsibility for project management. In terms of 
supervision the FMS operates along similar lines to the more 
conventional areas in the plant (it includes a supervisor for the 
whole area and a foreman). The semi-skilled labourers' tasks 
include checking the coolant at least once a week, sweeping up, 
swarf removal etc. They also drive the forklift truck dedicated to 
the fixturing store area.
Programming is done by fourteen engineers in the company's separate 
NC Dept. Of these, five are involved with programming for the FMS 
although they are not attached to it on a full-time basis. Proving 
out is conducted jointly by the machine operator and the programmer 
who wrote the program.
The company's maintenance department, which is divided up on the 
traditional mechanical / electrical lines, is being used for 
maintenance of the FMS. If there is a problem the system supervisor 
is responsible for making initial contact with the maintenance 
engineers, who are now in the process of learning their functions 
and the system. They have partly been trained by the suppliers at 
their own factory. If the maintenance department cannot correct the 
fault the supplier's maintenance engineers are then called. Some of 
these engineers still remain on site from the period in 1984 when 




This firm is part of one of Britain's leading companies in the 
aerospace industry, The main company was in public ownership until 
1985 when it was privatised by the British Government. Work is 
related to a wide range of both civil and military spheres. The FMS 
studied operates on the main manufacturing plant of one of the 
company's divisions, which is dedicated to military work, in its 
aircraft group. The division has three plants in North West England 
employing a total of 10,000 people: one undertakes the design and 
development function; another tests the products; while the third, 
by far the biggest employer, is responsible for the manufacturing 
process. The company's total sales for military aircraft production 
for the half-year to June 1985 were worth £495.000,000.
The plant concerned produces advanced fighter aircraft (among other 
products) and thus has always operated at the forefront of advanced 
technology both in its products and manufacturing processes. 
Therefore the innovation of FMS is not seen as anything 
particularly revolutionary, and is actually only the most advanced 
part of a more general plan for computer integrated manufacturing. 
Nevertheless this FMS is undoubtedly one of the most ambitious and 
automated in Britain to date.
The FMS project started in earnest in late 1983. It is planned to
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take about three and a half to four years to complete (to 1986/87). 
At the time of interview the plant was already running two cells of 
machining centres producing prismatic parts: one a cell of ten 
Japanese machining centres; the other a"cell of five now obsolete 
machining centres of British make, bought second hand, and of a 
design associated with the original British flexible manufacturing 
system (Molins System 24). The second part of the FMS will 
eventually consist of six to eight new machining centres to replace 
those in the latter cell. Much of the work that might otherwise be 
produced on these machine tools is currently being sub-contracted 
to outside companies. Two of the new machine tools in this cell 
were installed as of early 1985 with the remainder of the machines 
being introduced during 1985 and 1986. A direct numerical control 
system links some thirty-five other machine tools in the factory 
(as yet excluding the FMS at this time), although this is expanding 
rapidly. Full mechanisation of materials handling also had yet to 
be added.
Project management is the responsibility of an in-house department 
of production engineers who are in charge of the implementation of 
all these changes to manufacturing methods. Because the FMS plans 
are merely one part of a far more wider modernisation plan 
interviewees were unwilling to provide a breakdown of the exact 
costs. It is only known that the FMS part of the plan is a multi­
million pound project and almost certain to be in the upper reaches 
of the ranges of expenditure on FMS projects. It is known that a 
government grant under its FMS support scheme paid for a proportion
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of the cost of the project.
The FMS is actually composed of the two machining cells described 
above, fed by a billet preparation area and automated tool store 
with transport provided by six automatic wire-guided vehicles. 
Quality control within the aluminium cutting cell of the FMS will 
be provided by two coordinate measuring machines, although these 
had not yet been used at the time of interview. All aluminium parts 
will be inspected on the first machine, only those failing on this 
proceeding to the second machine for a more rigorous check to 
determine whether they can be saved or reworked.
The ten Japanese machining centres have dual pallet change 
facilities and feature probing for inspection and automatic 
offsetting, added adaptive control facilities and automatic tool 
changing. Tools and workpieces were loaded to the machines manually 
at the time of interview. The tool magazine in each machine only 
holds forty cutters, which is problematic because each job machined 
uses about half this number of cutters. Therefore it is rarely 
possible to machine more than one job at a time before toolchanging 
is again required. Automatic tool and workpiece delivery when 
materials handling is added will solve these problems.
For the FMS the company itself also started the development of a 
new machining centre with a UK manufacturer to replace the old 
second-hand machines. These are twin-spindle machines capable of 
carrying sixty two tools (thirty one per spindle). At present these
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machines are only partly automated, but within the year up to mid- 
1986 nearly all operations which are still manual will be built 
into the system software.
The automated cutter store (which services all the NC facilities) 
stocks 75*000 different cutters, all of which are on file on the 
host computer and identifiable by bar code labels. Tool life 
- monitoring is employed to ensure that cutters called up to perform 
a job have sufficient nominated life left to do so. For any given 
job raw billets (pre-cut to length) are stored on an upper floor 
level to the FMS. The relevant tools are delivered from the tool 
stores as required and stacked in a crate capable of carrying up to 
sixty three tools. When the schedule indicates prepared tools and 
billets are delivered by AGV to the machine, one journey each being 
required for billets and tools.
Control of the FMS will be provided by another large DEC 
minicomputer, the software being a prototype development supported 
in part by a government grant for innovation. Communication with 
the machine tools is facilitated by a fibre optic link. The system 
was already part of a high level of computer integration at the 
time of interview. Computer-aided design, production control and 
production engineering data is linked into the host computer.
The work on the FMSs consists of over a thousand relatively 
inexpensive small parts within a size envelope of 600 x 300 x 120 
millimetres machined from either aluminium, steel or titanium for a
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make of fighter aircraft. Most of the work is in aluminium and this 
will be machined on the six machines in the new cell. Steel and 
titanium parts will remain on the ten Japanese machining centres, 
which means that tool life on these machines tends to be short.
Tolerances are typically three or four thousandths of an inch with 
five thousandths of an inch being the outside limit. Components are 
nested together on raw billets in groups of ten with very small 
ties of the raw material, and are broken off from the raw material 
in exactly the same manner as one would break bars of chocolate.
Low volume and high variety production is characteristic of the 
aerospace industry. In this case the FMS is intended to accept a 
very wide variety of part families while production volumes on the 
FMS are very low. Typically there would be a thousand different 
components to make on a particular group of machines with a maximum 
build rate of ten a month. More frequently build rates are as low 
as two or three a month. In some instances "one-offs” are being 
machined although, because the new machining centres are of a twin 
spindle configuration, the minimum batch size would be two. The 
general policy adopted, however, is that half a machine load is the 
minimum order quantity acceptable to the company. Thus the larger 
the component the more likely it is that a lower batch quantity 
will be permitted. Batch sizes vary in the FMS from about one to a 
maximum of about forty, but a batch size of forty would only be on 
very small components representing part of a machine load. The 
average batch size towards which the company is working in the FMS 
area is four, compared to a more average figure of twenty in the
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rest of the factory.
In the cell of Japanese machining centres there is already multi­
machine manning with a team of five operators working on the ten 
machines. The move to unmanned machines was considered quite a 
significant one, however. Within the Japanese machining centre 
cell, there are currently two manual jobs: loading and unloading 
raw billets and attending to the fixturing of parts. These tasks 
will remain manual. One operator patrols the ten machines.
The FMS workcrew will consist firstly of a transport worker 
ferrying raw material cut to the right length of billet across to 
the factory from the company’s dockside warehouse two or three 
miles away. This worker will simply deliver the material and load 
it into the cell. At the output end of the cell the AGV will 
deliver work onto a buffer zone which leads into a manual area. A 
number of manual operations, which are also under computer control, 
have to be carried out after the prime process, and before the 
parts are delivered to the next stage of production.
There are currently two types of operators, the first of which 
works on the upper level of the FMS and is currently responsible 
for loading of work onto billets, preparing cutters, and selecting 
appropriate cutters under computer instruction. That job is however 
planned to be superceded during 1986, and then the only job 
remaining will be the loading of the Japanese machining centres, 
for which one worker will be employed on each of two shifts. The
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second type of operator will enjoy a more supervisory or technical 
position, and is reponsible for patrol, first-line maintenance and 
inspection of, and adjustment to the machine tools. Two operators 
work in the cutter preparation area; one primarily looking after 
tool regrinding, the other mainly responsible for tool setting and 
storage.
Programming is done off-line by part programmers, operators not 
being permitted to edit or intervene in programs. The management's 
argument against operator involvment is that the industry has such 
strict quality requirements. Parts are proved out on the machine by 
the production engineer who programmed the job, and any change 
which is required to that job will be carried out off-line and then 
re-proved by the same person. Maintenance will principally be the 
responsibility of the company's own maintenance department, 
although industrial relations problems remain in this area.
iv) Plant C
The company concerned is a manufacturer of shoe-making machinery 
based in the Midlands. It is owned by a holding company, which is 
in turn owned by a vertically structured American corporation with 
interests in diverse industries. This corporation has factories in 
both the USA and a number of newly industrialising countries, 
although most domestic production seems to originate from the 
British plant rather than these other potential sources. The parent 
corporation is now trying to develop a more high technology image.
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Until 1981 the company had had very little investment put into it 
for a long time. A rationalisation exercise was then initiated from 
corporate level which included the hiring of new manufacturing 
management and severe reductions in staffing levels (from four 
thousand employees in 1981 to 1,700 - and still falling - in 1984). 
Turnover in 1984 was £41,000,000. Floorspace occupied has also 
dramatically declined and offices have moved to a new building.
As part of the rationalisation exercise the parent corporation 
decided that even if the products made were not high technology 
products then at least they should be manufactured using high 
technology processes. Key new members of the company’s 
manufacturing management were already convinced of the merits of 
group technology from their previous jobs and involvement in the 
British Government's (ASP) Committee. From this FMS was viewed as a 
natural step. In September 1982 the company first started looking 
at the possibility of producing by FMS, and in February 1983 an FMS 
proposal was put before the Department of Industry with a request 
for financial support. The project was intended from the outset to 
be introduced in a modular fashion over several years, and is still 
at a relatively early stage. Full computerisation and machine 
complement is yet to be achieved. Total cost of the full project 
was estimated at £2,500,000.
The first machine was installed in 1984 followed by a second in 
mid-1985* The next stage of the project was an installation of the 
host computer in November 1985* although finance from the parent
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company to support this stage of the project was reportedly hard to 
obtain initially. Eventually two further identical machining 
centres will be added. Three different suppliers are involved in 
the project: one for the computer hardware; another for the 
software; and a third for the machine tools and transport system.
When finished the FMS will consist of four identical machining 
centres, each with an eighty tool capacity, fed by a rail guided 
vehicle transport system. As of mid-1985 one of these machines had 
been installed together with the rail guided truck and 
approximately eight pallet stations to feed the machine. This first 
machine is now being operated on a twenty four hour basis. It is 
being used for development purposes on the two dayshifts and for 
production work over the nightshift and operated on a stand-alone 
basis. A second machine was about to be installed at the time of 
interview, and the number of pallets has been approximately tripled 
in anticipation of its arrival. This second machine will then be 
used for development purposes, the first machine being used solely 
as a production machine. Computer control will be provided by a 
model supplied by IBM, who have also supplied the computers for the 
tool management and computer aided design and manufacture (CADAM) 
packages. Present computer plans are restricted to the linking into 
DNC of the two machining centres.
When the host computer is installed tool condition management will 
be conducted by a system of the assignment of historic tool lives 
(at the time of interview tool wear was monitored purely manually).
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The machining centres are equipped with probing facilities, but it 
is not intended to use these any more than necessary on the grounds
of the addition to cycle times.
The company is intending to put a minimum of sixty and a maximum of 
four hundred products on the FMS per year. The average will be one 
hundred and sixty products per annum. As of mid-1985 one hundred 
and ninety parts have been specified for the system: given the 
number of products eventually intended for the FMS a lot of parts 
have therefore still not been introduced. A "product” in this sense 
means all the cubic parts for a particular type of shoe machine, so 
the number of actual parts is considerably higher. As mentioned 
before, though, the company's manufacturing engineers are advocates 
of group technology, and production of these wide variety of 
numbers of part is rationalised by the fact that they fall into a
number of distinct part families. All the products on the system
are part of a new range of shoe-making machines.
Most individual components fall within a six inch cube, are 
fashioned from castings or bar, require few operations and are of 
short ,cycle times. Average tolerance is eighty seven microns, 
although the tightest tolerances are of about sixty eight microns. 
Operations usually involve mainly drilling and tapping rather than 
extensive milling, although some larger parts ( such as machine 
bases, etc), which do require more metal removal, are also 
machined. There are a small number of fairly complex pieces 
requiring more operations also. The cycle time for all the
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components on each pallet averages out at one hour.
The level of flexibility between parts intended for the FMS (that 
is, production in batch sizes of one) has not yet been achieved. 
Using only the first machining centre on a stand-alone basis the 
company are producing in batches of ten. The control problems of 
producing batches of only one component manually (i.e. without 
scheduling via the host computer) appear to have defeated the 
company's abilities to keep track of parts. Producing in batches of 
ten is intended to be a temporary compromise, which increases cycle 
times to a workable figure. It is hoped that the arrival of the 
host computer will overcome this production control problem. Even 
so, this is still cheaper than producing in batches of (typically) 
sixty on conventional machine tools.
The FMS will be staffed on the basis of one operator per machine 
per shift, so at the time of interview there were three operators. 
At the moment operators are responsible for loading the part 
programs into the machining centre level control and monitoring 
tool wear by physical inspection. Once the DNC link is installed, 
however, they will be relieved of the former job, and the larger 
part of the latter will be performed automatically. The current 
procedure for inspection is that every part is inspected by 
separate inspection staff. In the future the production engineers 
want to move to random inspection. By moving to new methods of 
inspection on the FMS the company will be able to further its aim 
of reducing indirect labour by cutting the number of inspectors. At
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present the occasional inspector and the foreman are now the only 
indirect labour in the FMS area, although of course there is quite 
a lot of indirect labour backing up the FMS elsewhere in the 
production engineering department, and so on). However, on the FMS 
operators are also now doing their own inspection.
Maintenance will initially be the responsibility of the suppliers 
of the machine tools under their warranty period although 
eventually the firm’s own maintenance department will take over. 
Operators are not responsible for maintenance itself but they are 
responsible for calling the maintenance workers when necessary.
v) Plant D
This plant is the main UK production facility of a large multi­
national company that produces earthmoving and other automotive 
equipment. 1984 sales were £155 million. The plant has been badly 
affected by the economic recession. In the years 1980-85 the 
numbers employed on the site fell from 2,500 to 1,200 (comprising 
800 direct and 400 indirect workers) at the time of interview, 
mainly as a result of voluntary redundancies.
For some years now the parent company has been developing expertise 
in advanced manufacturing facilities, including the running of FMSs 
in some of its other plants in Europe and America. Since 1984 
manufacturing engineers at Plant D have been planning the 
introduction of FMS into this plant designed to produce components
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for a new range of tractors coming onto the market during 1986.
Plant D itself has experience with stand-alone CNC machine tools, 
but most production has traditionally been undertaken on transfer 
lines and high volume dedicated machinery using semi-skilled 
operators. Initially it had not been specifically intended that FMS 
should be the solution to producing these components, and indeed 
given the lack of expertise in FMS at the plant there was some 
reluctance to use a technology so experimental. Engineers decided 
that FMS was the biggest technological step that they felt they 
could justify taking given their state of knowledge.
Three FMSs are being installed at the plant at a total cost of just 
under £5,000,000. All three FMSs have been supplied on a turnkey 
basis by two German manufacturers, the second and third FMSs having 
the same supplier. Overall control of each cell is maintained by a 
DEC mini-computer which performs all necessary management functions 
and schedules components. If a day's production requirement is not 
met the host computer simply adds the shortfall to the following 
day's production requirement.
The first and second FMSs (catering for different stages of 
operations for the same components) were first installed in 1984 
and were producing parts at the time of interview. These were being 
worked on a single shift, and were not expected to be in full 
production until the end of 19^5 (when it was hoped that they would 
run on three shifts like the rest of the shopfloor). The first of
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these FMSs comprises three CNC vertical turning machines each with 
a tool magazine capable of carrying 120 tools. A rail guided pallet 
transport system carries components between loading stations and 
the machine tools and the FMS contains sixteen dedicated fixture / 
pallet combinations. Components are then moved onto the second FMS. 
This consists of a line of four machining centres, each holding a 
magazine of eighty tools, and served by a rail-guided pallet 
transporter. This system uses eleven dedicated fixture / pallet 
combinations. A manually-operated shaving machine is also a part 
of the latter cell. This cell runs unstaffed over lunch and tea 
breaks.
The third FMS was still in an early stage of development at the 
time of interview although it is believed to be in operation at the 
time of writing. This FMS machines chassis components and comprises 
two very large machining centres, each holding 110 tools and served 
again by a rail guided pallet transport system. There are three 
pallets within this FMS.
One of the features of all three FMSs is that within each cell the 
variety of tooling on each machine is identical and so any 
component in a given cell can go to any machine. Thus the host 
computers simply schedule parts to the next machine that is going 
to become available. Moreover tooling requirements for the range of 
parts are sufficently frugal to enable each tool magazine to hold a




Tool wear is monitored on the second and third FMSs by means of 
historic life monitoring, adaptive control through torque 
consumption measurement, and laser beam detection for breakage in . 
the case of smaller tools. The first FMS uses historical tool life 
monitoring and also compensates for tool wear in-cycle. It does 
this by conducting a probing operation after the first rough boring 
operation. This feeds back any change in required tool offsets for 
the roughing tool to the host computer. The finishing boring 
operation then takes place and compensates for any inaccuracy in 
the first roughing operation. The FMS area has a separate tooling 
section, which includes an automatic toolsetting machine. This is 
connected up to the host computer and automatically feeds back tool 
offsets to update the part programs. All tool setting is done by 
the operators. All inspection in the FMSs is performed 
automatically by in-process probing cycles, which check certain 
critical dimensions.
The components produced on the first two FMSs are five final drive 
and steering clutch components fitting approximately an 800 mm cube 
for each of two new models of tractor. Thus there is a total of ten 
components on these two FMSs. The first FMS turns internal 
diameters and has a cycle time of about thirty minutes. Operations 
on the second FMS are mainly drilling and boring of the same 
components with cycle times of between ten and fifty minutes. The 
third FMS machines from fabrications very large chassis case and 
frame components up to three metres long and weighing over two 
tons. Approximate cycle times for cases are three and a half hours
333
and one hour for frames. It is believed that eventually eight 
different parts may be produced on this FMS. There are some very 
tight positional and boring diameter tolerances to be held on all 
cells, although there is no closed environment. Tolerances of up to 
six tenths of one thou were mentioned on the second FMS. On the 
third FMS tolerances go to plus or minus a thou. Production will be 
in batches of one. It is estimated that on the first two FMSs 
overall throughput times have been reduced from one month to two 
days, with an even greater reduction on the third FMS.
The first and second FMSs are staffed by a team of four workers 
(who will alternate between necessary tasks), while one operator 
will be responsible for the third FMS. As regards system 
supervision one of the engineers has been familiarised with the 
system and will be working as supervisor in the DNC control room, 
although this will only cover one dayshift). As regards maintenance 
the company engineers have been sent to the suppliers' works to 
learn the systems. To date, though, the suppliers' engineers are 
frequently on site and provide back-up service.
vi) Plant E
This company is a wholly-owned susidiary of an American corporation 
whose main business is aircraft production but which is involved in 
a number of other areas of manufacturing. The firm concerned is the 
only European plant in the multinational's industrial hydraulics 
division and was set up in 1961. 1985 sales were just under
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£4,500,000. After considerable rationalisation in recent years the 
company now employs 193 workers, of whom approximately half are 
direct. Plant E manufactures gear pumps, hydraulic control valves 
and cylinders in separate areas of the factory.
At the beginning of 1982 the company was ordered by the corporate 
headquarters to undertake a major reorganisation and 
rationalisation exercise in order to cut losses. As a result of 
this the company returned to profitability by the end of the same 
year but still lacked sufficient sales to solve the problem of 
gross underutilisation of capital equipment. It was decided to 
strengthen the sales team at the company and to take this 
opportunity to launch a new range of gear pumps to try and improve 
sales. Despite a minimal but largely unhappy previous history of NC 
experience it was decided to use an FMS to produce the new range of 
pumps.
The project was financed by the company’s own borrowing together 
with a Department of Industry grant under the FMS Support Scheme, 
approval for which was gained in July 1983 • An Italian supplier, 
who took on the project on a turn-key basis, was chosen for the 
FMS. The first two machine tools were introduced into the plant at 
the beginning of 1984 to facilitate the training of staff while the 
part programs were written and the remainder of the equipment 
debugged at the supplier’s premises. The system has been running on 
a production basis since mid-1985.
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The FMS itself is completely partitioned off from the rest of the 
shopfloor in a temperature-controlled environment to help keep 
within the tight tolerances required. Within the FMS area the DNC 
control area and host computer are further partitioned off. The FMS 
consists of three identical machining centres. Operations carried 
out are mostly drilling, tapping and boring. There is also one 
milling operation, which is done using a special cutter. All 
machines are tooled up identically, each machining centre holding 
thirty-two tools. Sequencing is thus simple: as any part can go to 
any machine the host computer will normally schedule consecutive 
machines for each new set of parts. Tool wear is monitored by 
manual means only (although operators can check on developing 
problems by examination of print-out from the inspection machine - 
see below).
The machine tools are fed by a rail-guided robot, which loads sets 
of the five parts into identical fixtures (two per machine). 
Fixtures are permanently attached to pallets. A rail-guided robot 
picks parts for loading to the machine tools from the upper half of 
any of a row of five conveyors initially loaded with blanks by the 
system operator. Finished parts are deposited by the robot on the 
lower half of the conveyor and fed to the conveyor rear for manual 
unloading. At the end of each of the conveyors is a photo-electric 
cell. This tells the robot which of the conveyors has a part on it 
for loading. (Conversely it also tells which of the lower conveyors 
is empty for unloading purposes). One loading of the conveyor will 
suffice for about four hours system running time. The robot has to
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turn parts over halfway through the machining cycle to enable 
machining of all faces.
Also linked in are an inspection and washing machines. The 
inspection machine is linked to the host computer and feeds back 
the necessary dimensional data to enable the automatic correction 
of offsets on the machine tools as necessary. Inspection is carried 
out on a statistical sampling rather than 100# basis on critical 
dimensions. Finally the FMS contains a secondary special purpose 
cell. This latter performs cross-drilling and bush insertion - 
bushes are loaded by the operator into this cell for automatic 
insertion into the gear pumps. There is a tool pre-setting machine 
within the FMS area, but this is not connected up to the DNC 
because it was felt that the cost of the software to do so would be 
unjustifiable, especially considering the facilities contained on 
the inspection machine.
The parts machined on the FMS are five families of aluminium gear 
pump components. The basic parts are bodies, backplates, 
frontplates, adaptor plates and mounting, each of which type of 
part can have between three and nine variations. Tightest 
tolerances are of three-tenths of eight microns. Interviewees were 
unwilling to divulge cycle times but analysis of secondary 
literature sources (which will remain anonymous here for reasons of 
confidentiality) indicates a likely total cycle time of only a few 
minutes. It is soon intended to introduce a new type of gear pump 
onto the FMS, for which a production engineer at the plant was
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adapting master family programs at the time of interview. Gear pump 
components are produced in sets of five components on the FMS 
rather than batches.
The system is staffed by one operator per shift (with additional 
operators trained for back-up purposes). At the time of interview 
three operators had been trained to manage the system, although one 
of these had recently left. As regards other personnel the system 
is run by a production engineer and a quality engineer, both of 
whom were sent to the supplier's premises for a training course. At 
the time of interview it was intended to send a further one of each 
of these classes of personnel to the suppliers. Overall scheduling 
planning of components is the responsibility of the Production 
Control Department. One of the supplier's engineers has remained on 
site and is responsible for advising on maintenance. Over and above 
this the firm has three maintenance electricians with electronics 
knowledge capable of servicing the FMS.
vii) Plant F
This company is the British subsidiary of a major American machine 
tool manufacturer which has made extensive moves into the supply of 
advanced machining and materials handling technologies. Main 
products are computer numerically controlled machine tools, robots, 
control systems and programmable controllers. The plant is the UK 
headquarters of this company. It chiefly manufactures vertical and 
horizontal CNC machining centres, the turnover in 198  ^being about
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£23,000,000. The UK subsidiary has been hard hit by the economic 
recession of the early ’eighties and the workforce has been reduced 
from 2,300 in I98O to 770 in 1984.
However, since 1983, investment of about £6,000,000 has been taking 
place in capital-intensive facilities such as material requirements 
planning computers and computer aided design and manufacture. The 
company’s FMS, which cost about £700,000 (partly financed by a 
government grant), is an additional part of this modernisation 
programme. The FMS is comprised almost entirely of equipment 
supplied and marketed by the company itself. Thus it is a turnkey 
project and was installed at the company's plant in late 1984.
When visited the FMS comprised one machine tool, a dual pallet 
change horizontal machining centre of the company's own make. Eight 
pallets located at a loading station hold the fixtured work to be 
fed into the system. The machining centre has a toolchanger capable 
of carrying up to ninety tools on two chains. A number of tool 
management features are built into the machine level control 
software. The machining centre is equipped with adaptive control, 
facilities for sister tool replacement and probing for broken tool 
detection. It is intended to add another machining centre of the 
same model to the system, but the current low workload does not yet 
justify its addition. The FMS also includes a washing station which 
incorporates a robot (again of the company's own make), washing 
components from four fixed and one variable position jets. A 
horizontal coordinate inspection machine has been supplied by a
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firm now owned by the company. Inspection cycle times on this 
machine vary between two and eighteen minutes. Transport is 
provided by an automatic vehicle of Swedish make which is guided by 
wires buried in the floor.
Computer control is provided by a modular controller designed and 
marketed by the electronic systems division of the same company.
The controller is divided into three separate modules. The right 
hand controller handles data management on a ten megabyte personal 
computer capable of holding tooling data and about six hundred part 
programs. The central unit deals with the scheduling of work in the 
system, while the left hand module monitors the operation of the 
system.
All parts produced on the FMS are prismatic workpieces within a 
five hundred millimetre cube machined from steel and cast iron. 
Operations performed are milling, drilling, tapping, reaming and 
boring. The parts produced were originally designed and 
manufactured in the company's American facilities. This was part of 
a deliberate policy to maximise economies of scales and batch sizes 
by producing all parts on one site. A number of factors, chief of 
which was the fall of in value of the pound against the dollar in 
1984 and 1985, combined to reverse this policy as it was now 
calculated to be cheaper to produce parts for UK machines 
domestically. Thus it has now been decided to try and move towards 
one hundred per cent local content.
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Initially thirteen parts for one of the company's tool and cutter 
grinding machine were put onto the system. The part range has 
expanded to encompass parts for two other machine tools, one being 
parts for the same model of machining centre that is in the FMS. 
Typical parts include slideway bearing wiper plates and bearing 
blocks. Most of these parts are machined on fixtures holding 
multiple numbers of the part. Cycle times per pallet vary between 
fifteen minutes and one hour. Most components are machined in 
multiples on fixtures, typically giving a batch size of sixteen to 
twenty four for smaller parts.
The FMS is normally run by two operators on each of the two shifts, 
although only one is usually in attendance if the cell is working 
satisfactorily. One supervisor per shift is also in attendance. 
Scheduling within the system is manually performed by the 
operators, who decide on work priorities. Operators also perform 
all other operating duties within the system: loading and unloading 
of parts, changing of tools in toolchangers, swarf clearance, etc. 
As a supplier the company normally give operators of their FMSs a 
training course of a week's duration. It is believed that the 
operators of the in-house FMS received similar training.
A number of indirect functions add to the total labour associated 
with the FMS. Four part programmers in the production engineering 
department are dedicated to program writing for components planned 
for manufacture on the FMS. In total six production engineers are 
more or less devoted to servicing of the FMS. Maintenance is the
3^ 1
responsibility of the company’s own maintenance engineers, none of 
whom is specifically allocated to the FMS.
viii) Plant G
The company is a small manufacturer of propellor shaft seals for 
ships. It is owned by a British parent firm, which is in turn owned 
jointly by an American multinational company (49# shareholding) and 
a major British group specialising in metal and domestic goods (51# 
shareholding). A subsidiary of the latter has been responsible for 
the supply and project management of the FMS. Based on the South 
Coast the company employs eighty workers, of whom some twenty are 
on the shopfloor.
Moves towards FMS started in late 1982. The system cost slightly 
above £500,000 in total, one third of this being paid by the 
government in the form of a grant under its FMS support scheme. It 
was built, installed and tested at the machine tool supplier’s 
factory during 1984 and early 1985, after which it was moved to the 
company's new plant during March 1985* The system is now working on 
a production basis.
Machine tool hardware consists firstly of a CNC vertical turning 
and boring machine carrying twelve tools. This performs first 
operations, components having to be turned over manually to machine 
the second side. This machine turns outside and inside diameters of 
propellor shaft seals. Second operations (drilling, tapping, and a
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lesser amount of milling work) are carried out by a vertical 
machining centre supplied by the machine tool division of the 
British parent group. This is equipped with a thirty tool carousel. 
There are twelve circular coded pallets of one and a half metre 
diameter. Transport is provided by an automatic guided vehicle 
directed by underfloor wiring. Computer control is provided by a 
DEC supervisory minicomputer.
On the vertical boring machine tool wear is monitored at the level 
of the machine control, as the on-board controller has its own tool 
life monitoring package. This package is shadowed by the host 
computer, which analyses whether tools exist on that machine with 
sufficient assigned lives left to machine the next job. Tool life 
management on the machining centre is performed purely at host 
computer level.
Components machined are about twenty families of propellor shaft 
seals for ships. These are semi-circular, being made in two halves 
(to facilitate refitting at sea). Materials used are gunmetal and 
occasionally cast iron. Cycle time on each machine average forty 
minutes on the vertical borer and twenty minutes on the machining 
centre. Tightest tolerances are about four thousandths of an inch 
on some of the diameters, although this will only occur 
exceptionally. Positional tolerances are no lower than plus or 
minus ten thousandths of an inch. The most normal batch size will 
be one, high batch sizes being irrelevant to the company's type of 
work.
34 3
The FMS is staffed by a team of three, designated as system 
manager, cell technician and programmer, and cell loader. Routine 
maintenance is undertaken by the company’s maintenance man, while 
machine problems are tackled by the suppliers. At the time of final 
interview the company still had not formally accepted the system, 
so the suppliers' one year maintenance warranty was not yet 
operational.
ix) Plant H
The company is one of the larger subsidiaries of a major group with 
interests in diverse fields of capital goods manufacture. Turnover 
in 1984 was £80 million. The firm which is introducing the FMS 
produces coal cutting and hydraulic pit support machinery and 
employs about 1,400 workers on a site in Western England. At the 
beginning of 1984 the company was reorganised into three separate 
product groups: chock assembly, leg and ram manufacturing, and 
valves. The valve division of the company is responsible for the 
employment of a total of some four hundred people. Two major types 
of valves are currently produced, and a new type is to be 
introduced shortly (which will also be manufactured on the FMS).
In recent years the market for mining equipment has contracted 
overall, although the company's market share appears to be 
stabilising. The company is dependent on one major buyer, British 
Coal (formerly known as the National Coal Board), to which it sells 
about 60% of its output. Production was hit quite badly by the
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1984/85 miners' strike, which affected orders and morale 
considerably.
An in-house study on possible technological choices was conducted 
within the production engineering department in 1983* After a 
discounted cash flow analysis FMS triumphed as the most financially 
viable option, but only because of the availability of a Department 
of Industry grant (which was assumed in the calculation), and the 
proviso that the FMS option promised the least rapid return on the 
investment). The original idea of installing the project by stages 
was abandoned when it was known that a grant would be available.
The FMS represents a total investment of £3,200,000. The company 
received a Department of Industry grant in May 1983* Acceptance 
trials were conducted on the shopfloor during August and September 
1985 and the project was handed over for production purposes in 
January 1986 (about three months later than first intended).
The system consists of four identical machining centres, each with 
capacity for 110 tools. To enhance total tool inventory in the FMS 
the tooling carried on each machine is different, although there is 
a limited amount of duplication involving perhaps two of the 
machines. Tool life is monitored by means of historic life 
monitoring, adaptive control, a broken tool detection facility 
controlled by a proximity switch near the spindle. Probing is also 
used to detect broken tools and to probe components before the 
start of a cycle to ensure they are in the correct location agianst 
the end-stops of fixtures. This operation was not performed
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initially but was found to be necessary to be certain that parts 
are produced within tolerance and was thus programmed in. Probes 
are not used for performing inspection. The reason given for this 
is the unwarranted addition to machine downtime while probing takes 
place. A stand-alone coordinate measuring machine (one of two in 
the factory) is located next to the system and is used to measure 
parts coming off the FMS although it is not part of the system per 
se.
Each machining centre has two input/output stations. A rotary table 
transfers pallets between these and the machine. The machining 
centres will be served by two automatic vehicles guided by 
underfloor wires, although one of these will mainly be used for 
back-up capability in case of the other's breakdown. The AGVs bring 
workpieces to the machine. Tools, on the other hand, are carried to 
the machine tool magazines on a manually-controlled trolley and 
must be loaded into the magazines manually. There are four stations 
for loading and unloading components. Shop data entry units (SDEUs) 
are stationed at each of the loading stations.
Overall control of the FMS is provided from a raised control room 
overlooking the system which houses the two identical DEC PDP 11/44 
minicomputers used as host computers. One of these computers 
provides back-up capability in case of breakdown and will be used 
to run simulation packages. The management information system on 
the FMS will give on-line production data, which is an improvement 
on what currently exists with the stand-alone CNC machines:
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utilisation figures on these are one week out of date by the time 
they have been collected.
The FMS also includes a dedicated tool store, fixture store, tool 
setting area, and tool regrind shop. An automatic tool presetting 
machine is part of the tool setting area and automatically feeds 
tool offsets into the DNC with no further manual intervention being 
needed.
About twenty five families of valve component parts were considered 
suitable for production by FMS. By the time the system was ready to 
go into production the FMS had been tooled up to produce a total of 
fifteen part families. Of these nine families have little internal 
variation, while the remaining six contain a lot of different 
variants. One of these part families contains over one hundred 
variations on the basic shape. Materials used are high tensile 
brass and steel. Components need machining on all six sides and 
thus need loading twice (in order to machine the remaining faces). 
Tolerances can be close: up to 0.015 mm true positions, 0.05mm on 
hole diameters and 50:1 length/diameter ratios on holes. Cycle 
times vary from 22 minutes to 2.4 hours with an average cycle time 
of 45-60 minutes. Batch sizes vary from five to one hundred.
There are three distinct grades of job contained in the system. 
Staffing of the FMS is intended to be on the basis of four workers 
per shift as follows: system manager, two skilled 
setter/inspectors, and one loader / unloader. Additionally one
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manufacturing engineer responsible for tool and fixture design and 
programming and two maintenance engineers are assigned to the FMS.
x) Plant J
This plant is the base of a major British machine tool manufacturer 
which is now one of the largest domestic suppliers of CNC machining 
centres and flexible manufacturing systems. It is the subsidiary of 
a British-based multinational company with interests in most 
branches of the engineering industry. 1983 sales were nearly 
£14,000,000. However, the company has been running at a loss for 
some time and severe rationalisation has been imposed in order to 
try and achieve a return to profitability. The workforce was 
reduced from 1,100 in 1982 to 450 in 1984 and this decline was 
still continuing at the time of interview. A considerable number of 
the less critical parts have been contracted out. A labour 
flexibility agreement has been negotiated with the main shopfloor 
engineering union, the AEU.
The system is believed to have cost just under £1,000,000, part of 
which was paid for by a government FMS grant. The intended 
configuration for the FMS has changed several times and has also 
been subject to considerable delays, although nearly all the 
equipment has been supplied by component firms within the parent 
group.
By the time of final interview the FMS still consisted of two
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groups of machine tools, each served by its own transport system, 
being used for development purposes. Interlinking of the two 
transport systems was intended to occur by the end of 1985* A tool 
setting machine was about to be added but overall host computer 
control was still some way off.
All equipment in the FMS is of the company's own make, except for 
the host computer and the toolsetting machine which was about to be 
delivered. These latter are supplied by German companies. At the 
time of final interview the FMS consisted of a large prototype 
machining centre with a capacity for holding 200 tools. This 
machining centre was fronted by a pallet railway. Also included in 
the FMS but not yet linked to this machine at the time of interview 
were two smaller machining centres, each with a toolholding 
capacity of eighty. When the toolsetting machine is installed tools 
will be identified by means of a laser-read bar-code label which 
will enable the random assignment of tools to pockets.
Tool wear is monitored by means of torque sensing, assignment of 
historic tool lives and probing for broken tools (on critical 
operations only). A tool rationalisation exercise is being carried 
out to reduce the need to employ tools likely to suffer breakage, 
and therefore to reduce the need for probing cycles.
The products machined on the FMS are approximately twenty five 
families of prismatic components for the company's machining 
centres. Typical parts include headstock castings, tool housings
3*t9
and pallet tables. Cycle times for components vary widely, ranging 
from as little as ten minutes (although such components would be 
multi-loaded on fixtures to give an overall pallet cycle time of 
one to two hours) to seven hours in the case of machine tool heads. 
A variety of materials are used including aluminium, boilerplate, 
cast iron, steel and fabrications. The tightest tolerances are of 
plus or minus thirteen microns. Batch sizes are variable depending 
upon the type of component but are thought to average about twelve.
The FMS is under the overall control of a system manager. One 
machinist (classed as a setter/operator) is responsible for getting 
each of the two cells of machines operational. Part programming is 
undertaken by the company’s NC Department. All inspection is 
conducted off-line by the company's Inspection Department.
A day-to-day schedule of basic maintenance is carried out by the 
operators. Operators will be responsible for maintenance tasks not 
involving dismantling the machines or the use of specialised 
equipment. As the company are also the suppliers of the machine 
tools major maintenance will also be an in-house responsibility. 
Indeed the machine tools in the FMS were currently being used to 
allow the development of the company’s own maintenance 
recommendations for these machines.
xi) Plant K
This firm is the largest of a small independent group of companies
350
operating on a total of four sites, mostly in South East England. 
The company started in 1976 with only five employees. Its main 
business is a sub-contractor for volume production of machined 
parts for the automotive industry. At the time of interview in 1985 
the company employed in total some 510 persons. Thus the company 
has expanded rapidly since it was formed. It has also started a 
business for stripping down and refurbishing machine tools,
. originally only for in-house use, but now also for outside
customers. Most recently the group has taken over a machine tool 
company. Turnover in 1984 was just over £9,000,000.
The main business however remains sub-contract machining 
principally for the car, bus and truck industries. Over half the 
company's business is conducted with one of Britain's major car 
manufacturers, which exercises a dominant influence over its 
production plans. Business is also conducted with foreign 
subsidiaries of the same automotive companies. About eighty five 
per cent of the work consists of turning operations, the remainder 
being mostly slot milling, grinding, gear hobbing and broaching. 
Materials are usually steels of various grades.
Most of the company's work is high volume production, and the 
production facilities are geared up to match this requirement. 
However, in 1981 the company bought its first CNC lathe to machine 
a gearbox main shaft. CNC was chosen because of the tight 
tolerances required on this job. Although it would have been 
theoretically possible to achieve these tolerances on a
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conventional centre lathe it would take about ten hours to carry 
out work of this precision for one component. By using CNC the 
company had achieved the same results first in six minutes and now 
in four and a half minutes. Since this first machine the stand­
alone CNC complement has expanded to seven, including Japanese 
stand-alone four-axis CNC lathes of the same models that have 
subsequently been used for the FMS.
Both the high volumes and high proportion of turning operations 
would seem at first to make the company unlikely to be a candidate 
for venturing into purchase of a flexible manufacturing system. The 
initial idea for the move to FMS was spurred in 1983 when the 
company won the contract from its major customer for a new type of 
gearbox. The tolerances for the components on this job would be 
much lower than any work encountered previously, and furthermore 
high volume production coupled with quick changeover between parts 
were considered important production requirements. The company 
decided to adopt FMS on this contract for the two criteria of 
volume and accuracy. Unfortunately, once the decision had been made 
to order an FMS the customer decided to cancel the gearbox 
contract. After some hasty re-thinking the company decided to 
continue with the plan to buy an FMS and to find other work to put 
on it instead.
Having made this decision a second problem occurred when the 
financial management of the company refused to accept the worth of 
the investment, valued at about £1,200,000, because payback was not
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anticipated to be achieved within the company’s normally accepted 
period. The British Government's FMS support scheme then 
contributed one third of the cost of the project (this being 
confirmed in January 1984), however, and thus the project was 
allowed to go ahead. The availability of the government grant was 
the clinching factor in deciding to adopt FMS.
The machine tool hardware was supplied by a Japanese company, of 
whom the firm had previous experience. The English agent for this 
supplier took on management of the whole project, and no 
development work at all was done by the firm receiving the FMS.
This role included the supply of machine tool and computer 
hardware, software, transport system and training of employees. The 
first machines were installed on site during the summer of 1984 and 
the rest in the late autumn of that year. This facilitated in-house 
training on the machines and a build-up of experience. Following 
this the transport system and then the computer equipment was 
installed. The FMS finally began work on a production basis in mid- 
March 1985.
The FMS consists basically of two separate machining cells, each 
with two turning machines within a perimeter fence. Both cells are 
linked up under DNC but each performs quite distinct machining 
duties. The first cell consists of two Japanese four axis lathes 
interlinked by conveyor, and this cell turns blanks of up to 150 
millimetres in diameter. The second cell consists of two larger 
four axis lathes by the same manufacturer also interlinked by
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conveyor which handles turned parts of up to 250 millimetres in 
diameter.
Each lathe is equipped with an on-board robot for the purpose of 
loading and unloading parts, and two turrets: containing twelve 
tools in the top turret and eight in the bottom turret. As far as 
possible a standard tooling philosophy is employed for each job: on 
average three roughing tools and one finishing tool. Two 
continuously moving belt conveyor systems, one for each cell, link 
each cell's machine tools so that the component's first operation 
is performed on the first machine, replaced by robot on the 
conveyor, ferried to the second identical machine where the part is 
turned over and the second operation performed.
Computer control is located in a room adjacent to the FMS, which 
covers a large corner of the machine shop. In this room are two 
Octopus computers. The first is the host computer, which holds all 
the system data on a disc file. The second, a computer of the same 
make, is used to perform part programming and editing. In addition 
each machine tool has its own VDU and printer which logs the 
current status of its machine and prints out quality control 
information for each part produced.
Tool lives are monitored by two methods: 1) programmed tool life, 
with a warning point triggered off at a certain percentage of 
expired life; 2) probing of critical dimensions, automatically 
feeding back offsets to the host computer for updating in order to
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keep dimensions within seventy per cent of the allowed tolerance 
band. A probe will shut a machine down if it detects a dimension as 
being over two thousandths of an inch oversize. In this instance it 
assumes such a large disparity is the result of a broken tool and 
calls for manual attention.
So far only six main parts have been run on the FMS, exclusively 
forged or billet steel gear blanks. The cell of larger lathes has 
tended to keep running on only one of the larger of these jobs (a 
camshaft gear). The FMS components feature tight tolerances, with 
the least tight tolerance on the gears being one thousandth of an 
inch (twenty five microns) and some bore tolerances being half of 
this. The FMS has not been used to run small batches of prototypes 
so far. Despite the fact that changeover times are relatively short 
the production engineers prefer to keep batch sizes as high as 
possible to minimise downtime. Batch sizes currently run were given 
as often 10,000, with a minimum of 3t000. Component cycle time on 
the FMS is approximately two minutes.
The FMS is run by three direct personnel per shift. One skilled
setter is responsible for programming and management of both cells. 
Loading and monitoring of each cell, and quality control, is 
carried out by a semi-skilled operator.
xii) Plant L
This plant is one of the main production sites of a manufacturer of
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buses and is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of a British-owned 
automotive company. Sales in 1984 totalled £430,000,000. The site 
as a whole employs some 1500 people and is split into facilities 
for the production of chassis on the one hand and gearboxes and 
axles on the other. The latter business employs 550 direct workers 
and 250 indirect workers and is now responsible for the 
introduction of a FMS to produce a new range of gearbox components.
Management were unwilling to divulge the cost of the FMS, but it is 
known that 10% of the cost was covered by a government grant. It is 
noteworthy that the availability of this grant was the deciding 
factor in enabling the adoption of a FMS specifically. At the time 
of interview the FMS was still being introduced: a tool pre-setting 
machine had just been delivered and a minority of the machining 
centres were still to be delivered. It was intended that the system 
would be running on a trial basis by September 1985*
The FMS consists of five identical machining centres of West German 
manufacture laid out in linear fashion. Each machining centre has 
capacity for 160 tools. Thus the provision of both sister tooling 
and duplicate tooling between machines will be quite high, which 
enables the satisfaction of one of the company's main requirements 
that any workpiece should be able to go to any machine within the 
FMS.
These machining centres are served by two automatic guided vehicles 
which collect parts from and deliver them back to two load / unload
356
stations fed from a line of forty-two dedicated pallet / fixture 
combinations. The aim of having so many pallets is to enable twenty 
four hours unstaffed machining work to be lined up for the system. 
The loading of this work on the pallets will take four hours (of 
the twenty four). A tool pre-setting machine, which will 
communicate tool offsets directly to the DNC, is to be installed 
beside the machining centres. An FMS control room is situated along 
a raised balcony directly overlooking the system. The control room 
contains the host computer terminals, a VDU connected to the 
system, a system layout diagram and a terminal for the simulation 
system on which the FMS has been modelled.
The machining centres have power monitoring facilities to monitor 
tool wear and also probes, which will be used to test tool 
integrity at the end of an operation. The addition to the cycle 
time is felt to be a minor inconvenience compared to the necessity 
of manually checking tools that tools are not broken.
Initially the part spectrum consists of five separate components 
fopr one existing and a new type of gearbox, each of which types is 
produced in in-line or angle drive forms. This produces a total of 
fourteen component variations to be machined on the FMS. These 
require machining on at least five faces. Batch sizes appeared to 
be undecided at the time of interview but it seems likely that they 
will be large by FMS standards. Some complex work is involved and 
tolerances are very fine, especially on bores. Cycles times per 
pallet vary from thirty to ninety minutes, with an average of forty
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minutes. The only material is aluminium, which facilitates fast 
machining times.
The FMS is staffed by a team of four operators per shift (all 
picked from the company's existing CNC machinists and subsequently 
upgraded). These will share the necessary system responsibilities 
of loading, tool-setting and "roving operator". Three engineers 
have been allocated to the project and these are responsible for 
development and running of the overall computer software.
Part programs are written by a manufacturing engineer but are 
proved out jointly by this person and a setter. There will be two 
types of inspection employed within the FMS. The operators are 
partly responsible for their own inspection will carry out a "jig 
check" every so often on components using standard measuring 
instruments. On first-offs components will be sent to a special 
area behind the machining centres. Separate inspection staff will 
be involved here in a more thorough check. Also, the machines 
themselves are equipped to perform a more rigorous inspection on 
components than that performed by the operators. This process will 
also be employed although at the time of inteview the intervals for 
this had not been decided.
As regards maintenance, two members of the existing maintenance 
team have been hand-picked by management to be the FMS maintenance 




The company is a large manufacturer of medium and high speed diesel 
engines for industrial and marine applications. Sales in 1984 
totalled £72,000,000. It is a subsidary of a British parent company 
which also owns a number of other firms manufacturing diesel 
engines. At the time of interview the company operated on five 
sites in South West England employing a total of 3.000 people. 
Subsequently, however, to rationalise production it closed two of 
these sites, one of which was the small machining shop which 
contained the firm’s first FMS. The plant at which the FMS was 
installed prior to the move functioned purely as an overspill 
machine shop. About twenty five people were employed on the site in 
total, of whom about ten to fifteen were on the shopfloor on each 
of the three shifts worked. Since the time of interview this FMS 
has been dismantled and reassembled on the shopfloor at the 
company’s headquarters plant, which is located about ten miles 
away. Two further FMSs are in the process of planning and 
installation at the headquarters plant.
A study team composed of customer and supplier representatives was 
formed in 1982 to investigate the feasibility of the FMS project. 
Orders were placed in mid-1983 when the British Government’s 
Department of Trade and Industry confirmed that it would pay for 
one third of the cost of the project. Total cost of the system is 
about £750,000, the remainder of the investment being internally 
financed. In the period January to October 1984 the system was
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commissioned and integrated. The FMS has been running on a 
production basis since late 1984 with a break for removal of the 
system to the headquarters plant at the end of 1985*
All components on the FMS are delivered by robot to a set sequence 
of machines as follows: 1) CNC lathe, 2) gauging station, 3) part 
orientation station, 4) broaching machine, 5) machining centre, 6)
- balancing machine (for flywheel components only). The first robot 
transports components from the pick-up bin as far as the third 
station, at which point the second robot takes over.
Machine tool hardware consists firstly of a four axis CNC lathe 
which performs the initial operation on components. The lathe 
carries six tools in both its top and bottom turret. The top turret 
has room for twelve tools but only six are carried to allow 
sufficent room for proper clearance. A tool rationalisation 
exercise has been carried out to reduce toolchange requirements 
with the result that there is now no need for any tooling changes 
for the manufacture of components within the flywheel component 
family. Tool life is monitored in two ways: there is cutting force 
monitoring on the machine and there is also a tool index counter: 
the operator can signal the system when a new tool is put in and 
the computer will count down its assigned life as it machines each 
component. The lathe was originally equipped with in-process 
gauging, but this has now been removed because it was found that 
the probing added to the total cycle time by about four minutes.
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The second machine tool is a four-axis vertical machining centre of 
British manufacture which is used mostly for drilling and tapping 
operations. The machine can carry up to eighteen tools. Tool wear 
monitoring on the machining centre is performed by probing at the 
beginning of cycles, and the offsets are transmitted for future up­
dating back to the CNC control cabinet. Broken tool detection by 
probing also occurs. Once again probing cycles have been reduced 
from roughly every operation to one in thirty components in order 
to diminish cycle times.
One further machine tool in the FMS is a broaching machine, onto 
which components are loaded after gauging and before going onto the 
machining centre. Preliminary inspection, originally performed by 
probing facilities on the lathe, is now done by a post-process 
gauging machine, onto which components are loaded after both sides 
have been machined on the lathe. The lathe has two links: one to
the host computer and one to the post-process gauge. The gauge
measures a number of critical dimensions. The deviation of every 
gauged feature from the ideal size is fed back to the host 
computer, which then will update tool offsets on the lathe.
Balancing of flywheel components is carried out on a balancing
machine of German manufacture. This performs any final correction 
of component dimensions required by measuring the component, 
determining how far it is out of balance and removing surplus metal 
with a drill-head. The FMS also includes a camera-based vision 
system to correctly orientate turned parts for presentation to the 
machine tools.
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Computer control is provided by an IBM minicomputer. Output is 
displayed on three visual display units and a printer located in 
the FMS control room directly beside the system. The system is 
"menu-driven". All files have a series of sub-menus called up by 
depression of a given key on the keyboard.
The FMS is designed to produce three different families of large 
turned components in a set order of operations for an existing 
range of small 500cc engines. Some tolerances (particularly bores) 
can be as tight as half a thousandth of an inch. The component 
families (which have cycle times of between six and nine minutes) 
are three types of bearing housing, eleven types of flywheel, which 
in turn divide into disc wheels and spoked wheels, and one 
gearwheel blank. The materials machined are cast iron and spherical 
graphite. Three new types of flywheel (two spoked and one disc) 
have been introduced into the system since production started in 
late 198*1, although only one of these is fully "proved out". There 
is considerable capacity for future expansion of the part range as 
a number of types of bearing housing and gear wheel blank are still 
being sub-contracted to outside manufacturers. An average batch 
size would probably be one hundred.
The only direct labour in the entire cell is one worker, who is 
classed as a setter/operator, for each of the three shifts. 
Scheduled and breakdown maintenance were formerly the 
responsibility of the equipment suppliers. Now scheduled 
maintenance is mostly done by the company's service engineers based
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at the headquarters plant, who are on twenty four hour call-out to 
the FMS.
xiv) Plant N
This plant is one of two sites owned by a manufacturer of large 
diesel engines for power generation and marine applications. The 
company is a subsidiary of a British-owned multinational firm, 
which also has an interest in other diesel engine manufacturers 
(including Plant M above). In 1983 the company's sales were 
£47,000,000. The company has been badly affected by the recession. 
The plant has suffered heavy redundancies in recent years, 
declining from a peak of some 1200 employees to approximately 950 
at the time of interview. Also it was trying to reduce the amount 
of floorspace owned in order to reduce the rates bill. Ability to 
contract floorspace is hindered by the company's very wide-ranging 
production requirements in a batch mode. It is necessary, for 
instance, to retain a lot of older special purpose machinery for 
certain jobs rather than being able to just switch to a smaller 
number of CNC machines.
From the outset the company was intending to purchase some form of 
FMS anyway to solve its production problems, particularly that of 
tooling variety. The FMS being supplied is very much a relatively 
cheap and proven off-the-peg system, employing a minimum of 
development work. For this reason the firm has used the services of 
a German company with which it has considerable previous experience
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as a supplier of stand-alone CNC machine tools, which has taken 
charge of the project on a turnkey basis. This company had the 
advantages of offering a standardised FMS "package” which could 
also cope with the high tooling requirements at Plant N. The system 
cost a total of £1,900,000 and 10# of this cost was supplied by 
means of a government grant.
. Installation of the FMS was planned to take place in a number of 
stages as follows: 1) Operational by September 1985 " two machining 
centres and a rail guided pallet system; 2) 1985/86 - third 
machining centre and a washing station, plus extra rail guiding for 
pallets to be added as necessary; 3) 1986 - fourth machining centre 
and possibly an inspection machine.
Thus the system will eventually consist of four identical machining 
centres each holding seventy-two tools, which will be fed by a 
rail-guided pallet system incorporating pallets of various sizes 
according to the components on the system. In the first phase two 
of the machining centres will be fed by six pallets loaded from 
three loading stations, one of which is for special purposes. The 
tool presetting unit is connected to the DNC computer and 
automatically transmits tool radial and length offsets to the 
latter. This then updates and automatically compensates the part 
programs as necessary. The machining centres are equipped with 
historic tool life monitoring, probing and adaptive control 
facilities. As with other FMSs, however, it was unclear at the time 
of interview whether the probing facilities would actually be used.
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The most original feature of the FMS will be a central tool library 
behind the machining centres, to which tools will be robotically 
downloaded. Tools will nevertheless have to be manually loaded into 
the tool library in the first instance and barcoded to enable 
recognition of their position by the host computer. The host 
computer is most sophisticated at tool management duties. It also 
undertakes automatic scheduling (although emergency manual 
scheduling is also possible).
As regards overall process control the company is working towards a 
two-tier DNC system. The FMS will have its own host computer but 
this will also be connected into a higher-level DNC link-up which 
will control all the CNC machines on the shopfloor. This level of 
DNC will be controlled from the Production Office. A CAD/CAM system 
will also be linked up to this level of direct numerical control.
The system will initially machine in four set-ups some twenty to 
twenty five parts common to all models of engine. These parts are 
fashioned from cast iron, aluminium and steel and have cycle times 
varying between five minutes and two and a half hours per set-up 
but averaging an hour and a half. Positional tolerances average one 
thousandths of an inch and the tightest tolerances are half of 
this. The tightest boring tolerances are of three-tenths of a 
thousandth of an inch. It is intended that a mixed range of new 
parts will gradually be added to the system over time until there 
are about sixty parts running. Included in these new components 
will be some parts that are currently sub-contracted. Examples of
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planned reductions in batch size on some of the components to be 
machined on the system include: cams - from forty down to eight; 
cylinder heads - from thirty down to one; pistons - from forty down 
to ten. In this last example very high fixturing costs (£30,000 per 
fixture) preclude lower batch sizes on economic grounds.
It is intended to run the FMS with two operators per shift.
- Management consider the important requirements for workers within 
the system are initiative and flexibility in the sense of being 
willing to undertake a variety of jobs such as tooling activity, 
loading, and editing of NC programs. The remaining skill areas 
relate to the setting of particular components to go on the FMS, 
which in certain cases is quite complicated; and to knowledge of 
tooling. It was not clear at the time of interview what procedure 
would be employed for part inspection. The plans for the FMS 
possibly include an automatic inspection machine but some members 
of management feel that its utilisation level would be low. It is 
nevertheless possible that operator inspection using gauges may be 
retained. Alternatively (as with Plant A), if a coordinate 
measuring machine is purchased, it may be sited near the FMS so 
that it could be used for other work as well. Maintenance will be 
performed by the existing maintenance staff, who will be sent to 
the supplier’s premises in Germany for a training course.
xv) Plant P
This company is in the aerospace industry, nearly all work being
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defence-related. It is mainly owned by a major British aerospace 
group, the minority shareholding being held by an American 
corporation. 1984 turnover was £63 million, and the company employs 
in total some 2,000 persons. It operates on two sites in South West 
England, the headquarters being part of the same site as those of 
the parent company. Both in the main plant (where two FMSs are now 
either running or in the process of installation) and in its 
satellite plant - where the small-scale FMS studied here is located 
- the company has also been an early British user of flexible 
manufac turing technology.
The company's first FMS, costing about £1,800,000, was installed in 
this satellite plant, which is located only some ten miles from the 
headquarters to which it is linked on-line. A government grant 
supplied about one-sixth of the cost of the system, the remainder 
of the finance being internally generated. Production begem in 1981 
although the linking of machine tools, transport and host computer 
comprising an FMS was not completed until late the following year.
A contract from the British Ministry of Defence to produce ejector 
release units (ERUs) for a fighter aircraft was won and it was 
agreed to use this contract for an experiment in FMS manufacturing 
methods.
At the outset the shopfloor was re-equipped for production of the 
ejector release units. This involved the installation of a bar-fed 
lathe, two grinders, a mill, drill, spark eroder (nearly all of 
which are stand-alone CNC machines); as well as deburring, crack
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detection, heat treatment, cadmium plating, assembly and testing 
facilities. Two identical four pallet stand alone machining centres 
were bought from a major British manufacturer of such equipment and 
installed at one end of the shopfloor to perform the majority 
(about 10%) of the preliminary machining work needed on the 
components.
- The developmental work for the FMS was performed largely by a 
project team comprising representatives of the company and also 
staff and research students based at one of the nearest British 
universities. The development process from stand-alone machining 
centres to their linking into an FMS to manufacture these 
components nevertheless seems to have been a piecemeal process. 
Gradual improvements to productive efficiency were part of the 
original production engineering philosophy for the facility. As 
explained by the plant’s superintendent particular production 
problems meant that first automatic tool changing was found to be 
required followed by automatic pallet loading. These facilities 
were engineered in association with the suppliers of the machining 
centres. Additionally the company itself engineered a hydraulic 
system. Finally computer hardware was added and linked into the 
computer databases of the main plant.
The hardware of the FMS consists firstly of two identical machining 
centres fronted by a circular four-pallet table. Each machine 
carries forty tools with an auxiliary conveyor capable of storing a 
further eighty tools. Tools are loaded to the magazine by the
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operator. In front of these stands a rail-guided transport system 
which carries thirteen pallets with dedicated fixtures. The FMS is 
controlled by a large DEC minicomputer of a type with which the 
main plant had already gained operating experience. This controls 
and optimises the loading of the machining centres, controls 
production, and produces a variety of management information on 
production statistics, "downtime" and maintenance information, etc, 
which can be printed out on-site. Although the host computer has 
facilities to monitor the wear of tools (though not their breakage) 
through tracking the progress of each tool towards a pre-programmed 
life previously assigned, our information indicates that this is 
not used in practice. Operators instead monitor tool wear manually.
The FMS is used to manufacture the eight components out of maraging 
steel for ejector release units with the highest value added. Each 
ERU contains a total of some one hundred parts (mostly of low value 
and machined on other facilities). The eight components on the FMS 
are small but complex in shape and require about six or seven 
machining operations each. Components consist of a main casing plus 
a number of hooks and plates requiring extensive milling, drilling, 
reaming and tapping. Tolerances are as low as four thousandths of 
an inch. The maraging steel of which they are made is a very 
difficult material to machine because of its extreme hardness. 
Additionally, its swarf tends to stick on to the tools and has to 
be pulled off by hand. Cycle times can last up to four hours or 
even more.
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At the time of interview a new set of components unrelated to the 
ejector release units but fitting within the machines’ specified 
part size capability were being programmed and proved out. The new 
parts consist of seven aluminium alloy components for a small 
engine, all of which are machined on one fixture. Total cycle time 
is forty minutes. Subsequently the FMS has now been used to produce 
these items on a commercial basis.
Versatility in terms of batch sizes remains questionable. One 
limitation is that the original aim of producing components on the 
FMS in sets seems to have been unofficially abandoned. The 
necessary resetting time for such continual changeover between 
components was considered to take too long. Monthly production 
requirements are fairly steady and predictable at seventy units per 
month, and thus components are usually now machined in batches of 
approximately this number in order to minimise changeover time. 
Because this arrangement allows a small reserve stock ("buffer’1) to 
be built up, scrap problems arising from particular faulty 
components, which might otherwise mean failure to meet output 
targets, can be minimised.
Administratively the plant is run by a superintendent who acts as a 
general overseer as well as a supervisor of the FMS part of the 
facility. Due to the small size of the plant there is little 
formality or hierarchy to be observed in the relations between 
superintendent and workers. The superintendent's role is basically 
"human resource management" and he is responsible for selection of
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new workers at the plant when required.
All the shopfloor workers at the plant were originally skilled 
workers employed at the company’s headquarters plant, from where 
they applied for and were granted a transfer. Most have now been 
working at the plant since it was originally set up in 1981, and 
this is true also of the personnel tending the FMS. As there are 
some 775 skilled workers on the shopfloor at the main plant there 
was no difficulty in obtaining workers with the right skill levels 
willing to transfer. To varying degrees the FMS operators take a 
role in first-line maintenance in the case of minor breakdowns in 
order to avoid having to wait for a maintenance engineer from the 
main plant. Final inspection after the testing of assemblies is 
still performed by two inspectors (indirect labour) based on-site, 
although the FMS workers do help to inspect the work that comes off 
the machining centres. Toolsetting for the whole plant is performed 
by a worker dedicated to the toolroom.
xvi) Plant R
The company concerned is one of Britain’s first users of a flexible 
manufacturing system. The FMS was originally set up as a separate 
company by the parent firm, which is a British-based multinational 
with about forty trading subsidiaries operating in three main 
business areas: scrap metal, cranes, and machine tools. The group’s 
machine tool activities made an overall loss in 1983 and 1984 as a 
result of the economic recession but returned to show a slight
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profit in 1985*
Of the nineteen companies comprising this latter group two are 
manufacturers of centre lathes, one based in Northern England and 
the other in Eastern England. Originally destined for the site of 
the Northern company the FMS was actually installed in a spare 
building owned by this other subsidiary East England company, a 
. major British manufacturer of standard centre lathes employing 
about five hundred people. 1984 turnover was £14,000,000. For some 
time the FMS was not integrated into the business activities of the 
other firm on the same site, although this process of absorption 
has been taking place since the beginning of 1985* Originally the 
FMS was formed into an entirely separate company (although 
recruiting managerial, technical and operating personnel from its 
partner).
In 1976 the then Labour Government, through its Department of Trade 
and Industry's (DTI) Automated Small Batch Production (ASP) 
Committee, was presented with a report recommending the development 
of a flexible manufacturing system within British industry. The 
Government sent out a letter to all machine tool manufacturers 
seeking companies prepared to develop some form of FMS with the aid 
of government finance to do so. The parent company was the only one 
to respond positively to this letter at that time. The Chairman of 
the parent group took the DTI's letter as an oppportunity for the 
company to expand its hitherto rather traditional base in machine 
tool technology.
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The Group put a figure of £100,000 on setting up a feasibility 
study, and the money for this was granted by the government in mid- 
1977• The feasibility study was presented to the British 
government at the beginning of 1978. The parent group put a figure 
of £3,000,000 on the project, and in early 1979 a three-year 
contract was signed with the government for the design and 
implementation of an FMS. The parent group formed a new subsidiary 
. company for this purpose. The Government paid 75# of the cost of 
the project, which was finally completed - slightly overdue - at 
the end of 1983. During 1984 the new company used the FMS for 
teaching and demonstration purposes, plus some sub-contracted 
production from other machine tool subsidiaries of the parent 
group. By the end of 1984 the parent group felt it had reached the 
point where it had gleaned as much knowledge on FMS for learning 
purposes as it needed. The knowledge gained and the system itself 
is now being passed on for production purposes to the sister 
company, to whom the management of the FMS has been turned over, 
while the original company is using the knowledge gained to become 
an FMS consultant and supplier instead.
The FMS is contained in the whole of one shed and comprises nine 
machine tools laid out in linear fashion. The first four machines 
are two two-axis CNC lathes and two five-axis CNC lathes (an 
adaptation of the previous type, employing a robot vision feature 
for part orientation), which perform first operations. These tools 
were supplied by the company which has now taken over the FMS. The 
two-axis machines were prototypes for a new range of CNC lathe the
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company now markets. The five-axis machines were also prototypes 
but have not been commercially marketed to date. There are sixteen 
tools in the two-axis lathes and twelve per turret in the five-axis 
lathes. The turning machines are followed by five second operation 
machine tools: a gear chamfer; a gear shaping machine; a 
cylindrical grinding machine; a hobbing machine; and finally a 
horizontal broaching machine. The latter two are non-NC machines 
. but function automatically, being initiated and stopped by relay 
switches. Parts are delivered to the tools by eight robots (the 
last two machines being served by one robot) supplied by a new 
division of the parent group and specially developed for the system 
in association with a Japanese machine tool supplier. The robots 
pick the components from pallets, and also perform the crucial role 
of counting components on and off the machines in the system: this 
data is fed back to the central computer from the robots so that 
the host can keep track of the progress of a batch. Pallets are 
transported from any of six loading stations to the machine tools 
upon a continuous roller conveyor. All the above is under direct 
control from an adjoining room by a pair of Systime host computers 
(one of which is used as a back-up). Much of the software is now 
being changed as the purpose of the FMS has changed from a 
demonstration and teaching to a production facility.
Since the beginning of 1985 the FMS has been fully absorbed both 
for production and administrative purposes within the sister 
company. At the time of final interview, however, considerable work 
was recognised as still being necessary to meet the revised
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production requirements. Direct computer linkages into the 
production databases of the main company are still very limited, 
however.
The FMS produces a range of the low value turned components 
incorporated into the company’s range of lathes within an envelope 
of 220 millimetres diameter by 420 millimetres length. Such parts 
produced on the FMS include gears, discs and shafts machined out of 
steel, cast iron and aluminium. Parts produced on the system have 
both changed and increased since the change of ownership. Work sub­
contracted to the FMS from outside plants is being phased out in 
favour of freeing the capacity for concentration on in-house work. 
Ultimately the FMS may produce one third of the company’s suitable 
small turned parts.
At the time of interview the FMS was still very much in the process 
of conversion to new work, with about four-fifths of the adaptive 
process still to be undertaken. Programs for one hundred and seven 
different components had been ’’proved out” for the system, forty of 
which had been written since the change of ownership at the turn of 
1984/85. The time required to change tools, machine settings, etc, 
over between different batches of components is about half an hour. 
The average batch size is approximately fifty.
The FMS is now supervised by a system manager, and there are four 
other personnel employed within the FMS: two direct workers and two 
programmers (one of whom is a temporary addition). The labour
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issues arising in the FMS are comprehensively discussed in the main 
body of the text. The workers are responsible, to the degree they 
feel competent, for minor maintenance on the FMS. More major 
maintenance (machine breakdowns, etc) is the responsibility of the 
company's maintenance department, whose responsibility it will be 
to develop a planned maintenance policy for the FMS.
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APPENDIX TWO: Additional plants visited providing supplementary 
information
i) Overview
A number of other plants were surveyed in addition to the fifteen 
plants supplying the main information in this study. These were 
initially visited as they were believed to be installing flexible 
manufacturing systems meeting the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s definitional criteria. In the event this proved not to 
be so. In two cases (Plants T and X) plans to install FMS had 
become subject to either cancellation or to significant delay and 
revision. In the remaining four cases press reports suggesting the 
purchase of FMSs proved inaccurate when the plants were visited.
The systems seen being operated in these cases consisted of stand­
alone CNC machining centres or DNC systems and, in one case, a CNC 
flow-line.
These plants did however provide some extremely useful background 
information about the use, problems and capabilities of CNC and DNC 
systems in small-batch engineering companies. Further, these plants 
allowed some interesting insights into the difficulties of applying 
FMS (as defined by the DTI) to small-batch production. For these 




Plant T is the home counties headquarters plant of a manufacturer 
of control and instrumentation equipment for power stations. It 
employs approximately 800 people, of whom some 200 are direct 
workers. Sales in 1984 were £24 million.
In 1983 the plant was planning to install a FMS based upon an 
interlinked CNC lathe and machining centre under host computer 
control to produce an undecided number of electrical signature 
transmitter components. An FMS Support Scheme grant was awarded for 
this project. The FMS plans were however scrapped during 1984 after 
the purchase of these two machine tools, which were thus operated 
in a stand-alone fashion. Each machine has its own operator.
Simpler jobs on the machining centre are programmed by manual data 
input, whereas all work on the lathe is programmed thus. Long-term 
plans were afoot to put these machine tools under direct numerical 
control pending the necessary investment funds being granted.
The planned FMS was abandoned for three reasons. Firstly, it was 
felt that too little expertise existed at the time of interview on 
the difficulties of combining machining centres and lathes in FMS, 
especially the materials handling problems. Managers argued that 
the machine tool suppliers had been unwilling to perform enough of 
the necessary developmental work. Secondly, it was argued that the 
plant's batch sizes, mostly less than a hundred and more commonly 
as low as twenty, were too small to allow a reasonable level of
378
system utilisation from an FMS. Lastly, it was felt that too few of 
the plant’s components required operations on both the lathe and 
machining centre to justify interlinking the two.
iii) Plant U
This company is an expanding family-owned machine tool manufacturer 
. based in East Anglia. Most of the output consists of CNC vertical 
milling machines. 1985 sales were £6,500,000 and the firm employs 
roughly 200 workers.
In the period between 1983 and 1986 the company has been 
introducing a CNC transfer line to machine from castings fourteen 
different base, column, saddle, and headstock components for 
machine tools. Reducing lead times on these parts was the main 
reason for the introduction of the system. The system consists of 
two piano mills, CNC milling machine, a slideway grinding machine, 
CNC milling / drilling machine and induction hardening facilities. 
All tools were of the company's own make, or bought secondhand and 
reconditioned in-house. Transport of parts within the system is the 
task of cable-operated wheeled trolleys. The system is not under 
direct numerical control and therefore no government grant from the 
FMS Support Scheme was available. The system is staffed by three 
workers on each of the two shifts run. Part programs are written 
and edited by the company's own specialised programmers.
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iv) Plant V
This company Is a small home counties manufacturer of drinks- 
dispensing equipment such as handpumps. It employs some 200 people 
and its turnover In 1985 was £5.250,000.
The system studied was^  supplied on a turn-key basis by a German 
company, and consists of four bar-fed CNC lathes under direct 
numerical control. The lathes are in two groups of two, one being 
used for initial cutting and the other group for second operations. 
The DNC system is used to machine a variety of the company’s turned 
components. The system's main aims are to reduce setting-up times 
for low batch size runs and to overcome a shortage of skilled 
labour which was felt to be holding back the expansion of 
production.
The company has never had a separate programming department and, 
for this reason, control of the DNC system is entirely devolved to 
craft-trained personnel. Six skilled setter/operators have been 
trained to program and operate the system.
v) Plant X
Plant X is a northern machine tool manufacturer, and for some years 
part of a group with various interests in machine tools. 
Considerable rationalisation and retrenchment was taking place 
within the group during the period of fieldwork. The company's
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speciality is very large general purpose CNC milling machines, of 
which four main types are produced. Sales in 1984 totalled £12 
million and the firm has 390 employees.
The company originated a plan in mid-1983 to build an FMS to 
machine twelve large parts (such as columns, rams and gearboxes) 
for its range of machine tools. The main aims were to cut the level 
of work in progress f increase machine utilisation and reduce set-up 
times. The system was to comprise two of the company's own CNC 
milling machines linked by a rail-guided vehicle and under direct 
numerical control. One of these machining centres would be the 
first phase of the FMS.
At the time of interview these original FMS plans were in a state 
of suspension. It appeared that the development of the system had 
been rushed with a view to exhibition of the FMS at a machine tool 
show in 1984. Interviewees now thought however that the initial 
design concept was too grandiose, and the project was being 
replanned with a view to the eventual installation of a rather 
smaller scale system.
vi) Plant Y
This firm is a southern England manufacturer of tobacco- and 
cigarette-processing machinery. It is owned by an American 
multinational company which keeps tight budgetary control over this 
subsidiary. Rationalisation measures affecting design, assembly and
381
inventory-holding were under way at the time of interview. The 
company has 65O employees on the site, of whom 212 are directly 
productive. Its sales were £38 million in 1983*
Inaccurate press reports suggested that the company was intending 
to link a number of horizontal CNC machining centres to form an 
FMS. In the event only stand-alone machine tools were planned. The 
machine tools studied included two new German horizontal CNC 
machining centres with dual pallets and automatic tool change. 
These were staffed by an operator on each shift. Programming was 
carried out off the shopfloor by part programmers although 
operators helped to edit these. Also studied was one CNC vertical 
milling machine, also with automatic tool change, which (unusually 
for this company) was programmed by manual data input.
vii) Plant Z
The plant is an engineering subcontractor in the home counties, 
specialising mostly in aerospace and defence work. It has five 
hundred employees and sales in 1982 (the most recent figure 
available) of £10 million.
At this firm a DNC link was gradually being installed to ten of the 
CNC machine tools on the shopfloor. Interlinking of materials 
handling was considered out of the question because of the small 
batch sizes and continually changing nature of the jobs machined.
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The machine tools studied at this firm included an advanced 
Japanese horizontal machining centre with quintuple pallet change, 
adaptive control, a three hundred tool magazine and computer 
controlled Inspection facilities. Many of these "automatic” 
features were not actually used in practice, partly because of the 
time required to programme them and also because of a lack of 
technical knowledge within the firm as to how they worked fully. 
Also studied were two vertical CNG machining centres with limited 
automatic tool change and a horizontal machining centre without 
this facility. All of these tools were staffed by skilled 
machinists. Programs were constructed away from the shopfloor but 
operators were permitted to edit programs.
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APPENDIX THREE: Reasons for FMS Introduction, and types of 
flexibility demonstrated by FMS case study plants
PLANT A
MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS 
Reduction of lead times








Yes. Little need to retool system due to high 
overall tool capacity.
Yes. Production of components in batches of one. 
Minimal because very limited tooling duplication 
between machines. Now receiving attention.
Probably, but at present running significantly 
below capacity.
No room for expansion.
Yes. Some modification undertaken, particularly as 
result of poor programs and materials supplied. 




MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS
Rationalisation of machine shop facilities between sites to benefit 
from economies of scale and updated technology.
Increased overall control of production process by extension of* DNC 
and machining in-house.








Yes, but currently limited due to high tooling 




In practice production requirements are of fixed 
volume.
Yes
Theoretically yes, but in practice part 





MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS
Cut inventory and work in progress by production in sets
Cut indirect labour costs
Further reduce unit cost of components








Yes. Need for toolchanging considerably reduced by 




Yes. Being expanded as finance becomes available. 
Yes, although unknown if used.
Yes, although new products are of same basic type.
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PLANT D
MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS 
Manufacture for following day's assembly requirements
TYPE OF FLEXIBILITY DEMONSTRATED
Machine Yes. Considerable tooling duplication
. Mix Yes. Production in sets as necessary
Routing Yes. Identical machine tools and tooling.
Volume Yes.
Size Room for further expansion unlikely
Modification Yes. Minor design modifications incorporated during




MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS
Cut inventory and work in progress by production in sets
Cut labour cost
Improve quality standards









Probably, but not known wheter this is used in 
practice.
Yes. Identical machine tools and tooling.
Yes.
No
Yes. Unforeseen design changes to pumps 
incorporated. "Master family programming" macro 
facility eliminates need for full reprogramming 




MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS 
In-house demonstration of FMS capabilities 
Reduced lead times 
Reduced batch sizes









Not at time of interview
Not at time of interview, but will be available 
when second machine tool added.
At present running below capacity.
Limited scope for expansion because little space 
available to house additional pallets and fixtures 
Unknown if used
Limited (see size flexibility above).
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PLANT G
MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS
«*
Increased control over production process
Ability to expand machining capacity at low labour and
organisational cost








Limited by low tooling capacities
No
No
Yes in theory, but almost always unit production in 
practice.
No
Yes. Macro facility eliminates need for full 
reprogramming when new seal designs introduced.
Also rapid ability to modify existing programs, 




MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS
Reduce economic batch quantity
Reduce throughput times
Increase levels of machine utilisation
Increased control over labour and production process








Yes. Toolchanging possible while machine tool 
cutting.
Limited. Policy decision to minimise number and 
variation of pallets in system at any one time.
Yes (but see mix flexibility above)
Limited.
Yes
Yes. Part redesigns and prototype components can be 
incorporated. However, part modifications are 
limited by need for National Coal Board approval of 
modifications.
Limited to new ranges of valve.
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PLANT J
MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS 
In-house demonstration of FMS capabilities 
Reduction of work in progress 
Modernisation of production facilities
TYPE OF FLEXIBILITY DEMONSTRATED
Machine Yes
Mix Not used at present
Routing Yes
Volume Unknown
Size Being expanded as finance becomes available
Modification Yes, but not known if used in practice




MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS
Reduce economic batch quantities to adjust to smaller volume market 
Improve product quality 
Reduce labour costs
TYPE OF FLEXIBILITY DEMONSTRATED
Limited in practice 
No 
No
Yes (although batch sizes high by FMS standards) 
Plans for expansion in medium-term future 
Yes, but not yet used in practice 
Yes, because components currently produced are not 
those originally planned. At present no known plans 











MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS
Increase machine utilisation, introduce ^ unattended running
TYPE OF FLEXIBILITY DEMONSTRATED





Modification Yes, but unknown if used in practice




MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS 
Increase control over production by machining in-house 
Manufacture according to needs of following week’s assembly 
requirements








Limited. Rationalisation of tooling has reduced 




Yes (although batch sizes high by FMS standards) 
Yes. Intended to be able to expand or contract 
system as necessary.
Yes




MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS 
Reduce set-up times 
Reduce economic batch quantity 
Increase machine utilisation
TYPE OF FLEXIBILITY DEMONSTRATED
Machine Yes. Aided by central tool delivery
Mix Yes
Routing Yes
Volume Limited due lack of fixture duplication
Size Being expanded as finance becomes available
Modification Unknown if used
Product Yes, but limited in practice by fixture costs
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PLANT P
MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS 
Reduce inventory and work in progress 
Increase machine utilisation 
Reduce labour requirements 
Familiarisation with FMS technology




Volume Production level requirements per month fixed
Size No
Modification Yes, but in practice part specifications are fixed
by Ministry of Defence requirements.




MAIN STATED AIMS FOR INTRODUCTION OF FMS
Originally: experimental and demonstration FMS; reduction of 
throughput times.
Now: proof of commercial justification of FMS; increased machine 
utilisation








First operation lathes very flexible. Set-up times 
on second operation machines high. Second operation 
machine tools due to be modified or changed at time 
of interview to increase flexibility.
Yes
Yes, on first operation lathes. Not on second 
operation machine tools.
Limited
Yes, within limitations of site.
Yes
Yes, within certain families of parts.
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